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Professor, Department of Health Administration 
 
 
 
By using a natural experiment approach and longitudinal national hospital data, 
this study sheds light on the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership 
forms by comparing their relative reductions in HH provision after the implementation of 
the BBA. The empirical findings reveal that for-profit hospitals behave differently as 
compared to public and private nonprofit hospitals, due to their different operational 
objectives. While the response of for-profit hospitals is consistent with the 
profit-maximizer model, both public and private nonprofit ownership types behave 
consistently in accordance with the model of two-good producers whose objective is to 
maximize market outputs for meeting the health care needs of the community, given the 
break-even requirement. This finding provides support for the tax exemption the United 
States government has granted private nonprofit hospitals. 
Although the response patterns of the nonprofit ownership types are in general 
similar, this study found that, contrary to expectation, religious hospitals were more 
likely than secular nonprofit hospitals to have reduced HH provision after the BBA. 
Further studies are needed to explore the difference in operational behaviors between 
these two ownership types. 
Built on previous related studies and applying a more comprehensive set of 
independent and control variables with improved data sources, this study is able to 
examine the effects of certain organizational and market factors on hospital offering of 
HH care pre-BBA and the change in the provision of HH care in the six years following 
the implementation of the BBA. Hospital proportion of Medicare patients, hospital size, 
total profit margin, case mix index, elderly density in the market are found to be positive 
determinants of a hospital‘s likelihood of offering HH care. However, these 
organizational and market factors, in general, play a non-significant role in influencing 
hospitals‘ changes in HH care provision after the implementation of the BBA. In the 
study, explanations and implications of these finding are discussed. Finally, potential 
limitations to this study and opportunities for future research are addressed.
  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Study Problem 
The primary goal of this study is to shed light on how the objective functions of 
hospitals with different ownership types differ by comparing their responses to changes 
in payment policies following enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. This Act 
created a natural experiment by imposing differential financial incentives on hospitals 
with different ownership types. Of particular interest is the change in hospital provision 
of one particular post-acute care service: home health care.    
During the period 1980 to 1997, the number of hospital-based post-acute care (PAC) 
services in the United States increased dramatically. Two major reasons for the increase 
were: (1) to meet the needs of the growing elderly population, and (2) to respond to the 
1983 implementation of prospective reimbursement in the form of Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) in the hospital sector for patients covered by Medicare. DRGs created 
major pressure on hospitals to shorten hospital stays and contain costs (Morrisey, Sloan, 
and Valvona, 1988; Shortell, Gillies, and Devers, 1995; Kane, Kane, and Ladd, 1998:35). 
Hospital provision of PAC services—such as home health (HH) or nursing home 
(NH) care—is viewed by many researchers and managers as an effective integration 
strategy for hospitals (Hughes and Renehan, 2005; Robinson, 1994; Dansky, Milliron, 
and Gamm, 1996). By integrating with PAC facilities and providing PAC services on its 
1 
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own a hospital would not only ensure the smooth transfer of patients to PAC facilities and 
reduce lengths of stay and related costs (Chiu, 1995), but it would also bring in revenues 
from sources other than acute care. This strategy was especially successful as PAC 
services were not included in the prospective payment either by public payers (Medicare 
and Medicaid) or private payers (private LTC insurance companies or out-of-pocket 
payers). Consequently, the percentage of hospitals having a NH unit rose from 9 percent 
in 1972 to 21 percent in 1990 (Robinson, 1996). The number of total Medicare-certified 
HH agencies (HHAs) increased from 2,924 to 10,444 between 1980 and 1997 (NAHCH, 
2008). The ratio of the number of Medicare-certified hospital-based HHAs to the number 
of total Medicare-certified HHAs grew from 12.3 percent in 1980 to 30.1 percent in 2000 
(NAHCH, 2008). 
However, this hospital diversification/integration strategy was seriously challenged 
by the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). This Act resulted in a 
reduction in Medicare payments for hospital-based PAC services, particularly HH care. 
Most researchers and managers agree that the BBA dramatically changed the 
environment in which HHAs operate (Horwitz, 2005a; Fennell and Campbell, 2007). 
While profitable or potentially profitable prior to passage of the BBA, most HH services 
have become unprofitable since the implementation of the BBA. Studies have reported 
that many hospitals started dropping HHAs after the BBA (Paone and Mullen, 2005, 
Horwitz, 2005a). The number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs declined from 
2,698 to 2,151 between 1997 and 2000, and by 2007, there was a further decline to 1,503 
(NAHCH, 2008). 
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The changes instituted by the BBA provide an opportunity for researchers to 
examine hospital-based HH services by ownership type under different reimbursement 
conditions. The aim of this study is to examine whether the implementation of the BBA 
resulted in changes in the provision of HH services among hospitals of different 
ownership types. 
Background 
Home Health Care 
Although HH care has only accounted for less than 3 percent of total personal 
health care expenditures in the U.S. (Poisal et al., 2007), HH care serves the greatest 
number of people among the continuum of LTC services. In 2000, U.S. HH programs 
discharged about 7.2 million people. The number of patients receiving HH care at a given 
point of time is estimated to be 1.4 million (Feldman, Nadash, and Gursen, 2005).  
The U.S. HH care industry grew rapidly in the past decades largely due to the 
growing number of the elderly, public funding and policy, popular demand, and 
technological advances that promote complicated care at home (Hughes and Renehan, 
2005). Both the absolute capacity and relative importance of HH grew significantly. 
Between 1970 and 1997, HH expenditures increased from $0.2 billion to $34.5 billion, 
and the share of total health expenditures accounted for by HH rose from 0.3 percent to 
3.2 percent (Levit, Smith, Cowan, Lazenby, and Martin, 2002). According to the National 
Association of Home Care and Hospice (NAHCH), the number of Medicare certified 
HHAs increased from 1,753 in 1967 to a peak of 10,444 in 1997, dropped to 6,861 in 
2001, and gradually rose again to 9,284 in 2007 (NAHCH, 2008). 
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The vast majority of HH consumers are people age 65 or over, accounting for 
approximately 86 percent of total HH care recipients (NAHCH, 2008). As the population 
continues to age, the need for HH care is projected to grow (Hughes and Renehan, 2005). 
In addition, some scholars have suggested that HH care is preferred over institutional care 
because home care is not only less costly but also more comfortable and accommodating, 
and more able to foster the greatest possible independence from the perspective of the 
care recipients (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2009). 
Hospital Provision of Home Health Services 
Social expectations have been rising that U.S. hospitals and healthcare systems 
would become more integrated, seamless, patient-centered, efficient, and cost-effective 
organizations (Shortell et al., 1995; Institute of Medicine, 2001, Evashwick, 2005; 
Griffith and White, 2007). Although general short-term community hospitals serve people 
of all ages and with all types of diagnoses and conditions, a significant fraction of 
patients they treat are older adults and people with chronic conditions. People age 65 or 
over account for about 12 percent of the U.S. population, but they represent about 46 
percent of inpatient admissions. It is common that elderly patients often need PAC 
following their discharges from the hospital (Paone and Mullen, 2005). 
As mentioned earlier, hospital provision of HH services has been viewed by many 
researchers and managers as an effective integration or diversification strategy for 
hospitals to adapt for survival under prospective payment reimbursement based on DRGs. 
For hospitals, to own or provide in-house HH services afforded control over the process 
for discharging patients to PAC, thus reducing the uncertainty of managing patients‘ 
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length of stay. The number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs increased 
dramatically from 359 in 1980 to 2,698 in 1997. During the same period, the ratio of the 
number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs to the number of total 
Medicare-certified HHAs grew from 12.3 percent to 25.8 percent (NAHCH, 2008). 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 was enacted to control the growth of 
Medicare spending and to offer Medicare beneficiaries additional choice for care through 
private health plans (MedPAC, 2000). The BBA affected Medicare reimbursement 
payments for hospital inpatient and outpatient services as well as PAC services such as 
HH and NH care. For hospital inpatient services, the Act froze base payment in fiscal 
year 1998 and reduced updates in subsequent years. The BBA also enacted a new policy 
intended to limit early transfer of patients from hospitals inpatient to PAC settings. The 
BBA lowered the adjustment for indirect medical education to teaching hospitals, reduced 
the adjustment received by hospitals that treat a disproportional share of low-income 
patients, and lowered capital payment rates for hospitals (MedPAC, 2000). 
With respect to hospital outpatient services, the BBA created a new prospective 
payment system (PPS) that pays predetermined amounts for services that are similar 
clinically and in their use of resources (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2009c). The hospital outpatient PPS went into effect on August 1, 2000. 
The Act transformed Medicare PAC reimbursement payment from a retrospective 
cost-based system to a system of fixed daily rates (Feldman, Nadash, and Gursen, 2002). 
The new policy mandated that NHs receive a case-mix-adjusted, all-inclusive per diem 
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rate for each Medicare resident starting on July 1 of 1998. A classification system was 
designed to assign each Medicare resident into one of the 44 different resource utilization 
groups (RUGs) on which NHs are reimbursed. The per diem rates cover all services 
including medications, laboratory tests, supplies, and rehabilitation therapies (Angelelli, 
Gifford, Intrator, Gozalo, Laliberte, and Mor, 2002). In other words, while DRGs are 
used for the reimbursement of hospital inpatient care, RUGs are used to pay for care 
provided by NHs for Medicare beneficiaries. Therefore, RUGs have had a financial 
impact on NHs similar to the effect DRGs have had on hospitals since the mid-1980s. In 
addition, prior to the BBA, hospital-based NHs received higher payment rates from 
Medicare than did their freestanding counterparts. The differential payment scheme was 
gradually eliminated in a three-year period (Angelelli et al., 2002). That is, for hospitals 
providing NH care, NH PPS (RUGs) was phased in beginning July 1, 1998, and became 
fully implemented in July 1, 2001. 
Similarly, the BBA significantly changed Medicare payment to HH programs. The 
BBA also mandated that a PPS should be developed for the reimbursement of HH 
services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. However, while the new system was being 
developed, an Interim Payment System (IPS) was put in place to control the growing 
expenses of HH care. The IPS was phased in beginning October 1997 for Medicare HH 
reimbursement with the start of each agency‘s cost reporting period. The system became 
fully implemented one year later. Under the IPS, HHA reimbursement was constrained by 
both an aggregate per-visit cost limitation and by aggregate per-beneficiary cost limits 
(McCall, Petersons, Moore, and Korb, 2003). 
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The HH PPS was not established until the fourth quarter of 2000. Effective October 
1, 2000, the HH PPS replaced the IPS for all HH agencies. While the IPS did not take 
into account the clinical condition of a beneficiary, the new HH PPS adjusted for health 
conditions and care needs of the beneficiary. Similar to the mechanism used in the NH 
and hospital inpatient/outpatient PPSs, the HH PPS also adjusted for geographic 
differences in wages for HHAs across the country. The adjustment for clinical 
characteristics and service needs of the beneficiary is referred to as case-mix adjustment. 
The HH PPS provides HHAs with payments for each 60-day episode of care for each 
beneficiary. If a beneficiary is still eligible for care after the end of the first episode, a 
second episode can begin; there are no limits to the number of episodes a beneficiary who 
remains eligible for the HH benefit can receive. In addition to the case-mix adjustment, a 
special outlier provision exists to ensure appropriate payment for beneficiaries who have 
the most expensive care needs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2009b). 
These adjustments, which were not present in the IPS, were made to ensure that all 
beneficiaries, even the sickest, have access to HH services for which they are eligible. In 
short, HH reimbursement is a little more generous under HH PPS than under the IPS. 
Because of the issues that were illuminated by the excessive payment reductions 
resulting from the BBA, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 was passed by Congress to lessen the financial impacts 
brought about by the BBA on healthcare providers including hospitals, NHs, and HHAs. 
In general, BBRA softened payment reductions, extended periods for implementing 
payment-cutting policies, or placed a moratorium on service caps with the intention that 
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these cost control policies would not cause harm to beneficiaries‘ access to high-quality 
health care. It was estimated that the amount of payment increase resulting from the 
BBRA totaled $6.8 billion, $2.7 billion, and $1.3 billion for the hospital, NH, and HH 
sectors, respectively (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999). 
The timeline of the implementation of the related HH payment policies mandated 
by the BBA discussed above is shown in Figure 1. In this study, years 1997 through 2003 
are selected to form the study period since the reimbursement policies of interest 
occurred and took effect during this period. At the end of 2003, the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 was enacted that created a policy environment different from 
the study period for operations of hospitals and HHAs. Thus, the years between 1997 and 
2003 are used for the comparison of hospital provision of HH services. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Timeline of the Implementation of the BBA Policies Related to Home 
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HH Agencies in the Post-BBA Era 
Medicare has been the major payer for HH services, accounting about 30 percent of 
total HH revenues, followed by Medicaid which contributed about 20 percent of total HH 
revenues in 2000 (Hughes and Renehan, 2005). Thus, the expectation of HHAs for 
continued and increasing Medicare reimbursement was seriously eroded by the BBA that 
transformed a cost-based, fee-for-service payment system to the restricted schemes for 
Medicare HH payment. After the implementation of the BBA, HHAs had to bear the 
financial risk of taking care of Medicare patients with certain probabilities that the care 
provided to a Medicare patient would cost more than the reimbursement rates for that 
patient. HHA statistics show that roughly one-third of all Medicare-certified HHAs 
closed in the three years following the implementation of the BBA. The number of all 
Medicare-certified HHAs declined from 10,444 in 1997 to 7,152 in 2003, a reduction of 
31.5 percent (NAHCH, 2008). 
Issues Raised by the BBA Concerning Hospital Provision of Post-Acute Care 
As described earlier, the strategy used by hospitals to diversify into or integrate with 
PAC services was seriously challenged by the enactment of the BBA. After the BBA, a 
decline of hospital-based HHAs was reported. The reduction in the number of 
hospital-based HH programs raises critical questions concerning the continuum and 
access of care and the availability of PAC beds after acute-care hospitalization (MedPAC, 
2000; Angelelli et al., 2002; McCall, Petersons, Moores, and Korb, 2003; Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2009). The growing demand for HH, coupled with fewer 
hospital-sponsored HHAs, raises the potential issue of access of hospital patients to 
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needed HH services. Therefore, it is important to examine which organizational and 
market factors would be related to hospitals‘ decisions to reduce their LTC provision in 
facing tightened reimbursements. 
If hospitals of different ownership forms react to the changing reimbursement 
environment differently based on their mission and goals and this translates into their 
respective objective functions, this raises the question, ―Does ownership matter as 
hospitals reevaluate their HH programs post-BBA?‖ If yes, ―which ownership types are 
more or less likely to stop provision of HH services following implementation of BBA?‖ 
In addition, decisions on service provision are important strategic issues for health 
care organizations (Porter and Teisberg, 2006). Health care organizations (HCOs) should 
consider multiple factors in deciding to provide or drop a particular service. A 
comprehensive examination of the provision and change of HH services by hospitals 
needs to take these factors into account. 
Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
The specific aim of this study is to shed light on the objective function of hospitals 
by examining how they change their provision of HH services in response to a change in 
financial incentives, and to explore the relevant factors that influence hospital provision 
of HH services. Specifically, this study is intended to answer the following two questions: 
1) What were the relative changes in hospital provision of HH care among public, 
religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals after the implementation of 
the BBA? 
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2) What are the organizational and market factors that are associated with hospital 
provision of HH care before and after the BBA? 
In this study, public hospitals refer to those hospitals owned and operated by 
government including state, county, and city governments. For-profit hospitals are private, 
investor-owned hospitals controlled on a for-profit and tax-eligible basis by an individual, 
partnership, or a profit-making corporation. Nonprofit hospitals are defined as 
nongovernment hospitals controlled by tax-exempt organizations, including religious 
organizations, community hospitals, cooperative hospitals, hospitals operated by fraternal 
societies, and so on (American Hospital Association, 2009a). 
One unique aspect of this study is the further division of nonprofit hospitals into 
religious and secular hospitals which, in theory, may have different motivations and 
operation behaviors. Religious hospitals, such as Catholic hospitals, play an important 
role in the U.S. health care system for the capacity and volume of care they provide as 
well as the type of populations they serve. For instance, religious hospitals account for 
approximately 14 percent of total hospital beds in the U.S. (calculated from the 2007 
American Hospital Association survey file). Religious hospitals are also expected to offer 
more services to vulnerable populations such as the poor and the uninsured in their 
communities due to their charitable purposes. Given the uniqueness of religious hospitals 
and the limited literature exploring the potential differences between religious hospitals 
and other ownership types, it is worth separating religious from secular nonprofit 
hospitals in health service research. 
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Significance of the Current Study 
Ownership type may influence the objective function of the institution and hence its 
response to change in the health care market. The implementation of the BBA provides an 
opportunity for researchers to examine how for-profit, religious nonprofit, secular 
nonprofit, and public hospitals operating hospital-based HHAs responded to a new 
national policy. Differential responses might suggest different underlying motives, 
objectives, or operating utility models for hospitals with different ownership structures.  
As discussed above, the BBA changed the financial condition in which HH services 
operate. While HH services were generally profitable prior to the BBA, they became 
relatively unprofitable after the BBA. Therefore, the relative change of hospital provision 
of HH services among hospitals with different ownership structures would help identify 
the role financial incentives play in the decision to offer such services.   
The answers to these questions have several important implications. First, the 
general public should be interested in knowing whether health care providers such as 
hospitals of all kinds are indeed operating on a for-profit basis. This issue is particularly 
relevant in a time of health care reform. For example, when commenting on the 2009 U.S. 
health reform proposed by President Obama and Congress, Dr. Marcia Angell argues that 
―We are the only advanced country in the world that has chosen to leave health care to the 
tender mercies of a panoply of for-profit businesses, whose purpose is to maximize 
income and not to provide health. And that's exactly what they do‖ (Public Broadcasting 
Service, 2009). This study should be able to shed light on this comment by revealing the 
objectives of U.S. hospitals. 
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From the perspective of policymakers, it is important to know whether there were 
undesirable changes in the capacity of hospital-based HHAs after the implementation of 
the BBA. A significant reduction in the number of hospital-based HHAs can lead to a 
serious problem of PAC accessibility for needed patients. Policy makers may also be 
interested in knowing how other factors influence provision of HH services and how 
these other factors may interact with the BBA in determining hospital provision of HH 
services. As the population ages, the importance of HH services will continue to rise. 
Thus, the change in the capacity of HH services resulting from a particular policy like the 
BBA should be a major interest to policy makers. In addition, this study provides an 
examination of the issue of interest for an extended period of time. Most of the previous 
studies on the change in services brought about by the BBA focused on the period 
from1997 to 2000. Very few published studies have explored the issue beyond 2000. A 
study considering a longer period of time gives policy makers more information 
regarding the profound and dynamic impact of the BBA. 
For hospital managers, this study offers empirical evidence showing how hospitals 
in their ownership sector responded to the BBA in provision of HH care compared to 
other ownership types. It also analyzes hospital decisions about HH services post-BBA, 
as well as identifies other key factors associated with those decisions. 
In addition, this study is a first attempt to adopt a multi-theoretical framework for 
exploring how hospital provision of HH services changed post-BBA. As will be 
discussed later, this study integrates theoretical perspectives from economics, resource 
dependence theory, transaction cost economics, institutional theory, and population 
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ecology. Hence, a multi-theoretical model for identifying the potential behavioral 
difference among hospitals with various ownerships including the religious and secular 
nonprofits was developed and tested. The conceptual model contributes to the possibility 
of revealing a comprehensive set of strategic considerations and market factors 
influencing hospitals‘ decisions to provide HH services before and after the 
implementation of the BBA. 
Overview of Conceptual Framework 
Based on the assumption that hospitals should consider multiple factors in addition 
to financial incentives in deciding whether or not to offer or discontinue certain services, 
and in responding to changes in the environment, this study adopts a conceptual 
framework based on a number of major constructs drawn from economic models and 
several organization theories. Specifically, economic models of nonprofit organizations 
proposed by Weisbrod (1988) as well as resource dependence, institutional, population 
ecology perspectives and transaction cost economics are applied to form the conceptual 
framework and to guide the development of study hypotheses. 
Weisbrod‘s models focus on the underlining objectives and resulting behaviors of 
nonprofit organizations. He suggests that nonprofit organizations may be ―for-profits in 
disguise‖ whose objectives and behaviors are not different from their for-profit 
counterparts. Weisbrod also posits that a nonprofit institution can be a ―two-good 
producer‖ which offers mission and revenue goods at the same time. The last model 
Weisbrod proposes is ―inefficient profit maximizers‖ in which nonprofits have the same 
objectives while they differ in behaviors from for-profit organizations. These models 
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provide a relevant framework for studying the objective function of hospitals with 
different ownership forms. This study argues that the two-good model, inefficient profit 
maximizer model, and a mission-good-only model fit religious, secular, and public 
hospitals, respectively. These models thus are used to predict the behaviors of hospitals of 
certain ownership types in changing HH care provision after the BBA. 
 Hospitals‘ changes in HH provision in response to the implementation of the BBA 
can be viewed as a typical example of organizations‘ reactions to changes in the 
environment. Resource dependence, institutional and population ecology theories and 
transaction cost economics are organization theories commonly applied to the 
examination and prediction of the interaction between the organization and its 
environment. Each theory provides a unique set of constructs referring to specific 
hospital considerations closely associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of changing HH 
provision in response to the major reimbursement reduction for HH services brought 
about by the BBA. These considerations can be understood as filters that carry over or 
filter out the need for or desire of hospitals to change HH provision post-BBA. The 
objectives of hospitals predicted by the ownership models can be viewed as a prism that 
differentiates the responses of hospitals with different ownership forms to the 
implementation of the BBA. A simplified conceptual model based on the discussion is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Scope and Approach 
In this study, the population includes all U.S. non-federal, acute-care general hospitals 
that operate in the 50 states and District of Columbia. The sample used for analysis is  
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Figure 2. A Conceptual Model of Hospitals‘ Changes in HH Provision Post-BBA 
composed of hospitals reporting to the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Surveys of hospitals between 1997 and 2003. The unit of analysis is an individual 
hospital in a particular year in the study period. 
This analysis applies a study design comparable to a natural experiment where the 
implementation of the BBA serves as an intervention, and public hospitals serve as the 
control group, and other ownership types of hospitals are study groups. With this design, 
the changes in HH provision among the ownership types are compared. The econometric 
approach applied for data analysis is difference-in-difference estimation with a data form 
of independently pooled cross-sections. This analytical approach has been used by 
researchers to conduct policy evaluations. 
The study data are formed by merging relevant datasets with needed information in 
the years of study. The datasets employed include AHA annual survey files, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital cost report files, CMS case-mix index 
files, and Area Resource Files (ARF). These datasets are created and maintained by 
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public or professional institutions to facilitate health services research and have been 
widely used. However, data management and cleaning efforts are needed before the 
merged data can be analyzed because there are missing values as well as outliers in the 
original datasets. 
This study reports descriptive statistics and correlations of major study variables. 
Bivariate and multivariate analyses of the relationships of interest are presented. The 
predicted probability of offering HH services for hospitals with four different hospital 
ownership types is then plotted overtime. Finally, results of hypothesis testing and 
implications of the findings are discussed. 
Conclusion and Outline of Remaining Chapters 
This chapter introduces the study conducted in this dissertation. The background of 
hospital provision of HH care, the nature of the BBA, and the possible impact of the BBA 
on the provision of HH are described. Research aims and questions are proposed in 
exploring the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership types and the 
factors associated with their changes in HH provision post-BBA. Also, the rationale and 
importance of conducting this study are explained. Finally, the theoretical framework, 
focus and methods adopted are briefly summarized. 
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature on how objective functions of 
organizations can be measured. The literature on relationships between hospital 
ownership and service provision, hospital changes in PAC service provision (in particular, 
HH care) after the BBA, and determinants of hospital provision of PAC services are also 
reviewed in the second chapter. In Chapter 3, the description of the multi-theoretical 
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framework is presented, as well as a brief description of each theoretical perspective. 
Hypotheses are proposed based on theoretical constructs and existing empirical evidence. 
In Chapter 4, the research design, description and sources of data are presented. This 
chapter provides variables and measurements used in the study, as well as the 
econometric analysis plan. Results in narrative and tabular form are presented in Chapter 
5. The last chapter provides the conclusion of hypothesis testing and policy implications 
of this study. Finally, potential limitations and future suggestions are discussed.
  
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
This chapter reviews previous empirical studies aimed to explore objective 
functions of hospitals and the relationship between the implementation of the BBA and 
hospital provision of HH care. The first section discusses the measures used by previous 
studies to study the objective function of the healthcare organization (HCO). Discovering 
objective functions of hospitals is the primary interest of this study. Thus, the selection 
and application of a valid measure that can reflect the objectives of hospitals are critical 
to this study. The second section briefly summarizes the findings concerning the effect of 
hospital ownership on service provision. This dissertation hypothesizes that hospitals of 
different ownership types have different objectives, as reflected by providing different 
types of services. The third section synthesizes the existing evidence showing the change 
in utilization, outcomes, and hospital provision of certain PAC services after the 
implementation of the BBA. The fourth section specifically discusses some primary 
findings concerning the initial changes in utilization and hospital provision of HH care 
post-BBA. The last section reviews the factors found by researchers to be associated with 
hospital provision of PAC services. Some of these factors provide insights in formulating 
some of the study measures and can be reevaluated by the results of this study. The 
empirical findings reviewed in this chapter provide an important foundation on which 
this study can be built and extended. 
19 
20 
 
Measurement of the Objective Function of Health Care Organizations (HCOs) 
In this study, a HCO‘s objective function is defined as the organization‘s goal in 
terms of profit orientations. The objective function of a for-profit HCO is to maximize its 
profit. On the other hand, a nonprofit HCO‘s objective function should reflect its 
considerations other than profit. However, this statement of objective function about 
nonprofits is often arguable. Health economists have proposed many different models to 
explain the behaviors and underlying objectives of nonprofit HCOs (Newhouse, 1970; 
Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1988). 
The continuation of the argument about the objective function of nonprofit HCOs 
among different theoretical models may be in part because HCOs‘ objectives in general 
cannot be directly observed. Thus, researchers have applied a number of approaches to 
measure HCOs‘ observable behaviors that may reflect their objective functions. For 
example, Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) use the patient average length of stay (LOS) as 
an indicator of the extent to which a hospice is intended to maximize profit under a 
Medicare flat fixed payment scheme. The Medicare hospice reimbursement method 
creates an incentive encouraging maximization of patient LOS. Thus, hospices operating 
on a for-profit basis should have a strong incentive to selectively admit patients with 
longer expected LOS, and admit patients sooner after a hospital discharge. The study 
found that for-profit hospices are significantly more likely than religious nonprofit 
hospices to admit patients with longer, more profitable, expected LOS. In terms of the 
timing of admission, no significant difference between the two ownership types was 
found. 
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An HCO‘s objective function may be viewed as a parallel to the utility function of 
an individual. In this regard, the approach used by Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) is 
similar to that applied by Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) who used the length of time 
(in weeks) that an injured worker receives workers‘ compensation to study the response 
of workers to the change in financial incentives brought about by new worker 
compensation laws. Meyer and colleagues (1995) studied the change of injured workers‘ 
compensation and injury duration after the implementation of new workers‘ 
compensation policies in the states of Michigan and Kentucky. The policies increased 
maximum weekly benefits of workers‘ compensation, creating an incentive for 
high-earning individuals to lengthen their injury duration and benefit amount. After 
controlled for worker age, marital status, gender, industry, and severity of the injury, 
results show that the increase in injury duration is greater for high-earning workers than 
for low-earning workers by 16.2 percent and 20.3 percent in Kentucky and Michigan, 
respectively. The difference in compensation duration increase in Kentucky is significant 
at the 0.05 level. 
In a recent stream of studies, Weisbrod and colleagues applied managerial rewards 
or compensation structures in revealing the objective functions of hospitals of different 
ownership types (Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999; Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Erus and 
Weisbrod, 2003). For example, Ballou and Weisbrod (2003) employed the data collected 
in 1992 to compare the compensation schemes of CEOs among governmental, religious 
nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals. They found not only significant 
differences in these aspects between for-profit hospitals and other nonprofit hospitals 
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(including governmental hospitals), but also clear contrasts among religious, secular, and 
governmental nonprofit ownership forms. 
Compared to for-profit hospitals, nonprofit and public hospitals as a whole paid 
significantly more base salary (except for public hospitals that paid insignificantly fewer 
base salary) and less bonus, had lower ratio of bonus to base salary, lower probability of 
offering bonus incentives and rewarding financial performance, and higher probability of 
rewarding quality of care for their CEO compensation. Compared to secular nonprofits, 
religious nonprofits paid significantly more base salary, had lower probability of offering 
bonus incentives but higher probability of rewarding care quality. Religious hospitals 
paid significantly more salary, and had higher probability of offering bonus incentives as 
well as rewarding care quality, as compared with their governmental counterparts. Finally, 
compared to public hospitals, secular nonprofit hospitals paid significantly more base 
salary and bonus, had higher bonus to base salary ratio, and higher probability of offering 
bonus incentives. The authors concluded that there are indeed differences in objective 
functions and/or constraints among the institutional forms, reflecting by their contrasting 
CEO compensation schemes. The paper thus calls for a more general model that 
differentiates the objective functions of nonprofit hospitals in the three ownership forms. 
Some researchers have also employed quality indicators of HCOs as a reflection of 
accomplishing objectives of organizations (Grabowski, 2001; Chou, 2002; Spector, 
Selden, and Cohen, 1998; Harrington, Zimmerman, Karon, Robinson, and Beutel, 2000). 
This approach is based on the assumption that health care providers such as hospitals or 
nursing homes are able to take advantage of asymmetric information by only meeting the 
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minimum requirement of quality of care in order to minimize operating costs and 
maximize profits. Therefore, a HCO with a nonprofit objective may differentiate itself 
from other profit-maximizing counterparts by providing higher quality of care to the 
patients/clients it serves. For example, Chou (2002) applied the data from 1984, 1989, 
and 1994 National Long-Term Care Survey to investigate the hypothesized difference in 
care quality between for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes. Results of the analysis show 
that the difference became clear when the situation of asymmetric information is present. 
For those cases without a spouse and child visit within 1 month after admission, 
nonprofit NHs had significantly fewer cases in death, dehydration, and urinary tract 
infection, as compared with for-profit homes. In addition, for the residents who are 
cognitively unaware, nonprofit NHs had significantly fewer cases in dehydration and 
urinary tract infection. Interestingly, these two ownership forms did not differ 
significantly in these quality indicators when there were not the asymmetric situations 
specified above, except that nonprofit status is associated with fewer deaths for 
cognitively unaware and aware residents alike. 
In addition, Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan (2002) examined whether the rates 
of exit from the hospital industry differed across the various forms of hospital ownership 
in response to the decrease in demand for acute care. They found that over the 1985-1994 
period, for-profit urban hospitals are the most responsive to reduction in demand through 
exiting from the industry, followed by their non-federal public and religious nonprofit 
counterparts, while secular nonprofits are significantly the least responsive of the four 
ownership types. 
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Finally, researchers commonly view the provision of certain types of services as a 
commitment to particular populations (LeBlanc and Hurley, 1995; White, Begun, and 
Tian, 2006), strategic goals (Porter and Teisberg, 2006), and operational objectives 
(Horwitz, 2005a; Clement, White, and Valdmanis, 2002) of HCOs. Horwitz and Nichols 
(2007: 1) support this approach by arguing that ―investigating service offerings is 
particularly useful because, in a highly regulated industry in which managers are 
constrained in their attempts to maximize profits (e.g., it is difficult and sometimes illegal 
to turn away low-paying patients), managers have some freedom to open or close a 
service as a way to increase profits.‖  
The application of the change in provision of services as an indicator of hospitals‘ 
objective functions should be advantageous to other approaches presented above for 
several reasons. First, LOS and quality of care are sometimes beyond the control of 
hospitals. These indicators may reflect patient conditions more than hospitals‘ objectives. 
Second, HCOs‘ managerial compensation schemes, particularly the compensation for 
nonprofit hospital CEOs, have been closely scrutinized by governmental agencies and the 
society in recent years. Therefore, managerial compensation may no longer be a valid 
measure of the objective function of nonprofit hospitals. Finally, hospital rates of exit 
from the industry in response to the decline of acute care demand may depend directly on 
performance rather than operating objectives. Also, hospital closure is a much serious 
and complicated corporate decision than the adjustment of a service mix. The former is 
faced with more constraints and usually takes much longer to decide. Thus hospital 
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closure may not be an indicator of hospitals‘ objectives as sensitive as the change in 
service provision. 
Following the argument discussed above, this analysis employs the change in the 
provision of HH services to measure hospitals‘ objectives. Specifically, the probability of 
dropping HH services provision is compared across different ownership forms of 
hospitals before and after the implementation of the BBA. Since different ownership 
types within the nonprofit sector are seldom compared, this study extends the knowledge 
gained from the existing studies by examining the change in provision of HH care among 
hospitals with different incentives, including public, religious, non-religious (secular) 
nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals post-BBA. 
Hospital Ownership and Service Provision 
Ownership Effects on Types of Service Provision 
Researchers have found empirical evidence that ownership type affects hospital 
provision of certain services (White and Begun, 1998/99; Horwitz, 2005a). In a study 
exploring urban hospital adoption of AIDS/HIV-related services, LeBlanc and Hurley 
(1995) found a strong ownership effect. Public urban hospitals were 3 times, 4.1 times, 
and 5.7 times more likely to fully invest in HIV/AIDS-related services than private 
not-for-profit, for-profit, and church-owned urban hospitals, respectively. 
Additionally, White and Begun(1998/99); White, Cochran, and Patel (2002); and 
White, Begun, and Tian (2006) found that, after controlling for relevant market, 
organizational, and demand factors, Catholic hospitals were more likely than for-profit 
hospitals to offer services that represent a commitment to social justice (e.g., indigent 
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care), compassionate care (e.g., patient support groups, social workers, nursing homes, 
and pastoral care), end-of-life care (e.g., hospice, pain management, and palliative care), 
or societally stigmatized services (e.g., HIV/AIDS) for vulnerable populations.  Also, 
Catholic hospitals were more likely to provide end-of-life and compassionate care 
services than other not-for-profit hospitals, and more likely than public hospitals to 
provide end-of-life and stigmatized services. 
Horwitz (2005a) compared hospital provision of profitable and unprofitable 
services among different ownership types from 1988 to 2000. During the study period, 
after controlling for other factors, public urban acute-care hospitals were consistently and 
significantly more likely than their for-profit counterparts to provide psychiatric 
emergency services which are widely recognized as an unprofitable service. On the other 
hand, for-profit urban acute-care hospitals were consistently and significantly more likely 
than their public counterparts to provide open-heart surgery which has been classified as 
a highly profitable service. Nonprofit urban acute-care hospitals consistently fell between 
their public and for-profit counterparts in the probability of providing the two mentioned 
services across the period of study. 
Ownership Effects on Hospital Response to Payment Policy Change 
At least two studies have shown that hospitals with different ownership forms 
respond differently to health care payment policy change in providing uncompensated 
care. Davidoff, LoSasso, Bazzoli, and Zuckerman (2000) found that Medicaid and 
Medicare payment generosity increased uncompensated care provision in nonprofit and 
public hospitals. Expanded Medicaid eligibility reduced provision of uncompensated care 
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by public and for-profit hospitals, but did not affect the provision of uncompensated care 
by nonprofit hospitals. Medicaid HMO penetration was found to be associated with a 
decrease in uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals, but not with public or 
for-profit hospitals. Additionally, Bazzoli, Lindrooth, Kang, and Hasnain-Wynia (2006) 
found that the decline in Medicaid payments that resulted from the BBA reduced 
uncompensated care provision in safety-net hospitals which were largely comprised of 
public and religious hospitals. 
The BBA and PAC 
Implementation of the BBA and Change in Hospital Provision of PAC 
A number of studies have explored the change in hospital provision of PAC such as 
HH and NH care after the implementation of the BBA. The Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) (2002) reported to Congress that 20 percent of hospital-based 
NHs exited the market by 2000, due to the implementation of the BBA. Similarly, a 
decline in the number of hospital-based HHAs after the BBA was also reported. Between 
1997 and 2000, the number of hospital-based Medicare-certified HHAs decreased from 
2,698 to 2,151 (a 20 percent decrease) (NAHCH, 2008). 
One study done by Angelelli, Fennell, Hyatt, and McKenney (2003) researched 
rural hospital provision of and change in provision of PAC after the BBA between 1997 
and 2000. The results of this study suggest that the percentage of rural hospitals having a 
hospital-based or freestanding NH generally remained the same. The percentage 
providing HH care declined slightly from 67 percent to 61 percent. From 1997 to 2000, 
rural hospitals in general became more aggressive in ensuring the continuum of health 
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care (from acute care to PAC). In general, hospitals in rural areas are faced with more 
difficulties in transferring discharged patients because there are relatively fewer PAC 
resources nearby (Angelelli et al., 2003). The aged population may also be more 
prevalent in rural areas. This phenomenon points out that regional characteristics, such as 
the percentage of elderly in the population and the location (rural/urban) of hospitals 
could be important factors that influence hospitals‘ decisions/strategies concerning the 
provision of PAC services. 
Impacts of the BBA on PAC Utilization and Outcomes 
McCall, Korb, Petersons, and Moore (2003) employed Medicare beneficiary data 
in the first six months of fiscal year (FY) 1997 and the first six months of FY 1999 to 
study the change in the use of post-hospital care services after the BBA. Specifically, the 
study includes Medicare data in five DRGs, including stroke (DRG 014), Chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (DRG 088), heart failure (DRG 127), hip fracture (DRG 
210), and Diabetes (DRG 294). The study also examined whether the number of adverse 
outcomes had risen, as measured by hospital readmissions, emergency room visits, and 
death. Their findings suggest that utilization of rehabilitation and LTC hospitals increased 
after the BBA, while expenditures of post-hospital care for the beneficiaries in the five 
DRGs dropped an average of $454 per discharge. In addition, only five quality categories 
with significantly worse adverse outcome out of possible 90 indicators were observed. 
Another study done by Kilgore, Grabowski, Morrisey, Ritchie, Yun, and Locher (2009) 
showed similar results, which found that Medicare hospice utilization rates and costs 
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increased post-BBA. Also, there was no discernable difference in mortality rate in 
Medicare cancer patients before and after the BBA. 
The BBA and Home Health Care Utilization and Provision 
Impacts of the BBA on Home Health Industry 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the initial impact 
of the BBA on HH utilization. By using a 1 percent sample of Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries, McCall, Komisar, and Petersons, and Moore (2001) compared HH 
utilization and expenditures among three time periods: (1) FY 1997 (October 
1996-September 1997), the 12 months prior to the beginning of the IPS; (2) FY 1998, the 
12 months during the IPS was phased in; and (3) FY1999, the 12 months after the IPS 
was fully implemented. Results show that use of Medicare HH services dropped 
dramatically post-BBA. From FY 1997 to FY 1999, total Medicare reimbursements for 
HH visits decreased by more than 50 percent. Also, payments per enrollee declined by 
half over this period. HH payments per user were found to decline by 37 percent annually. 
HH users per 1,000 beneficiaries and the number of visits per user dropped 21 percent 
and 41 percent, respectively. 
McCall and colleagues continued to conduct a multivariate analysis applying 
regression techniques to examine the same issue (McCall, Petersons, Moore, and Korb, 
2003). By controlling for relevant factors such as beneficiary demographic characteristics, 
prior medical care utilization, community characteristics, supply of HH resources, 
substitutes for HH care, and state historical Medicare/Medicaid health care and HH use, 
the authors analyzed the incidence of HH use in the Medicare beneficiaries and the 
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utilization of HH among the Medicare HH users. Results show a 22 percent decline in the 
incidence of using HH services post-BBA. Stronger reductions were found in the 
incidence of use for beneficiaries age 85 and older, those in states with high historical 
Medicare HH use, and those with dual (Medicare and Medicaid) eligibility. The study 
also showed a 39 percent drop in the number of visits per user. More intensive reductions 
in the number of services were found in high historical Medicare use states as well as for 
those age 85 and older, nonwhites, females, those using for-profit agencies, and those 
treated for certain diagnoses including diabetes, skin ulcers, heart failure, and 
cerebrovascular diseases. Less intensive reductions were associated with hospital-based 
agencies. 
Likewise, Kilgore and colleagues (2009) found that HH utilization rates and costs 
among Medicare cancer patients dropped substantially after the BBA, partly because the 
BBA shifted some of the cancer patients to hospice. However, significant reduction in 
total Medicare costs after the BBA was also noted. 
Implementation of the BBA and Change in Home Health Care Provision among 
Hospitals of Different Ownership Types 
Horwitz (2005a) has done research intended to reveal the objectives of hospitals 
with public, nonprofit, and for-profit ownerships. More specifically, the study tested 
whether hospital ownership types specialize in services based on profitability. The study 
based largely on the data of non-federal, urban, acute-care, general hospitals in the AHA 
files from 1988 to 2000. In the study, the author examined 34 services which were 
categorized into three groups based on general probability: (1) profitable services, (2) 
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unprofitable services, and (3) services with variable profits during the study period. The 
classifications of the service profitability were a result of efforts including reviews of 
peer-reviewed medical and social science literature, MedPAC and Prospective payment 
Assessment Commission reports to Congress, trade publications, business magazines, 
and newspaper reports. The author also conducted interviews with hospital 
administrators and doctors to get the qualitative evaluation of relative service profitability. 
The various sources yielded relatively similar results (Horwitz, 2005b). Of particular 
interest here is the result regarding the change in hospital provision of HH between the 
pre- and post-BBA eras. The result shows that, for all the three hospital types, the 
probability of offering HH services increased when the service was profitable 
(1988-1997) and started to decrease when the services became unprofitable (1998-2000). 
However, growth of HH care when it was profitable and decline of HH care when it was 
unprofitable were particularly dramatic among for-profits. Controlling for hospital and 
market characteristics, the probability of a for-profit hospital‘s providing HH services 
tripled from 17.5 percent to 60.9 percent between 1988 and 1997. During the same 
period, the probability increased slightly from 40.9 percent to 51.7 percent for nonprofit 
and from 38.1 percent to 51.9 percent for public hospitals. From 1997 to 2000, as HH 
care became relatively unprofitable due to the implementation of the BBA, the 
probability of offering HH care fell a striking 37.5 percent among for-profit, but only 7.7 
percent among non-profit and 1.5 percent among public hospitals. 
Horwitz and Nichols (2007) continued this stream of study by applying more 
sophisticated approaches to explore a related but different question: Are service provision 
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by hospitals of different ownership types influenced by market ownership mix? 
Longitudinal data from 1988 to 2005 were employed by the authors with the aim to 
empirically examine the conflicting theoretical perspectives about the behavior of 
nonprofit hospitals. Also, the authors used a number approaches to define hospital 
markets, including Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and geographic radius. Results 
show that nonprofit hospitals were systematically less likely to offer unprofitable 
services in markets with high for-profit dominance than in other markets. The evidence is 
particularly clear on HH provision. When HH services were most profitable, from 1993 
through 1997, nonprofit hospitals were more likely to offer them in high than in low 
for-profit penetration markets. However, when HH services turned less profitable, 
nonprofit hospitals reduced their likelihood of offering HH more dramatically in high 
than in low for-profit penetration markets. 
This dissertation is directly related to the two studies previously mentioned, 
particularly the Horwitz (2005a) study. This study can be viewed as a replication and 
extension of the mentioned study specific to HH provision by hospitals with different 
ownership forms. First, this study examines the issue beyond 2000 through 2003 which is 
not covered in the Horwitz study. Second, this study further classifies private nonprofit 
hospitals into religious and secular groups which have theoretically and empirically 
demonstrated to be different in objectives and behaviors (Ballou and Weisbrod, 2005; 
Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan, 2002). Third, the Horwitz (2005a) study may suffer 
from several issues. As the author indicated, missing values and observations from 
non-responses in the AHA are a major concern. Although the issue resulting from 
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missing values had been considered and addressed through reasonable efforts, sample 
selection biases could occur given the fact that a significant portion of hospitals did not 
report service provision in the AHA survey. This study addresses the issue by employing 
a more valid data source, as will be described in Chapter 4. Also, there may be issues of 
omitted variables in the Horwitz study, as mentioned by the author. The study only 
controlled for hospital size, teaching status, geographic location, gender, race, household 
income, and age of the residents in the market. There should be other institution-specific 
factors such as patient case-mix, professional and financial capabilities that determine the 
provision of HH care. In addition, other relevant market factors such as the HH resource 
in the local market should also be taken into account. This study thus strengthens the 
finding by including more relevant organizational and market factors proposed by a 
number of organization theories which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Other Determinants of Hospital Provision of PAC 
In addition to the research mentioned earlier in this chapter, several studies have 
been conducted to examine factors associated with hospital provision of or 
diversification to PAC (Wheeler, Burkhardt, Alexander, and Magnus, 1999), nursing 
home services (Chiu, 1995; Lucente, 2006), and home health services (Xu, 2000). 
Subacute Care 
The study conducted by Wheeler and colleagues (1999) applied cross-sectional, 
time series data from 1985 through 1991 and a Heckman two stage model to examine the 
factors associated with hospital provision of subacute care (SAC) as well as the size of 
the care measured by the number of total subacute beds in the hospital. Results show that 
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the number of subacute care beds in private, acute-care general community hospitals was 
significantly and positively associated with nonprofit status, system affiliation, hospital 
size, nursing staff to bed ratio, total expenses to bed ratio, competition, per-capita income 
in the county, growth in hospital size, and having swing beds. Also, in the face of higher 
financial risks, for-profit hospitals tended to have more SAC beds compared to nonprofit 
hospitals. 
The authors found that the size of hospital SAC was significantly and negatively 
associated with financial risk, the number of physicians to beds ratio, occupancy rate, 
being in a rural area, and outpatient revenue proportion. Additionally, in the situation of 
higher cash flow, for-profit hospitals tended to have fewer subacute care beds relative to 
their nonprofit counterparts. Finally, Wheeler and colleagues did not find a significant 
association between the size of SAC and cash flow as well as proportion of population 
age 65 or over in the county. 
Nursing Home Services 
Chiu (1995) and Xu (2000) applied conceptual models drawn from transaction cost 
economics and the same analytical models to examine the linkage between hospitals and 
nursing home and home health services, respectively. Applying the same conceptual and 
analytical models, Lucente (2006) also investigated whether the considerations of 
providing NH care differed before and after the implementation of the BBA. 
Using a sample composed of all non-federal, acute-care general hospitals in the 
1990 AHA survey file, Chiu (1995) found that hospitals located in areas with high 
hospital occupancy or had a higher proportion of total discharges contributed by 
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Medicare patients were more likely to have a hospital-based NH. However, larger 
hospitals were slightly but significantly less likely to provide its own NH care, compared 
to smaller hospitals. Other factors included in his analytical model are not significant 
determinants of hospital provision of NH care. These factors include NH beds to elderly 
population ratio, the number of geriatric services, availability of HH care and swing beds, 
affiliation with HMO/PPO, state CON stringency, system membership, rural locality, 
ownership, the interaction terms between Medicare discharges and hospital size, and 
between poor people proportion and the number of beds to elderly population ratio. 
Lucente (2006) examined determinants of hospital integration of NH care before 
(FY 1994/1995) and after the BBA (FY 2000/2001). Basically the author found similar 
determinants in these two time periods. Significant and positive predictors of hospital 
integration of NH care in both periods include the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, 
hospital occupancy rate, geriatric service provision, a rural location, Medicare discharge 
proportion, hospital case mix index, and hospital size. On the other hand, significant and 
negative predictors in both periods contain average length of stay in the market, nursing 
staff to beds ratio, state CON, and teaching status. However, the provision of NH care 
was significantly and negatively associated with the proportion of elderly in poverty and 
system membership only in the post-BBA period. The most dramatic change is observed: 
while for-profit hospitals were more likely than nonprofits to integrate with NHs before 
the BBA, they became less likely than their nonprofit counterparts to provide in house 
NH care after the BBA. 
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Home Health Care 
Finally, Xu (2000) employed the non-federal, acute-care general hospitals included 
in the AHA survey files of 1993, 1996, and 1997 to explore the determinants of hospital 
arrangement of offering HH care. The results from a model contrasting a hierarchy 
(providing hospital-based HH care) with a market (depending on external freestanding 
HHAs) arrangement suggest that hospital size, Medicare discharge proportion, provision 
of geriatric services, provision of rehabilitation services, provision of NH care, rural 
locality, system member, being in west states, and nonprofit ownership (vs. public 
ownership) are significantly and positively associated with hospital provision of HH care. 
On the other hand, teaching status and for-profit ownership (vs. public) are significantly 
and negatively associated with hospital adoption of an in-house HHA. Non-significant 
determinants include HMO/PPO contract, HMO penetration, hospital occupancy rate, 
for-profit HHA proportion in a county, SNF beds relative to elderly population, HH 
supply relative to elderly population, hospital‘s experience in offering social support 
services, and imbalanced demand over supply of HH services in the market.  
The major empirical findings of the studies specific to hospital provision of PAC 
services discussed in this chapter are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of Determinants of Hospital Provision of PAC Services 
Construct Determinant Effect Type of Service (Reference) 
Hospital Ownership types 
Ownership NFP (vs. FP) Positive HH (Xu, 2000)；HH:1988-94; 
1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a); 
SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); NH, 
post-BBA (Lucente, 2006) 
Negative HH:1994-97 (Horwitz, 2005a) ; 
NH, pre-BBA (Lucente, 2006) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Public (vs. FP) Positive HH (Xu, 2000); HH:1988-94; 
1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a) 
Negative HH:1988-94; 1998-2000 
(Horwitz, 2005a) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
NFP (vs. public) Positive HH (Xu, 2000); HH:1988-1997 
(Horwitz, 2005a) 
Negative HH:1998-2000 (Horwitz, 2005a) 
Catholic Positive EOL: compared to public, FP, and 
other NFP (White et al., 2002) 
Interaction of ownership and financial factors/market 
BBA NFP x BBA (vs. 
public) 
Negative NH, HH (Horwitz, 2005a) 
FP x BBA (vs. 
public) 
Negative NH, HH (Horwitz, 2005a) 
For-profit 
market 
NFP*high FP market 
(vs. low FP market) 
Positive NH, HH: 1993-1997 (Horwitz & 
Nichols, 2007) 
Negative NH, HH: 1997-2000; HOS 
(Horwitz & Nichols, 2007) 
FP x high FP market 
(vs. low FP market) 
Positive NH, HH: 1993-1997 (Horwitz & 
Nichols, 2007) 
Negative NH, HH: 1997-2000 (Horwitz & 
Nichols, 2007) 
Cash flow FP x Cash flow Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Financial risk FP x Financial risk Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Other hospital characteristics 
Resource 
munificence; 
transaction 
frequency 
Size Positive HH (Xu, 2000); SAC (Wheeler et 
al, 1999); EOL (White et al., 
2002) ; NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Negative NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Access to 
financial 
capital 
System affiliation Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); HH 
(Xu, 2000) 
Negative NH, post-BBA (Lucente, 2006) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Construct Determinant Effect Type of Service (Reference) 
  Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995); NH, pre-BBA 
(Lucente, 2006) 
Financial 
performance 
Cash flow Non-significant SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Financial risk Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
FP x Cash flow Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
FP x risk Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Access to 
other resource  
#Physician/#bed Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
#RN+LPN/#beds Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Negative NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Expenses/#beds Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Transaction 
uncertainty 
Occupancy rate Positive NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
Asset/transacti
on specificity 
#Type of geriatric 
services 
Positive HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente, 
2006) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
# Type of 
rehabilitation 
services 
Positive HH (Xu, 2000) 
# Type of 
social/support 
services 
Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
Provision of NH Positive HH (Xu, 2000) 
Provision of HH Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Transaction 
frequency 
% Medicare 
discharge/patient 
days 
Positive HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Chiu, 1995); 
NH (Lucente, 2006) 
% Medicare 
discharge x hospital 
size 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
HMO/PPO contract Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995); HH (Xu, 2000) 
Market factors 
Market 
demand, 
transaction 
uncertainty 
Rural area Positive HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente, 
2006) 
Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Competition Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Per capita income Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
%Elderly in poverty Negative NH, post-BBA (Lucente, 2006) 
Non-significant NH, pre-BBA (Lucente, 2006) 
Elderly % Non-significant SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999); HH 
(Xu, 2000) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Construct Determinant Effect Type of Service (Reference) 
 Imbalanced demand 
over supply of HH 
services 
Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
Transaction 
frequency 
HMO penetration Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
Transaction 
uncertainty 
Area hospital 
occupancy rate 
Positive NH (Chiu, 1995) 
# NH beds/elderly 
population 
Positive NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995); HH (Xu, 2000) 
% poor person x (# 
NH beds/elderly 
population) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
 #RN/LPNs employed 
by HHAs/elderly 
population 
Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
# For-profit 
HHAs/total HHAs in 
market 
Non-significant HH (Xu, 2000) 
Hospital average 
LOS 
Negative NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Control 
variables 
Teaching hospital Positive EOL (White et al., 2002) 
Negative HH (Xu, 2000); NH (Lucente, 
2006) 
Growth rate (in beds) Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Availability of swing 
beds 
Positive SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Outpatient 
revenue/total revenue 
Negative SAC (Wheeler et al, 1999) 
State CON 
stringency 
Negative NH (Lucente, 2006) 
Non-significant NH (Chiu, 1995) 
Located in west 
states 
Positive HH (Xu, 2000) 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Since the 1980s, health care environment has been in turmoil and full of rapid 
changes and uncertainties. In order to survive in the dynamic environment, HCOs such as 
hospitals must be able to respond to these changes appropriately. Various economic and 
organizational theories have provided useful tools in understanding the motivation for 
certain decisions HCOs make in response to the change in the environment. 
This chapter proposes a conceptual model using multiple theories to study the 
change in HH care provision by hospitals with different ownership structures in response 
to the implementation of the BBA. The depiction of the conceptual model is followed in 
turn by a brief description of each theoretical perspective. Major constructs derived from 
each theory will then be discussed and applied to propose relationship between the 
constructs and the issue of interest and to develop the study hypotheses. 
Integrated Theoretical Perspectives 
Multiple theoretical perspectives are applied to examine hospital decisions 
regarding provision of HH services. Each theoretical viewpoint provides distinctive 
explanations to various motives of organizations to provide HH care or not. Multiple 
theoretical approaches have been commonly used in health services research (e.g., 
D‘Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997; Zinn, Weech, and 
Brannon, 1998; Walston, Kimberly, and Burns, 2001; Roggenkamp, White, and Bazzoli, 
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2005). The rationale for combining multiple theoretical perspectives in studying the 
question is that, as many researchers have suggested, no single theoretical perspective 
currently existing can fully explain health care organizational responses to and their 
performances under certain environmental forces or contingencies (Stiles, Mick, and 
Wise, 2001; Luke and Walston, 2003). Hence, a multiple-theoretical approach may give 
researchers a more comprehensive picture of the issue of interest. 
Various views in terms of using multiple theoretical approaches in health services 
studies are observed. Some researchers suggest an ―either-or‖ proposition while others 
argue for an ―X and Y‖ thinking (Shortell, 1997). The former proposition views different 
theoretical perspectives as competing arguments while the latter views them as 
complementary frameworks which are adopted in this study. 
The Conceptual Model 
Organizational scholars recognize that organizations have diverse goals. 
Organizational goals may serve cognitive, motivational, symbolic, or justification 
purposes (Scott and Davis, 2007). In some cases, these goals may be competing within 
an organization. For example, Daft (2001) distinguishes official goals (e.g., mission 
statements) from operative goals. Official goals provide legitimacy (symbolic functions). 
Operative goals provide decision guidelines and criteria of performance (cognitive 
functions), employee development (motivational functions) (Daft, 2001), and explain and 
defend organizational decisions and behaviors (justification functions) (Weick, 1969). 
Additionally, Shortell, Zukoski, Alexander, Bazzoli, Conrad, and Hasnain-Wynia (2002) 
suggested that most organizations have multiple motives for engaging in certain types of 
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activities. They point out that these motives may be of an instrumental nature, a 
legitimacy nature, and/or an altruistic nature. 
There are numerous motives or goals associated with hospital provision of PAC 
services. Wheeler et al. (1999) suggested that the objective functions of hospitals in 
diversifying into sub-acute care include minimizing financial risk, maximizing financial 
returns or profits, and providing socially valuable services. Giardina, Fottler, Shewchuk, 
and Hill (1990) indicated that the benefits hospitals may gain from LTC diversification 
(their discussion was based on the pre-BBA context) include: (1) offsetting revenue loss 
from declining/more stringent acute care payments, (2) taking advantage of the 
profitability and growth of the LTC market, (3) meeting the incentive to discharge 
patients as quickly as possible, (4) increasing revenue from charges for ancillary services 
such as rehabilitation, (5) achieving economies of scale, (6) establishment of a referral 
network, and (7) improving their public image.  Giardina and colleagues thus concluded 
that entering the LTC market would help hospitals meet both their financial goals and 
their stated missions such as meeting health care needs of their communities. 
Following the arguments and approaches used in previous research, this study 
integrates a number of major concepts from health economics, resource dependence, 
transaction cost economics, institutional theories, and population ecology to explore the 
issue of interest and to develop hypotheses. This study basically assumes that hospitals‘ 
decisions regarding the provision of HH services are based on multiple organizational 
considerations and related market factors posited by these theories. 
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The conceptual model illustrated in Figure 3 basically suggests that hospitals‘ 
decision to offer HH services and their responses to policy changes regarding HH 
services (such as the BBA) are not determined by only one particular factor. Instead, 
hospitals‘ decisions in providing HH services are based on a number of concerns or 
contexts. 
 
Figure 3. The Conceptual Model 
 
This multi-theoretical model provides a comprehensive set of organizational 
considerations or contexts related to hospitals‘ decisions concerning whether they should 
change the provision of HH services in response to the payment reduction brought about 
by the BBA. Each organizational consideration or market context pointed out by the 
theoretical perspectives can be viewed as a filter or prism which differentiates, filters out, 
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or carry over certain considerations in hospitals‘ decision to offer HH care after the BBA, 
contributing to the different behaviors or decisions hospitals take or make concerning the 
provision of HH care post-BBA. Specifically, this study considers the objectives of 
hospitals with different ownership forms to be a prism that differentiates the responses of 
hospitals in the change in HH care provision to the implementation of the BBA. In 
addition, the constructs proposed by the organization theories act as filters that bring 
about or remove certain considerations for hospitals in response to the change in the 
reimbursement environment. 
In the following sections, each of the theoretical concepts or arguments relevant to 
hospitals‘ decisions on the provision and change in provision of HH services is discussed. 
The major points of the discussion are summarized in Table 2. Hypotheses to be tested 
are proposed after each of the theoretical discussions. 
Economic Perspectives 
The basic assumptions of economic theories lie in scarcity of resources and rational 
decision making (Folland, Goodman, and Stano, 2004). Decision makers (i.e., consumers 
and producers) are rational in terms of ―making choices that best further one‘s own ends 
given one‘s resource constraints‖ (Folland et al., 2004). This implies that a rational actor 
always behaves based on his/her self interest and calculation of consequences. In 
economic analysis, the goal of consumers is to maximize their own utility while the 
objective of producers/firms is profit maximization.
4
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Table 2. Theoretical Premises and Implications for Hospital Decision Regarding the Provision of HH Services 
Basis of 
Comparison 
Economics Resource Dependence Transaction Cost Institutional Population 
Ecology 
Basic premise Organization decisions 
are established to 
maximizing 
self-interest/utility 
Organization decisions 
are shaped by internal 
resource availability and 
external actors who 
control critical resources  
Organization 
decisions are 
established to 
minimizing 
transaction cost 
Organization 
decisions are 
shaped by 
institutional 
environments/ 
pressures 
Organization 
structure and 
change are shaped 
by internal inertia 
and evolving 
environments 
Organizational 
goal 
Utility/profit 
maximization 
Efficiency 
Maintaining autonomy 
Obtaining resource for 
survival 
Minimizing 
transaction cost 
Efficiency 
Pursuing 
legitimacy for 
survival 
Adaptive survival 
Role of 
managers in 
decision 
making 
Organizations exercise 
active choice 
Organizations exercise 
active choice 
Organizations 
exercise active 
choice 
Organizations do 
not exercise 
active choice 
Organizations do 
not exercise active 
choice 
Individual adaptive 
ability is limited 
Type of 
organizational 
change 
Intentional Intentional Intentional Unintentional 
Environmentally 
induced 
Unintentional 
Environmentally 
induced 
Environment Pre-BBA: Inpatient 
payment was reduced 
by DRGs, hospitals 
need to create new 
sources of revenues in 
order to be profitable 
Post-BBA: HH 
payment was cut by 
BBA and become 
unprofitable 
Medicare patients/ 
revenues are critical 
resources to hospitals 
DRGs created hospitals‘ 
need to connect acute 
care and HH care to 
ensure the care for 
Medicare patients, 
resulting in the increase 
in hospital dependence 
on PAC 
As hospitals‘ need to 
transfer patients to 
limited number of 
HH settings 
increases, transfer 
uncertainty and 
complexity rises, 
bringing up overall 
transaction cost. 
As population 
ages, provision 
of HH care is 
considered 
more necessary 
and legitimate 
As more hospitals 
offer/drop HH, 
isomorphic 
pressure 
increases. 
DRGs/BBA 
required hospitals 
to bear financial 
risk of patient care, 
creating an 
environment that 
threatens the 
survival of hospital 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Basis of 
Comparison 
Economics Resource Dependence Transaction Cost Institutional Population 
Ecology 
Hospital view 
HH provision 
as a mean for 
Achieving mission 
Maximizing profit 
Optimizing efficiency 
Maintaining 
autonomy/reducing 
dependence on other PAC 
facilities in discharging 
Medicare patients 
Reducing transaction 
costs in discharging 
Medicare patients to 
HH facilities 
Conforming to 
social pressure 
for offering HH 
and gaining 
legitimacy to 
operate 
Adapting to the 
reduced payment 
environment 
 
Rationale for 
offering HH 
care 
HH services are 
profitable  
Generating additional 
revenues 
Meeting bottom line 
Fulfilling mission 
Enhancing competitive 
advantage 
Controlling patient source 
and managing patient 
need 
Reducing dependence on 
other HH facilities 
Managing threats from 
government policy such 
as DRGs 
Managing 
transaction 
uncertainty and 
complexity 
Reducing transaction 
costs 
Ensuring efficient 
operation 
Meeting the 
requirement 
from 
authoritative 
organizations 
Meeting social 
expectation 
Conforming to 
other hospitals 
offering HH 
Being pushed to 
offer HH 
otherwise will be 
selected out by the 
environment and 
policy 
Inertia to change 
(post-BBA) 
Rationale for 
not offering 
HH care 
HH services are 
unprofitable and 
financially risky 
Lack of slack resource 
Lack of financial and 
personnel capabilities 
Transferring patients 
to HH facilities in 
the market involves 
minimal transaction 
costs 
Conforming to 
peer hospitals not 
offering HH 
Inertia to change 
Key predictor 
of HH care 
provision 
Ownership form 
Competition 
Profitability of service 
Economies of scope 
Resource dependence 
Resource uncertainty 
Resource availability 
Organization constraints 
Transaction 
uncertainty, 
frequency, and 
complexity 
Coercive pressure 
Normative 
pressure 
Mimetic pressure 
Organizational 
inertia 
Environmental 
adaptation and 
selection 
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Therefore, from the perspective of economics, economic actors have free choices 
among goods or inputs in maximizing their utilities or profits but under certain 
constraints. The human nature of rationality and self interest and the market opportunities 
(i.e., choice of goods or inputs) and constraints (induced by income, prices, and market 
demands) contribute to the efficient allocation of limited resources in a society through 
perfect competition. 
Among the market factors discussed above, economists view price as the most 
critical signal to economic behavior. The change of price is referred to an ―invisible hand‖ 
in guiding all market and economic activities. A perfectly competitive market will reach 
its equilibrium in terms of demand and supply through the price dynamic (Folland et al., 
2004). The use or allocation of resources is thought to be the most efficient at the point of 
equilibrium where the market supply meets the market demand. 
According to economics, producers such as firms and hospitals will reduce the 
output of a good/service when the price of the good/service drops, holding other things 
equal. The producer will then redirect the resources or inputs saved from the production 
reduction of the good/service to the production of other goods deemed profitable. By 
doing this the producer expects to efficiently allocate his/her limited resources and 
attempts to make up the revenue reduction due to the decreased price and production of 
the original good, thus maintaining or increasing his/her profit.  
These economic perspectives provide a sound explanation for the growth of 
hospital-based PAC services after the implementation of DRGs in 1983. For hospitals, 
the implementation of DRGs represented a dramatic change of economic environment 
48 
 
(healthcare market) where they operate. It signifies the reduction of reimbursement and 
prices for the acute care services hospitals provide. Thus hospitals started to limit their 
acute care services (e.g., reducing lengths of stay) while at the same time expand or 
diversify into other profitable services such as NH and HH services. On the other hand, 
as long as other important factors are not major concerns, one may expect that 
profit-maximizing hospitals would reduce their PAC provision after the payment 
reduction of PAC services resulting from the BBA.    
Behaviors of Hospitals with Different Ownerships 
From the perspective of economics, for-profit hospitals should behave exactly like 
profit-maximizing firms (Wheeler and Clement, 1990). They should do whatever it takes 
to make profit and distribute the profit to owners or shareholders. However, traditional 
economic perspectives may tell only part of the story of the overall hospital behavior. 
One of the unique aspects of the U.S. hospital sector is its mixed ownership types 
(Stevens, 1999). For-profit, public/government-operated, and private nonprofit hospitals 
operate simultaneously in the health care market. Theoretically and by definition, 
nonprofit hospitals should have objectives different from those held by their for-profit 
counterparts. 
Health economists have long been interested in the objective functions and 
behaviors of HCOs of different ownership forms. Weisbrod (1988) proposed three 
conceptual models for describing the objective functions and behaviors of nonprofit 
HCOs, which may or may not differ systematically across ownership forms in 
responding to the change in price/financial incentives. The first model suggests that 
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nonprofit HCOs are ―for-profits in disguise.‖ That is, nonprofits are in fact acting to 
maximize profit and behaving like for-profits. From this view, the argument concerning 
for-profit HCOs discussed above can be applied to all hospitals including for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. Certain empirical evidence supports this argument by showing that 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals have similar cost or revenue behaviors (Sloan, 2000). 
The second model holds that nonprofits are pursuing/producing two kinds of goods, 
i.e., mission goods (or M-goods) and revenue goods (or R-goods) at the same time. 
Providing R-goods generates revenues necessary for nonprofit HCOs to fulfill their 
missions by providing as many M-goods as possible, subject to a budget constraint. In 
other words, nonprofits have to at least break even in order to be sustainable in the long 
run. In this regard, nonprofits will take a balanced position of producing M- and R-goods. 
Nonprofit HCOs might remain in the production of M-goods even though these goods 
are not profitable, as long as there are sufficient R-goods. On the other hand, nonprofits 
may not be as sensitive as for-profits in responding to reduced financial incentives in the 
production of M-goods.  
The third model proposed by Weisbrod holds that nonprofits are inefficient profit 
maximizers. Because of the non-distribution constraint held on nonprofit organizations, 
there is a lack of incentive for managers in nonprofit HCOs to operate efficiently 
although their underlying intentions are profit-oriented. Based on this argument, 
nonprofits will behave differently from for-profits in reacting to changing financial 
incentives or prices of services, not because they are mission-driven, but because they are 
inefficient in making the change. 
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These conceptual models of nonprofit HCOs are particularly relevant to nonprofits 
except for public HCOs. Public hospitals, with a mission to ensure equal access to 
needed care, play a critical role in the healthcare safety net, providing care to the 
uninsured and to minority populations. Among the three hospital ownership types (public, 
for-profit, and nonprofit), public hospitals may be least vulnerable to changes in the 
economic/financial environment because public hospitals are products of government 
policy or intention. The sustainability of a public hospital depends more on political 
decisions than financial considerations. A public hospital can survive even operating at a 
financial loss and is backed up by public budgets when it meets public/policy purpose 
(Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, and Himmelstein, 2002). 
In addition, the goals and services of public HCOs are regulated directly by law or 
established by sponsoring governmental agencies, thereby being much less flexible in 
operation compared to their private nonprofits. Thus, a more appropriate model for 
describing the objective and behavior of public HCOs may be a M-goods-only (i.e., 
mission-focused) model, in which the objective of public hospitals is to meet social needs 
only, regardless of the profitability of the services provided. 
Finally, the U.S. private nonprofit hospitals can be further classified into two 
sub-categories, religious (or faith-based) and secular nonprofit hospitals. The former may 
fit more closely into the two-good model while the latter may fit more closely into the 
inefficient profit maximizer model proposed by Weisbrod. These propositions will be 
further discussed in the hypothesis section. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the conceptual model for describing the objectives and relative 
positions of hospitals of the four ownership types in the continuum of profit 
maximization versus mission orientation. Based on the model, each ownership type will 
be discussed relative to other types and hypotheses developed for empirical testing. 
 
Figure 4. A Conceptual Model of the Objective Function of Four Major Ownership 
Forms of Hospitals 
 
For-Profit versus Public Hospitals 
It is quite straightforward to predict for-profit hospitals‘ response to the BBA. Due 
to their focus on profit-maximization, other things being equal, for-profit hospitals would 
aggressively increase provision of HH services when HH business is profitable, and 
would leave the business when it becomes unprofitable (Harrington et al., 2002). 
In discussing organizational change, population ecology theory (PET) posits that 
organizations, rather than making active or strategic changes, are relatively inertial 
structures which are difficult to change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan and Carroll, 
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1995). There are two types of structural inertia: internal inertia and external inertia. The 
former includes organization internal policy, vested interests, and sunk costs. The latter 
includes public policies and legitimization of organization activities. Applying this 
perspective to the change in hospital provision of HH services post-BBA, one could 
expect that public hospitals may have greater inertia to change provision of HH services 
when compared to for-profit hospitals because public hospitals are directly constrained 
by public policies. 
These arguments are consistent with the findings in Horwitz (2005a) who reported 
the change in hospital provision of HH services as HH care turned unprofitable due to the 
BBA. After controlling for related factors, Horwitz found that the probability of offering 
home health care fell a striking 37.5 percent among for-profit, 7.7 percent among 
non-profit, and only 1.5 percent among public hospitals. Based on the discussion above, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1a: For-profit hospitals were more likely than public hospitals to 
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Private Nonprofit Hospitals versus For-profit Hospitals 
Private nonprofit hospitals differ from for-profit hospitals in that their goal is not to 
maximize profits. Instead, nonprofit hospitals usually have unique missions such as 
charity, religious/evangelical purposes, meeting community health needs, and 
teaching/research. Also, unlike a for-profit hospital, nonprofit hospitals are subject to the 
nondistribution constraint (Spector, Selden, and Cohen, 1998; Chou, 2002; Lindrooth and 
Weisbrod, 2007). In other words, they cannot distribute their profits (Folland, Goodman, 
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and Stano, 2004). Thus, they must use profits in ways other than distributing them to 
shareholders. For example, a nonprofit hospital may use profits to provide or support 
services which are not profitable but are important to the fulfillment of its mission 
(Wheeler and Clement, 1990). Further, nonprofit hospitals enjoy tax-exempt status from 
the IRS in exchange for the provision of a certain amount of community benefit. 
Therefore, nonprofit hospitals should have more slack resources and higher social or 
legal obligations than for-profit hospitals have to provide unprofitable care like HH 
services post-BBA. This is also consistent with the PET argument regarding greater 
external inertia faced by nonprofit hospitals than by for-profit hospitals. That is, 
nonprofits are directed by the external requirements for providing community benefits 
and constrained by internal requirements for offering mission services. Hence, nonprofit 
hospitals are in a less flexible position to change their HH provision after the 
implementation of the BBA compared to for-profit hospitals. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1b: For-profit hospitals were more likely than nonprofit hospitals 
to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Private Nonprofit Hospitals versus Public Hospitals 
However, all private hospitals must meet the break-even bottom line to stay in 
business. Hence, nonprofit hospitals must be concerned with profits even if profits 
provide little utility to the hospital (Hirth, 1999). If nonprofit hospitals are not as efficient 
as their for-profit counterparts, or they are equally efficient but cannot break-even under 
certain market environments, nonprofit hospitals will not have more slack resources than 
for-profit hospitals to offer unprofitable services. In this case, one may expect that 
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nonprofit and for-profit hospitals would respond similarly regarding their provision of 
HH services after the BBA. That is, although private nonprofit hospitals may not as 
sensitive as for-profit hospitals, they would be more sensitive than their public 
counterparts to the change of the Medicare payment environment. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1c: Private nonprofit hospitals were more likely than public 
hospitals to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Religious versus Secular Nonprofit Hospitals 
Most of the religious hospitals were originally founded to provide charity care for 
the vulnerable populations in their communities and, as such, have carried forward their 
missions of social justice. Religious hospitals are the private, nonprofit providers that are 
most similar to public hospitals in purpose. Religious hospitals are directly governed by 
their affiliating denominations as public hospitals are guided by governments. Both 
governments and religious denominations usually have established particular non-profit 
goals and guiding rules for their affiliated hospitals to meet certain social needs.  
In addition, as public hospitals receive funds from governmental agencies, many 
religious hospitals receive direct financial support from their sponsoring denominations. 
In this sense, both public and religious private hospitals could behave similarly following 
a policy change that reduces economic incentives to provide a particular service.   
However, like other private nonprofits, religious hospitals are easily subject to a 
break-even requirement given the fact that financial resources supported by their 
denominations are usually limited. They rely in large part on their revenues or profits 
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through providing revenue goods (R-goods). Therefore, religious hospitals fit perfectly 
with the two-good model suggested by Weisbrod.  
With respect to secular private nonprofit hospitals, they may behave in accordance 
with the model of an inefficient profit maximizer. Secular private nonprofits usually 
operate independently without regulatory governance in addition to general public 
policies or regulations. Moreover, many secular nonprofit hospitals may not have regular 
financial resources besides revenues from operations and service provision. In other 
words, they are faced with higher self-sustaining pressure compared to their religious and 
public counterparts. As market competition intensifies and the payment environment 
tightens, secular hospitals may need to be as profit-oriented as their for-profit 
counterparts. However, secular hospitals may not be able to be as efficient as for-profit 
hospitals due to the non-distribution constraint discussed earlier. 
From the perspective of population ecology theory, religious hospitals may have 
greater internal inertia with church-introduced policies and support which are absent in 
secular nonprofit hospitals. Therefore, religious hospitals could be more reluctant to 
change their provision of HH services post-BBA. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1d: Secular nonprofit hospitals were more likely than religious 
nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH services after the implementation of the 
BBA. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) holds that every organization is resource 
dependent to certain extent. In other words, no organization is entirely self-sufficient, nor 
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any organization can control all of the resources necessary for survival. Hence, the 
exchange of resources with other organizations is inevitable and critical to organizational 
survival. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) indicated, ―Resource dependence perspective 
looks at how an organization interacts with others and its environment to obtain critical 
and often uncertain resources through exchange.‖ 
Resources in the environment are always limited or sometimes scarce. If the 
resource critical to a particular organization is controlled by other organizations, 
uncertainty and dependence are induced, thus making the focal organization vulnerable. 
In this case, the survival of the organization is dependent on certain organizations that 
dominate or control the key resource. As resource dependence theorists argue, this 
interdependence between organizations is a fundamental determinant and predictor of 
organizational behavior and performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The resource dependence perspective assumes that organizations and managers to 
certain degree can actively and strategically arrange their environment to reduce 
unwanted reliance and enhance the likelihood of survival (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). 
According to RDT, organizations‘ dependence on other organizations does not 
necessarily result in risks for the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Nevertheless, 
an organization may face difficulties to obtain the resources necessary for its operation 
and survival when resources become scarce and/or the organizations that control key 
resources become undependable, unpredictable or more demanding. 
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Hospital Dependence on Post-Acute Care 
Medicare patients and revenues are critical resources for hospitals‘ survival. DRGs 
encouraged hospitals‘ to arrange acute care-PAC connections to ensure the care of 
Medicare patients after hospital discharge and to avoid readmission, resulting in 
hospitals' dependence on PAC services (Kane, Kane, and Ladd, 1998). In this situation, 
according to RDT, hospitals have two major strategic options, namely buffering and 
bridging strategies. Buffering strategies are employed by organizations to protect their 
technical core (Thomson, 1967; Oliver, 1991). One of the key buffering approaches 
would be growth by integrating PAC services into a hospital‘s service provision list. By 
providing its own PAC services, a hospital is able to control in large part the process of 
care and transfer of patients between acute care and post-acute care settings. 
On the other hand, bridging strategies entail the development and management of a 
dyadic relationship between a focal organization and other organizations. For example, 
instead of providing HH services itself, hospitals can have long-term contracts with 
outside HHAs for patient transfer and the coordination of care.  
As noted earlier, the BBA has tightened the reimbursement rates of Medicare for 
HH care. However, different hospitals have different proportions of Medicare patients, 
and as a result have received distinct degrees of reduction in reimbursement payment 
from the BBA. As discussed above, a hospital‘s reliance on PAC for discharging elderly 
patients has been an essential driver for hospitals to adopt a HH agency. Medicare 
beneficiaries are the major users of HH care and a significant portion of them are likely 
to require HH care after an inpatient discharge. A relatively higher proportion of 
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Medicare patient days would impose greater pressure on a hospital‘s discharge- planning 
activities as well as hospital reliance on PAC. Thus, the greater the Medicare inpatient 
day proportion in a hospital, the greater the need or reliance of the hospital on HH 
services. The following hypotheses are posited: 
Hypothesis 2a: Hospitals with higher proportions of Medicare inpatient days 
were more likely than those with lower Medicare inpatient day proportions to 
provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 2b: Hospitals with higher proportions of Medicare inpatient days 
were less likely than those with lower Medicare inpatient day proportion to 
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Hospital Financial and Professional Capability to Provide HH Care 
Nevertheless, providing HH services entails financial and professional/personnel 
capabilities which may not be present in every hospital. Hospitals without such 
capabilities may need to rely on bridging strategies in order to coordinate necessary HH 
care. The resources particularly important for HH care provision include capital and 
nursing resources. One factor that may directly influence hospital offering of HH care is 
the financial status of hospitals. Hospitals with better financial status (e.g., higher profit 
margins) may have more resources to provide services in addition to acute care services 
which are the core business of general hospitals. Also, HH services are provided largely 
by nursing professionals without whom a hospital may experience difficulties in offering 
or maintaining HH services. Nursing capability in a hospital can be reflected through the 
nursing density (e.g., the fraction of total FTEs accounted for by nursing staff) in the 
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hospital. Hospitals with higher nursing density should have more nursing capability than 
do those with lower nursing density. Therefore, one could expect that a hospital with a 
lower financial margin and lower nursing density may be less likely to have 
hospital-based HH services and more likely to discontinue HH programs after the BBA. 
Hence: 
Hypothesis 3a: Hospitals with less financial ability were less likely than those 
having more financial ability to provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 3b: Hospitals with less financial ability were more likely than those 
having more financial ability to reduce HH services after the implementation 
of the BBA. 
Hypothesis 4a: Hospitals with higher nursing density were more likely than 
those with lower nursing density to provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 4b: Hospitals with higher nursing density were less likely than 
those with lower nursing density to reduce HH services after the 
implementation of the BBA. 
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 2 through 4 is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) draws on concepts from economics and 
contract law to form a theoretical model explaining how organizations provide the most 
efficient exchange in response to market failure (Williamson, 1975; 1985). While 
neoclassical economics basically posits that the market is the most efficient governance  
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 Figure 5. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 2-4 
structure for guiding exchanges through the price mechanism, contracts, and competition, 
TCE argues that in some circumstances organizations will do a better job at the exchange 
relationship. 
TCE emphasizes the transaction and suggests that the characteristics and scopes of 
transactions determine the desirable transacting form and organizational boundary. The 
theory points out that transaction forms include ―spot market‖, ―hybrid arrangement‖, 
and vertical integration. In a spot market, exchange buyers purchase goods or services 
directly from suppliers in the market without the establishment of any prior relationships. 
A hybrid arrangement for exchange refers to developing a mid- or long-term relationship 
through a contract or joint venture arrangement with suppliers to guide exchanges. In the 
final transaction form, vertical integration, buyers ultimately gains permanent control 
over the supplier, i.e., to internalize the transaction. Vertical integration is also 
characterized as ―hierarchy.‖ TCE suggests that the design and the boundary of an 
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organization are the result of the organization‘s continuing process of ―make or buy‖ 
decisions. 
TCE views organizations as boundedly rational and opportunistic. Not any 
negotiation and contract are perfect, and organizations cannot anticipate all the 
circumstances of every contract, due to their bounded rationality. This issue could be 
largely reduced, however, if organizations were always truthful and willing to fulfill 
fairly the agreement signed even the contract is not perfect. Yet organizations can be 
opportunistic, that is, seeking their self-interest with guile, risks can thus arise from 
contracts. In these cases, transaction costs will inevitably occur as organizations try to 
seek necessary information, monitor and enforce contracts, ensure exchanges, and 
resolve conflicts or the failure of contracts. These factors can contribute to the failure of 
the market. If transaction costs related to a certain transaction are too high, organizations 
tend to internalize the transaction, that is, to make the services or goods within the 
organization instead of buying them from the market. 
In addition to the human characteristics mentioned above, Williamson (1985) 
argues that a high level of transaction uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency will 
contribute to the exchange process preferring organization to market. Under these 
conditions, hierarchical arrangements, in spite of higher fixed costs in general, will result 
in overall lower transaction costs than markets. It is because disagreements involved with 
transactions can be enforced and opportunism can be reduced through ―managerial fiat‖ 
(Williamson, 1975). 
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Transaction cost economics is particularly useful in describing the fundamental 
basis and behavior of organizations in the case of market failure. Since health care 
systems or the hospital sector deviate significantly from the perfectly competitive market 
assumed by classic economics and indeed operate in the environment characterized as 
market failure, TCE is insightful in studying health care organizations (Stiles, Mick, and 
Wise, 2001). In addition, the delivery of health care can be viewed as the composition of 
transactions among providers, patients, payers, and suppliers. Transaction cost economics 
is a relevant theoretical lens in studying transactions among parties. In this light, hospital 
provision of PAC services can be considered as a hospital‘s intent and action to better 
organize its transactions related to the provision of care. TCE has been commonly 
applied by health services researchers to study the linkage between hospitals and 
provision of NH care (Chiu, 1995; Lucente, 2006), HH care (Xu, 2000), and LTC 
(Angelelli et al., 2003). 
As discussed earlier, the implementation of DRGs induced the need of hospitals to 
coordinate the continuum of care from acute to post-acute care services. Coordination 
involves administrative costs that are not directly related to the production of health care 
services. Hence, the concept of transaction costs in TCE offers a useful framework in 
understanding the issue regarding coordination costs in hospitals. 
In theory, hospitals can simply refer patients needing PAC to HHAs in the market 
(i.e., buying from the market), they can also establish some types of contracts or joint 
venture with these HHAs to coordinate the care process (i.e., hybrid arrangement), or 
they can set up and provide their own HH services (i.e., make the service through 
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hierarchical arrangement). According to TCE, hospitals with higher transaction 
uncertainty, frequency or quantity, and transaction complexity entail higher transaction 
costs related to the coordination between acute and post-acute continuum of care, thus 
being more likely to provide HH services themselves (Williamson, 1985; Stiles and Mick, 
1997). 
Transaction Uncertainty 
According to TCE, as transaction uncertainty increases, organizations tend to 
―make‖ the product or service they need instead of ―buy‖ it from a market place 
(Williamson, 1975; Scott and Davis, 2007). Therefore, hospitals facing greater PAC 
transfer uncertainty should provide their own HH services rather than depending on the 
services provided by other HHAs. If a hospital is located in a healthcare market with few 
HHAs relative to the size of the elderly population, the hospital may be faced with higher 
transaction uncertainty. In other words, in a hospital market where HH capacities are 
limited and many Medicare patients discharged by hospitals need HH services, it may be 
hard for hospitals to develop long-term and stable relations with HHAs. In this situation, 
provision of a hospital‘s own HH services may be preferred because it not only makes 
hospitals able to ensure Medicare patient resources but also reduces hospitals‘ 
dependence on other HHAs and maintains hospitals‘ autonomy. Both TCE and RDT are 
drawn upon to predict that: 
Hypothesis 5a: Hospitals in markets with fewer HH services relative to 
PAC-needing patients were more likely than those in markets with less limited 
facilities to provide HH services. 
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Hypothesis 5b: Hospitals in markets with fewer HH services relative to 
PAC-needing patients were less likely than those in markets with more 
services to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Transaction Frequency 
With respect to transaction frequency, a larger hospital or a hospital with a higher 
proportion of Medicare patients may need to interact with PAC facilities on a more 
frequent basis and thus experience higher transaction costs. As Chiu (1995) pointed out, a 
hospital with a greater number of Medicare patient days is likely to have more 
transactions with PAC facilities such as nursing homes and home health agencies. Larger 
hospitals in general have higher numbers of Medicare patient days. Also, larger hospitals 
generally have a greater proportion of Medicare patients and provide more services. Xu 
(2000) empirically revealed that hospital size is associated positively with hospital 
provision of HH care. It can thus be expected that larger hospitals would be more likely 
than their smaller counterparts to provide their own HH services and would be less likely 
to reduce HH care when HH turns unprofitable. Thus: 
Hypothesis 6a: Larger hospitals were more likely than smaller hospitals to 
provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 6b: Larger hospitals were less likely than smaller hospitals to 
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Transaction Complexity 
Finally, hospitals having patients with more complex medical conditions may face 
greater transaction complexity when it comes to coordinating the care their patients need 
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following release from acute care wards. For hospitals, discharging a patient with more 
complex medical conditions to a HHA tend to involve more coordination between the 
hospital and the HHA, thus driving up transaction complexity as well as transaction costs. 
In health services research, a case-mix index (CMI) is often used to measure the average 
medical complexity of the patients for an individual hospital. A CMI may also be related 
to average length of stays, contributing to the pressure on a hospital to discharge patients 
in a timely basis, thus influencing the pressure on hospitals to integrate HH care. 
Hospitals with higher CMIs tend to have longer average length of stays, thereby having 
to work harder to make patient discharge as smooth as possible in order to make beds 
available for new patients. Also, a hospital with a higher CMI may be more likely to 
provide HH services because these more medically complex patients are likely to need 
post-acute care following discharge. The greater transaction complexity could drive up 
the need of hospitals to provide and maintain their own HH services, thus:  
Hypothesis 7a: Hospitals with higher CMIs were more likely than those with 
lower CMIs to provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 7b: Hospitals with higher CMIs were less likely than those with 
lower CMIs to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 5 through 7 is 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory emphasizes that organizations not only are influenced by 
competitive and efficiency-based forces, but also are shaped by widely-held beliefs and  
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 Figure 6. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 5-7 
 
rule systems in their professions and societies – both in how they structure themselves 
and how they perform their works (Scott and Davis, 2007). 
The basic premises of institutional theory explain why organizations within sectors 
adopt similar structures, practices, and procedures. According to institutional theorists, 
organizations do so to increase their legitimacy (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Institutional 
theory views organizations as adaptive organisms reacting to the characteristics and 
commitments of participants and to pressures or influences from the external 
environment (Selznick, 1948). However, organizations do so not because of 
active/strategic choices, but by unintentionally conforming to environmental pressures. A 
certain set of factors largely composed of cultural-cognitive (e.g., common beliefs and 
values), normative (e.g., professional standards and certification), and regulative 
elements (e.g., rules, law, and sanctions) are thought to form the institutional 
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environment, providing meaning to organizational life and creating pressures for 
organizations to perform in conforming to these accepted values, standards, and rules.   
Institutional perspectives emphasize that organizations face environments 
characterized by norms, rules, and requirements that the organizations must conform to 
in order to receive legitimacy and social support (Scott and Davis, 2007). The pressures 
of institutional environments often have the effect of directing organizations‘ attention 
away from task performance and efficiency/effectiveness. That is, organizations may be 
attempting to seeking rational or economic goals (e.g., maximizing efficiency, 
effectiveness, and profits, minimizing costs, or fulfilling mission) while in fact they are 
conforming to the institutional constraints (Luke and Walston, 2003). 
Coercive Pressures 
From the perspective of institutional theory, an organization‘s behavior is 
influenced by certain institutional forces including coercive pressures, normative 
pressures, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). First, coercive pressures 
are usually expressed through the forms such as requirements or regulations from 
governments or sponsoring institutions. As mentioned previously, both governments and 
sponsoring churches may consider provision of necessary HH services as one of their 
major missions or duties, thus imposing more requirements or policies on their affiliated 
hospitals to offer HH services. In this regard, one may observe public and religious 
hospitals to be less responsive than their secular and for-profit counterparts to reduce HH 
care due to the implementation of the BBA. This discussion is in accordance with the 
hypotheses 1a to 1d proposed earlier. 
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Normative Pressures 
Another source of institutional forces is normative pressure resulting from social or 
professional norms. Hospital provision of HH care can be considered an action hospitals 
take to conform to environmental requirements when they are located in an area with a 
substantial elderly population. In an area having higher elderly density or higher growth 
rates of the elderly population, social norms for hospitals to provide better continuum of 
care should be greater. Hence, one would expect that hospitals in areas with higher 
elderly density or higher growth rates of the elderly population would have a higher 
probability of offering their own HH services and a lower probability of cutting these 
services after the BBA. Also, a higher density of elderly people or a growth rate in the 
elderly population in a market creates greater dependence of hospitals on Medicare 
patients, HH agencies, as well as a higher frequency and volume of elderly patients 
needing transfers to HH care settings. Thus: 
Hypothesis8a: Hospitals located in areas with higher proportions of elderly 
population were more likely than those in areas with lower elderly proportions 
to provide HH services. 
Hypothesis 8b: Hospitals located in areas with higher proportions of elderly 
population were less likely than those in lower elderly proportion areas to 
reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Hypothesis 9a: Hospitals located in areas with higher elderly population 
growth rates were more likely than those in areas with lower rates to provide 
HH care. 
69 
 
Hypothesis 9b: Hospitals located in areas with higher growth rates of elderly 
population were less likely than those in areas with slower rates to reduce HH 
services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Mimetic Pressures 
Mimetic isomorphism is the third institutional mechanism influencing 
organizations to adopt similar practices. Researchers have demonstrated spillover effects 
brought about by for-profit HCOs on nonprofit HCOs (Horwitz and Nichols, 2007), and 
vice versa (Grabowski and Hirth, 2003). If a for-profit hospital is located in a market 
occupied by public and nonprofit hospitals, it may be faced with greater mimetic pressure 
brought about by its non-profit neighboring counterparts. On the other hand, it is 
plausible that a nonprofit hospital located in a for-profit dominant market may exhibit 
behaviors similar to its for-profit neighbors, thus: 
Hypothesis 10a: Nonprofit hospitals located in markets with higher 
proportions of for-profit hospitals were more likely than those in markets with 
lower proportions to reduce HH services after the implementation of the BBA. 
Hypothesis 10b: For-profit hospitals located in markets with higher 
proportions of nonprofit hospitals were less likely than those in markets with 
lower such proportions to reduce HH services after the implementation of the 
BBA. 
A conceptual display of the relationships proposed in hypotheses 8 through 10 is 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
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 Figure 7. The Conceptual Illustration of the Relationships in Hypotheses 8-10. 
The hypotheses stated above are summarized in Table 3 with the major factors 
hypothesized to be associated with hospital provision and change in provision of HH care 
before and after the BBA. Expected directions of the relationships of interest are also 
shown in the table.
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Table 3. Summary of the Study Hypotheses and the Expected Results 
Hypotheses Determinants of hospital 
(change in) provision of HH 
care 
Expected Sign 
Likelihood 
of offering 
HH 
Likelihood of 
continuing HH 
post BBA 
Economics- 
Ownership 
   
H1a FP vs. Public  (-) 
H1b FP vs. NFP  (-) 
H1c NFP vs. Public  (-) 
H1d Secular vs. Religious NFP  (-) 
Resource 
Dependence 
   
H2a~H2b Level of hospital dependence 
on post-acute care- 
% Medicare inpatient days 
(+) (+) 
H3a~H3b Hospital financial capability- 
Hospital profit margin 
(+) (+) 
H4a~H4b Professional capability- 
Nursing density 
(+) (+) 
Transaction Cost    
H5a~H5b Uncertainty- 
Limited HHAs 
(+) (+) 
H6~H6b Frequency-Hospital size (+) (+) 
H7a~H7b Complexity-Hospital CMI (+) (+) 
Institutional Theory    
H8a~H8b Normative pressure- 
Elderly population % 
(+) (+) 
H9a~H9b Normative pressure- 
Elderly population growth 
rate 
(+) (+) 
H10a Mimetic pressure-FP market  NFP hospitals 
(-) 
H10b Mimetic pressure-NFP market  For-profit 
hospitals (+) 
(+) means positive association; (-) means negative association 
  
 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines the methodologies used to examine how hospital provision of 
HH services changed after the implementation of the BBA. This chapter first discusses 
the research design, followed by a discussion of study sample, data sources, and variable 
measurement. Some issues encountered in the process of data management and the 
methods used to address these issues are also described. Finally, the 
econometric/statistical approach used to analyze the data is presented. 
Research Design 
This study can be viewed as a natural experiment in which the BBA is the 
intervention. Of particular interest is whether or not the reduction of hospital-based HH 
services after the BBA differs for religious, secular nonprofit, or for-profit hospitals as 
compared with public hospitals which serve as the control group in the analytical model. 
A natural experiment approach is very relevant for policy evaluation (Meyer, 1995). 
More specifically, this study applies a time series non-equivalent control group 
design which is a quasi-experiment design in nature (Polit and Beck, 2004: 185-186). In 
this study, however, there is only one data-collecting point (i.e., 1997) in the pre-BBA 
period while there are six data-collecting points (years 1998 through 2003) in the 
post-BBA period. The conceptual illustration of this research design is depicted in Figure 
8. 
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Figure 8. A Conceptual Diagram of the Research Design 
 
As shown in Figure 8, the intervention of the natural experiment is the 
implementation of the BBA. Although the new reimbursement policies are universally 
applied to all HH agencies, hospital managers in different ownership forms should 
respond to the BBA differently due to their different operational objectives. For example, 
in the face of the BBA, for-profit hospitals may feel under greater pressure to reduce HH 
provision in order to avoid the loss of profit. In contrast, public and nonprofit hospitals 
may not perceive a need to reduce HH provision since financial incentive is only part of 
their objective equations. In this situation, four treatment groups with different expected 
responses to the intervention are naturally formed. Hence, the responses of any two 
For-profit Hospitals
Secular Hospitals
Religious Hospitals
Public Hospitals
For-profit Hospitals
Secular Hospitals
Religious Hospitals
Public Hospitals
Implementation of the BBA
HH provision before the BBA HH provision after the BBA
Comparison of the changes in HH provision 
Control for 
related  
organizational 
and market 
factors
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groups can be compared with one serving as the study group and the other as the control 
group. 
The core interest of this study is whether the changes in HH provision from the 
pre-BBA to the post-BBA years among the hospitals with different ownership types are 
different. As in a true experimental context, this question can be answered by comparing 
the changes in HH provision between any two hospital groups. However, this study did 
not control the assignment of hospitals into the treatment groups. That is, there is no 
random assignment in this natural experiment, thus the four treatment groups are not 
equivalent. Direct comparison among the groups can cause biases. Therefore, statistical 
controls for relevant organizational and market factors affecting hospitals are necessary. 
Internal Validity 
There are several benefits as well as potential issues associated with the study 
design applied. One major benefit of a natural experiment approach is that the issue of 
endogeneity (reverse causality between dependent and independent variables) can be 
largely avoided. This is because the intervention (i.e., the implementation of the BBA) 
was not determined by whether a particular hospital provided HH care or not. It is the 
BBA that affects hospitals‘ decisions to continue or to stop offering HH care, among 
other things. Scholars have suggested that natural experiments can provide strong 
evidence regarding the effect of an intervention on outcomes of interest if the comparison 
is thoughtfully designed to achieve equivalence between treatment and control groups 
(Polit and Beck, 2004:191). 
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In addition, this study design should be able to control for the threats to internal 
validity including testing, instrumentation, and regression to the mean. These threats are 
commonly present in longitudinal research. First, the threat of testing occurs when 
hospitals changed their HH provision because of the report of the data regarding HH 
provision in the baseline year (i.e., 1997). This is not likely to happen because this study 
uses a retrospective approach. No real experiment was actually conducted at the time of 
data reporting and collection, thus there is no artificial influence of researchers on 
hospitals‘ reporting of the data used. Also, the collection of the data used in this analysis 
was on a routine basis without any purpose specific to the study of HH provision. 
Second, the issue of instrumentation arises when there are unwanted changes in 
characteristics of the measuring instrument or in the measurement procedure (Singleton, 
Straits, Straits, and McAllister, 1988: 203). This is unlikely to occur in this study, either. 
As will be discussed in the data section, the collection instruments and procedures of the 
data applied had been relatively consistent and stable across time. No significant change 
in these aspects during the study period is observed. Also, the data for a particular 
variable across years are drawn consistently from one particular data source or a mix of 
two data sources to ensure the consistency of data across time. 
Third, the threat of regression to the mean usually increases when cases are 
selected for study based on their extreme performance in the baseline period and thus the 
results of the following measurements tend to regress to the mean, resulting in a bias. For 
this situation to be applicable here, hospitals would have to have been selected into the 
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analysis because they offered or did not offer HH care. This is obviously not the case 
here since all hospitals with data available are included in the analysis. 
However, by applying the time series nonequivalent control group pretest-posttest 
design, this study may be faced with the threats to internal validity including history, 
selection, maturation, and attrition. These threats arise largely because nonequivalent 
groups are employed. There may be significant differences in development trends (e.g., 
growth in hospital size, tendency of financial performance, etc.), hospital closure, 
likelihood of being included in the analysis, and the external policy or regulatory 
environments among different hospital ownership groups. Most of the selection and 
maturation issues may be addressed through controlling for relevant organizational and 
market factors in the analytical model. However, if certain characteristics mentioned 
above are unable to be controlled for and are important to the hospital decisions to offer 
or not to offer HH care, biases will occur. 
There are several notable sources of threats to internal validity for which it may not 
be possible to effectively control. First, there might be history threats present in this study. 
Since the BBA may not be the only policy that affects HH reimbursement payments in 
the study period, other policies might also have similar effects which could potentially 
impact the relationship of interest. Nevertheless, the BBA is widely recognized to be the 
single, most influential federal health care policy enacted in the study period that directly 
impacted HH reimbursement payments. Thus, the reduction of payments and profitability 
for HHAs in this period should be largely attributable to the BBA. Other researchers 
have applied the same assumption to the evaluation of the impact of the BBA (McCall, 
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Petersons, Moore, and Korb, 2003). In addition to the BBA representing the major 
federal health care reimbursement policy, states might have enacted their own 
reimbursement policies as well in the study period. An analytical model including state 
dummies is conducted in order to control for the effects of state policies. However, this 
approach controls for only differences among states throughout the study period but not 
state changes in related policies across time period. Ideally this issue can be addressed 
through including all the interaction terms between the state and year dummy variables. 
Yet this can result in a very tedious model in which 300 additional interactions terms 
need to be included. Although the effects could be a potential limitation to this study, 
they should be minor since it is unlikely that a large number of states enacted major 
policies significantly changing HH reimbursement schemes in this time period.  
Selection threats are the second concern to the internal validity of this study. 
Although a number of organizational and market factors supposed to be associated with 
hospital provision of HH care are controlled for in the analysis, selection biases can 
occur if the hospitals not included in the sample are significantly different from those in 
the sample in characteristics important to this study. Fortunately, this issue should be 
minor since the AHA survey has high coverage and response rates. As will be described 
later, this study includes all the hospitals which are in the study population category and 
reported to the AHA surveys in the study period. Thus, the representativeness of the 
sample should be satisfactory. Nevertheless, some observations in the data have missing 
values or outliers in a number of independent variables. Sample selection biases can be 
present if the observations with missing values or outliers in the key variables are omitted. 
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This issue is addressed through the application of data imputation techniques and the 
inclusion of dummy variables indicating observations with missing values or outliers for 
each major variable with a significant number of missing values or outliers. 
Third, there might be attrition or mortality threats resulting from the reduction in 
the number of sample hospitals over time due to closure or non-response. If the hospital 
closure or non-response is associated systematically with ownership types and the 
likelihood to continue or discontinue HH provision, the results could be biased. 
Fortunately, the degree to which this is an issue can be examined and is addressed by 
including a dummy variable indicating those observations from hospitals reporting to 
AHA in some early years but not seen in later years. 
External Validity 
There might be anticipatory or expectancy effects of hospitals in response to the 
BBA which is a threat to external validity. For instance, some hospitals offering HH 
services might discontinue HH care as the Act was being proposed and discussed before 
1997. Also, some hospitals might have decided not to adopt a HH agency due to the 
anticipated reduction in HH reimbursement payment before the Act was implemented. 
These effects can result in an under estimation of the overall effect of the BBA on the 
reduction in hospital-based HH provision. Unfortunately, these effects are hard to 
empirically evaluate. However, these anticipated effects may not significantly impact the 
relationship of interest since the total number of hospital-provided HH agencies kept 
growing in 1995, 1996, and 1997, and started declining only in 1998. Therefore, this 
study should be able to reveal the relationship of interest to a satisfactory degree. 
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Construct Validity 
Threats to construct validity in this study may be minor since a natural experiment 
occurs in a natural setting without artificial intervention and manipulation of the study 
process. Thus, most of the threats to construct validity such as demand traits, 
experimenter expectancy, novelty effects, compensatory rivalry/equalization effects, and 
instrument issues may not exist. However, efforts are still needed to obtain adequate 
operationalization of the construct, clearly-defined measures that reflect all properties of 
construct, and representativeness of variables. 
Econometric Approach and Model Specification 
Following the work of Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995) who applied a natural 
experiment to examine the changes in workers‘ injury duration after changes in workers‘ 
compensation policies, this analysis applies the approach of independently pooled 
cross-sections across time. Specifically, a difference-in-difference analysis is employed 
to test the hypotheses. In this study, the unit of observation is an individual hospital in a 
particular year. A logit model is used to estimate the following equation: 
hhprovi, year=F[β0 + β1profiti, year + β2religiousi, year + β3seculari, year + B4Y98-03 + B5(profiti, 
year x Y98-03) + B6(religiousi, year x Y98-03) + B7(seculari, year x Y98-03)+ B8Xi, 
year+B9(Xi, year x Y98-03) + β10 (profiti, year x nfp_marketi, year)+ β11 [(religiousi, 
year + seculari, year) x fp_marketi, year ] + B12 [(religiousi, year + seculari, year) x 
fp_marketi, year x Y98-03] + B13(profiti, year x nfp_marketi, year x Y98-03) + B14Zi, 
year + εi, year 
Where: 
Logit model F(x) = 1/(1+e
-x
) = probability of offering hospital-based HH care 
hhprovi, year represents whether a hospital provided its own HH care in a particular year. 
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profiti, year, religiousi, year , and seculari, year represent the ownership types, i.e., for-profit, 
religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit, of hospitals, while public hospitals serve 
as the reference category. 
Y98-03 is a set of dummy variables representing the years 1998 to 2003 (post-BBA), while 
the year 1997 is the base group (pre-BBA). 
Xi, year is a vector of independent variables indicating relevant organizational and market 
factors in addition to the ownership variables.  
nfp_marketi, year and fp_marketi, year indicate the degree to which a hospital market is 
dominated by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, respectively, in a particular year. 
Zi, year is a vector of control variables. 
εi, year is the error term of the model. 
These variables will be discussed in detail in the section ―Variables and Measures.‖ 
The coefficients of most interest to this project are coefficient vectors B5~ B9 and B12~ 
B13. For example, hypothesis 1 states that, other things being equal, for-profit hospitals as 
a whole are more likely than their public counterparts to reduce the provision of HH 
services after the implementation of the BBA. If this hypothesis is supported, all of the 
coefficients (i.e., B5) of the interaction terms of the for-profit hospital dummy (using 
public hospitals as a base group) and year dummies (yr98~yr03, using yr97 as a base 
group) should be negative, meaning that for-profit hospitals had a greater reduction in 
HH provision after the BBA compared to public hospitals. It should be noted that this 
study applies difference-in-difference estimation with independently pooled 
cross-sections across time rather than a panel approach. Hence, the result should not be 
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interpreted as the difference in the likelihood of dropping hospital-based HH care after 
the BBA between a typical individual hospital of a particular ownership form and a 
typical hospital in the base group. Instead, the result should be understood as the 
difference in the likelihood of reducing HH services after the BBA between the whole 
group of the hospitals in a particular ownership form and the whole base group. The 
expected signs and relationships of the coefficients in the analytical model are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The Expected Coefficients for the Testing of the Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Determinants of hospital (change in) 
provision of NH and HH care 
Expected Coefficient 
H1a FP vs. Public B5<0 
 
H1b NFP vs. FP |B6| and |B7| < |B5|;  
B6, B7 <0 
H1c NFP vs. Public Β6 and B7<0 
 
H1d Secular vs. Religious NFP |B6| < |B7| 
 
H2a~H9a Other organizational and market factors 
derived from organization theories 
 
B8>0 
 
H2b~H9b B9>0 
 
H10a Mimetic pressure-NFP in FP market B12<0 
 
H10b Mimetic pressure-FP in NFP market B13>0 
The model specified above is able to explore the relationship between the 
implementation of the BBA and the relative change in HH care provision among 
hospitals of different ownership types over time. Including the year dummy variables and 
the interaction terms with year dummy variables makes the model relatively flexible and 
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capable of detecting any potential time pattern concerning the change in HH provision 
without assuming a particular pattern of change over time. 
Since the dependent variable is a simple binary variable, a logit or probit model for 
examining HH provision is relevant for analyzing the data. The statistical analysis 
applies the logit model since it is widely applied in health research. The result of logistic 
regression can be interpreted through odds ratios which are familiar to health science 
researchers and can be easily constructed using the coefficients of the independent 
variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2004). 
There may be heteroskedasticity in the model because the probability of offering 
HH care in a hospital is unlikely to be independent across time (Horwitz, 2005a). For 
example, if a hospital provided HH services in 1997, the hospital should be more likely 
than those not provided to offer HH care in the following years. Therefore, the issue of 
potential heteroskedasticity is addressed through a cluster-robust-VCE 
(variance-covariance matrix of the estimators) estimator where the observations from a 
particular hospital are treated as a cluster (Baum, 2006: 138). By applying the 
cluster-robust-VCE estimator, the estimates of the coefficients are not affected but the 
standard errors can be corrected. 
Study Population and Sample 
The population of this study includes all U.S. non-federal short-term, acute-care 
general hospitals operated in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The sample used 
for this study is composed of the short-term, acute-care general hospitals included in the 
AHA annual survey data sets of 1997 through 2003. Because federal 
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government-sponsored hospitals such as VA hospitals, military hospitals, and hospitals in 
the Indian reservations are intended to meet the health care needs of very specific 
population groups, these federal hospitals are excluded from this study. However, 
non-federal public hospitals such as state, county, and city hospitals serve the general 
public. As such, they are included in the study sample as are all private hospitals. In this 
study, short-term, acute-care general hospitals include those non-federal hospitals that 
provide ―general medical and surgical services‖ in the AHA survey. 
Figure 9 graphically illustrates the relationship between the population and the 
sample to be studied using the data in 1997 as an example. According to AHA, over 
6,500 hospitals are surveyed annually, including AHA registered hospitals as well as 
non-registered hospitals which are identified with help from state and local associations, 
Medicare and Medicaid centers, national organizations and governmental bodies (AHA, 
2009b). The response rate of the survey is also high, around 85 percent (AHA, 2006). 
The representativeness of the sample to the population should be acceptable. 
Figure 9 only shows the sample in one year, the number of hospitals included in the 
AHA survey and in the sample of each year is listed in Table 5. It can be seen from the 
table that the sample size in each year slightly declined over the study periods. 
Data Source 
Data are drawn from a variety of sources for this study. The source of data for 
hospital characteristics largely comes from the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
Annual Survey of Hospitals datasets of 1997 through 2003. Financial indicators and the 
case mix index for hospitals are from hospital cost report datasets and case mix index  
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Figure 9. The Population and Sample of a Particular Year (e.g., 1997) in the Study Period 
 
Table 5. Numbers of Hospitals in the Data Source and in the Sample by Year 
Year Number of hospitals in 
the AHA data file 
Number of hospitals 
in the sample 
Number of hospitals 
in HCRIS data file 
1997 6,299 4,810 6,056 
1998 6,247 4,772 6,053 
1999 6,116 4,703 6,019 
2000 6,044 4,661 5,894 
2001 6,003 46,27 5,823 
2002 6013 4,600 5,721 
2003 6,008 4,608 4,803 
Total 42,730 32,781 40,396 
 
files released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Market data at 
the county level are derived from the Area Resource File (ARF) datasets of 2006 and 
2001 (including related data in the study years). The information regarding state 
All U.S. hospitals in 
year 1997
Hospitals that did 
not report to AHA 
surveys in 1997 
Population
All U.S. non-federal general 
acute-care hospitals operating 
in 50 states and D.C. in 1997
Sample
All U.S. non-federal general 
acute-care hospitals operated 
in 50 states and D.C. and 
reported to AHA surveys in 
1997
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Certificate of Need (CON) regulations is obtained from the website of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures. 
The AHA annual surveys provide probably the most comprehensive data for the 
U.S. hospitals. The survey started in 1946, made a significant expansion of the datum 
elements collected in 1980, and has been largely stable in content since then (AHA, 
2009b). The survey data file provides information concerning hospital structure, facilities 
and services, utilization, staffing, financial status, location, and community benefit. The 
AHA data file currently contains more than 1,000 data items. However, most of the 
financial data reported by participating hospitals are not shown in the publicly released 
files. The strengths of the AHA survey data include its stable, regular, consistent 
administration of the survey, and the comprehensive scope as well as high coverage and 
response rates. These benefits make them a relatively trustworthy data source for 
hospital-related research. 
However, the AHA data file has certain weaknesses. The survey is entirely based 
on self reports from voluntarily participating hospitals, making it hard to ensure data 
quality. Although the response rate is generally high and AHA staff has made an effort to 
validate the data, missing values and outliers in many variables still can be found in the 
dataset. There may be also inconsistency in the report of data of a particular hospital 
across time if the hospital staff responsible for reporting data changes. Thus, a careful 
check and thoughtful management of the data are needed in using the AHA data files. 
The CMS‘s hospital cost report files (also known as Healthcare Cost Report 
Information System, HCRIS, datasets) are publicly available data sources providing 
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comprehensive sets of financial information of Medicare-certified hospitals. All 
Medicare-certified hospitals are required by the CMS to submit annual cost reports. The 
HCRIS datasets have very detailed pieces of hospital financial data, including the 
revenues and costs of hospital-based health care facilities such as skilled nursing 
facilities, HHAs, hospice, and renal facilities, etc. The CMS has made a reasonable effort 
to ensure that the data provided are up-to-date, accurate, complete, and comprehensive at 
the time of disclosure (CMS, 2009a). One potential issue with the HCRIS data is that the 
reporting period of each hospital in the annual file is not identical, making it sometimes 
hard to compare a particular financial indicator across hospitals. 
The CMS also provides hospital case-mix index (CMI) annual files through its 
website. A hospital‘s CMI is computed and provided by CMS every year based on the 
DRGs undergone in the hospital. According to the CMS (2005), a hospital's CMI 
represents the average diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for that hospital. It 
is calculated by summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by 
the number of discharges. 
The Area Resource File is currently created and maintained by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. The ARF is a collection of data from more than 50 sources, including the 
American Medical Association, AHA, US Census Bureau, CMS, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics, and so on. It is a database containing 
more than 6,000 variables for each of the nation's counties. The basic county-specific 
Area Resource File (ARF) is the nucleus of the overall ARF System. The ARF contains 
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information on health facilities, health professions, measures of resource scarcity, health 
status, economic activity, health training programs, and socioeconomic and 
environmental characteristics (HRSA, 2009). These data have been widely used by 
health researchers, planners, and practitioners to study the nation's health care delivery 
system and factors that may impact health status and health care in the U.S. Thus, that 
this study defines a hospital‘s market to be the county where the hospital is located. This 
definition of market-related measures has been commonly applied by other health 
services researchers (Alexander and Morrisey, 1989; Chiu, 1995). 
Finally, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website provides 
information on state CON regulations used in this study (NCSL, 2009). On the NCSL 
website, states with CON programs, dates of programs, as well as state CON information 
contacts and websites are listed. There is also information on states with CON programs 
by different types of facility such as HHAs, acute care hospitals, long-term care, and so 
on. The information on whether a particular state had a HH agency CON program in the 
study period is used in this study as a control variable.  
Data Management 
Data Integration 
Several steps are taken to integrate the separate data files into a final sample with 
all the data needed for this analysis. The process used to combine these data sources is 
illustrated in Figure 10. First, yearly files with the necessary data from each of the AHA, 
ARF, CMI, and HCRIS files are created, separately. Unused variables in the AHA files of 
1997 to 2003 are removed from each of the seven original AHA files. Data in the ARF  
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Figure 10. Data Sources and the Process of Data Integration 
 
yearly files are retrieved from the 2001 and 2006 ARF files. The two files include most 
of the data needed in the 7-year period except for the information regarding three items: 
(1) number of population age 65 and over in the county for year 2000, (2) per capita 
income in the county for year 2000, (3) number of HH agencies in the county for years 
1998 and 1997. The missing variables in the first and second items are created by using 
the mean of the values in 1999 and 2001 for each item. The missing variables in the third 
item are created by using proportional interpolation between the values of 1999 and 1994. 
The rationale behind these solutions is that the statistics in each item are quite consistent 
with a certain trend pattern across the years. Then seven yearly ARF files with data used 
in the analysis are created.  
All the necessary data associated with hospital financial reports for the study time 
period can be found in three HCRIS worksheet files, including worksheets A, G2, and G3. 
AHA 1997ARF 1997 HCRIS 1997
CMI 1997
County 
code
Medicare 
provider No.
Medicare 
provider No.
Data 1997
Data 1998
Data 2003
Combined Data 
1997~2003
State HH CON
State code
Final Data 
Set
HCRIS Combined files: 
Worksheets A, G2, G3
ARF 
2001
Merge files
Create files
Retrieve data
ARF 
2006
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Each of the worksheet files contains hospital cost report periods covering 1996 through 
2003. Yearly data needed are retrieved from each worksheet file. The selection of the 
yearly data is based on the criterion that the report period covers the first day (i.e., 1
st
 of 
January) of the year. For example, the data for year 1997 are selected if the data are in a 
report period that covers January 1, 1997. The use of this criterion is based on the fact 
that most hospitals have a fiscal year from October 1 to September 30 of the following 
year. The fiscal year of 1997 usually covers the January 1, 1997. Thus, the criterion used 
is in general be in accordance with the fiscal year period used in other data sources. The 
hospitals respectively retrieved from the three HCRIS worksheet files for a particular 
year are the same. The yearly data of the three files are then merged to form a yearly 
HCRIS data file. The number of hospitals in each yearly HCRIS data file is listed in 
Table 5. 
The second step is to merge these separate yearly files to form a combined yearly 
data file. The AHA yearly file serves as the master file in the merging process. For 
example, 1997 ARF, CMI, and HCRIS files are merged with the 1997 AHA file. To 
merge the HCRIS and CMI files with the AHA file, Medicare provider ID number is used 
as the merge variable. In merging the ARF and AHA files, the merge variable is the 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) state and county code. The result is the 
creation of a 1997 data file. 
After the seven yearly data files are created, the third step is to join these yearly 
files to form a combined data file with all data for the seven years. The last step in the 
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process is to merge the combined data file with state HH CON file in order to create a 
final dataset for the analysis. 
However, after examining the data in the final dataset, almost 1,000 observations 
with a blank in the Medicare provider ID are identified. Since the Medicare provider ID 
is a key variable used in the merging process, this blank may cause unexpected errors in 
the process. Therefore, an effort was made to match Medicare provider ID numbers to 
those hospitals with missing values in the yearly AHA datasets. This work was done 
through tracking the Medicare provider ID for each hospitals included in the sample 
through another hospital ID, the AHA hospital ID, which is a unique number for each 
hospital in the AHA dataset. This step resulted in a dramatic reduction of the number of 
hospitals in the sample with a blank in Medicare provider ID to 52. The number of 
observations in the sample with a blank in Medicare provider ID was decreased from 
more than 800 to 139. Since some hospitals indeed do not have a Medicare provider ID 
(communication with Kimberly Garber, AHA staff, 8/31/2009), probably because they 
are not Medicare-certified hospitals, these hospitals and observations are removed from 
this study. Thus, the final sample size becomes 32,642. 
Data Cleaning 
As expected, many observations with missing values and/or outliers are observed 
as shown in Table 6. The following steps were taken to deal with these issues: 
Step 1: One observation has a total FTE equal to zero and another one has a zero RN 
FTE, which are unlikely to be correct. These two outliers were replaced by the 
mean of the values of the same hospital in other years (i.e., the hospital mean). 
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Table 6. The Numbers of Observations with Missing Values and/or Outliers 
Variable # of obs with 
missing values 
in original data 
# of obs 
with 
outliers 
# of obs with missing 
values after filling in 
the hospital mean 
Missing 
dummy 
variable 
CMI 1,587  486 cmi_d 
County population 171  168 pop_d 
Elderly population 171  168 
Elderly population 
growth rate 
171  168 
Number of HHAs 171  168 
Unemployment rate 171  168 
Per capita income 171 114 280 income_d 
Medicare inpatient days 1  0  
Hospital net income 3,384  659 Used to 
calculate 
hospital 
total profit 
margin 
Hospital patient revenue 3,519  695 
Hospital other revenue 3,919  759 
RN FTE 0 1 0 Used to 
calculate 
nursing 
FTE % 
Hospital total FTE 0 35 0 
Medicare % 0 7 0  
Nursing FTE % 0 5 0  
Hospital total profit 
margin 
773 776 773 margin_d 
 
Step 2: One observation has a missing value in Medicare inpatient days. The hospital 
mean was imputed for the missing value. 
Step 3: 1,587 observations have a missing value in CMI. Since the CMI of a hospital 
does not vary dramatically across years, the hospital means were first calculated 
and imputed, reducing the number of observations with a missing value to 486. A 
dummy variable was created to indicate those observations that still have a 
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missing value. Then the mean of the variable calculated from the total sample (i.e., 
the sample mean) was imputed for these observations. The dummy variable 
(cmi_d) is included in the analytical model to control for potential bias caused by 
the imputation. 
Step 4: 171 observations were founded to have missing values in the items from the ARF 
files, such as county population, elderly population, number of HH agencies in 
the county, and so forth. Based on the fact that these statistics in general do not 
fluctuate significantly in the study period, the hospital means were used to impute 
for each item, decreasing the number of observations with a missing value to 168. 
A dummy variable, pop_d, was created to indicate those observations that still 
have a missing value. Then the overall sample mean of each item was calculated 
and imputed for these observations. 
Step 5: More than 3,000 observations have missing values for hospital net income, 
patient revenue, and other revenue. The imputation of the hospital means results 
in a reduction of the number of observations with missing values in hospital net 
income, patient revenue, and other revenue to 659, 695, and 759, respectively. 
Step 6: A ratio variable, hospital total profit margin, was created by dividing net income 
by the sum of patient revenue and other revenue. This calculation resulted in 773 
missing values. In addition, three values are greater than one which is 
unreasonable. Recoding these outliers as missing resulted in 776 observations 
with a missing value in this variable. The hospital means were first calculated and 
imputed, reducing the number of observations with a missing value to 763. A 
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dummy variable, margin_d, was created to indicate those observations that still 
have a missing value. Then the sample mean was calculated and imputed for these 
observations. 
Step 7: Seven observations have a Medicare inpatient day percentage over 100 percent 
which should be incorrect. Thus, these outliers were replaced by the hospital 
means.   
Step 8: Five observations have a nursing FTE ratio greater than one which is abnormal. 
These outliers were replaced first by the hospital mean, then by the sample 
mean. 
Step 9: For the per-capita income variable, 171 observations have a missing value and 
168 observations have a value equal to zero which is unreasonable. After filling 
with hospital means, there still are 280 observations with either a missing value or 
a zero. Thus, these outliers and missing values were replaced by the entire sample 
mean and a dummy variable, income_d, is created to indicate these observations.   
The methods applied to manage the missing variables, missing values and outliers 
are summarized in Table 7. 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable, HH provision, is whether a hospital provided HH care of 
its own in each of the years 1997 through 2003. Two pieces of information from the 
HCRIS and AHA files are used to create this variable. First, the variable is coded as ―1‖  
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Table 7. Methods Used to Address Missing Variables, Missing Values, and Outliers 
Variable Problem Action taken 
County population 65+ in 
2000 
Missing variable Created by using the mean of the values in 
1999 and 2001 
County per capita income in 
year 2000 
Missing variable 
# of HH agencies in county in 
1998 and 1997 
Missing variable Created by using the proportional 
interpolation of the values in 1999 and 
1994 
Medicare inpatient days Missing value Imputed by using the mean of the values 
of the same hospital in other years 
Hospital FTE Outlier Replaced by the hospital mean of the 
values in other years Hospital RN FTE Outlier 
CMI Missing value Imputed by using the mean of the values 
of the same hospital in other years. A 
dummy variable is created to indicate 
those observations still having a missing 
value; then the sample mean is imputed 
for those observations. 
County unemployment rate Missing value Imputed by using the mean of the values 
of the same hospital in other years. A 
dummy variable is created to indicate 
those observations still having a missing 
value; then the sample mean is imputed 
for those observations. 
County population Missing value 
County elderly population Missing value 
County elderly population 
growth rate 
Missing value 
Number of HH agencies in 
county 
Missing value 
County per capita income Missing value and 
outlier 
Imputed by using hospital means. A 
dummy variable is created to indicate 
those observations still having a missing 
or a zero value; then the sample mean is 
imputed for those observations. 
Hospital net income Missing value Imputed by using the mean of the values 
of the same hospital in other years Hospital patient revenue Missing value 
Hospital other revenue Missing value 
Medicare/total inpatient days Outlier Replaced by the hospital mean 
Nursing FTE/Total FTE Outlier Replaced first by the hospital means, then 
by the sample mean 
Hospital total profit margin Missing value and 
outlier 
Imputed or replaced first by hospital 
means. A dummy variable is created to 
indicate those observations still having a 
missing value; then the sample mean is 
imputed for those observations. 
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if a hospital had a nonzero HH revenue data as reported in the HCRIS file in a particular 
year. However, many hospitals are missing HH revenue. Most of these hospitals might 
not provide HH care, but some might simply fail to report their HH revenue. Also, in the 
data merging process, there are 3,179 observations belonging to hospitals included in the 
AHA files but not in the HCRIS file. In consequence, these observations do not have 
information regarding their HH revenue not because they did not provide HH care, but 
simply because there are no associated data in the HCRIS file. As such, the information 
regarding HH provision in the AHA file is used as supplementary information. 
Specifically, for those observations not identified with a HH revenue, if the 
corresponding hospital reported to the AHA that it provided or owned HH services, the 
variable is also coded as ―1‖. Otherwise, the variable is coded as ―0‖. 
According to the AHA annual hospital survey, HH care is defined as services 
providing nursing, therapy, and health-related homemaker or social services in the 
patient‘s home. The AHA survey asks hospitals to report whether HH services are 
provided through one or some of the following arrangements: (1) my hospital or its 
subsidiary; (2) my health system (in my local community); (3) my network (in my local 
community); and (4) a formal contractual arrangement or joint venture with another 
provider that is not in my system or network (in my local community). In measuring the 
objective function of the hospital, the first arrangement category should be the most 
relevant since in this arrangement the financial responsibility of the HH services is 
directly borne by the hospital. 
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The rationale behind the use of the HCRIS as the major source and the AHA as 
the supplementary source of the information for the dependent variable is that, in general, 
the HCRIS information is more reliable than that in the AHA file. As mentioned earlier, 
the HCRIS data come from hospital cost reporting which is required by CMS, while the 
AHA data are based on voluntary reports from hospitals. Altogether, the AHA and 
HCRIS data are inconsistent for around 14 percent (3,623/25,500) of the sample, after 
excluding those observations belonging to hospitals present only in the AHA but not the 
HCRIS files or those having a missing value in HH provision in the AHA files. 
Independent Variables 
There are a number of independent variables of particular interest to this study. 
The first set of independent variables includes ownership indicators identifying public 
(Public), religious not-for-profit (Religious), secular private not-for-profit (Secular), and 
for-profit (For-profit) hospitals, respectively. In the analytical models the omitted public 
ownership type serves as the reference group. The second group of independent variables 
contains year dummies (year‘98~year‘03) used to capture the responses of hospitals as 
regards HH provision after the implementation of the BBA. Each year dummy is coded 
as ―1‖ if an observation is from a particular year of interest. For example, yr00 is coded 
as ―1‖ if an observation is from the year 2000 and as ―0‖ otherwise. As mentioned earlier, 
most of the BBA reimbursement policies were phased in or were implemented in 1998 or 
later. Although HH IPS began being phased in the third quarter of 1997, it was not fully 
implemented until October 1998. Hence, year 1997 was about 1 year before the 
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implementation of HH reimbursement policies mandated by the BBA and is used as a 
baseline year for comparison.  
The third set of independent variables comprises interaction terms between the 
ownership dummies and the year dummies. The inclusion of these interaction terms in 
the model is to reveal the change in the likelihood of an ownership form to offer 
hospital-based HH care following the implementation of the BBA relative to public 
hospitals. 
The fourth group of independent variables is composed of organizational factors 
drawn from related organizational theories, which are considered to be associated with 
hospital provision of HH services. The measures of these organizational factors are 
discussed below. 
The variable Medicare represents the percentage of total patient days in a hospital 
contributed by Medicare patients. This factor measures the dependence of the hospital on 
PAC such as HH care. Medicare discharges are most likely to demand HH services and a 
certain proportion of Medicare patients will need HH care following the discharge. Thus, 
a higher proportion of Medicare patients indicates a greater dependence on PAC. Here, a 
proportion of Medicare inpatient days rather than a number of Medicare inpatient days is 
employed, because the number of Medicare inpatient days also reflects hospital size. 
Larger hospitals usually have more resources (such as discharge planners) to deal with 
the transfer need, reducing their reliance on PAC. A proportional measure takes this 
aspect into account and isolates it from the effect of hospital size. In addition, inpatient 
days instead of discharges are used since inpatient days indicate the extent to which 
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patients need care which is important in considering potential needs for PAC. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the coefficient to this variable is expected to be positive. 
The total profit margin ratio (Margin) of hospitals in the corresponding years 
measures hospitals‘ financial ability to provide HH services. Here a hospital‘s total profit 
margin is calculated by dividing total net income by total revenue (i.e., both from 
operating as well as non-operating revenues) of the hospital in a particular period. A total 
profit margin ratio rather than operating margin ratio is employed to represent the overall 
financial resources the hospital has to offer, or to continue to offer, HH care in a 
financially pressing time period. Total profit margin may be more relevant for all 
hospitals since nonprofit hospitals may receive contributions or donations for providing 
unprofitable services. A total profit margin ratio takes this part of non-operating revenues 
into account. As discussed in the previous chapter, the coefficient to this variable is 
expected to be positive. 
Third, hospital nursing capacity is measured by nursing density (Nursing) which 
is the ratio of the number of nursing FTEs (including RN and LPN) to the total FTEs in a 
hospital and its subsidiary in a particular year. Ideally the FTE figures in the hospital unit 
rather than the total facility including the hospital‘s subsidiary should be used. However, 
the hospital unit figures needed for calculating the FTEs are either unavailable or 
incomplete in the AHA file. Hence, the FTE figures for the total facility are applied. 
Endogeneity may be present since a hospital with a HHA tends to have greater nursing 
FTEs compared to another hospital without a HHA. Yet the issue is somewhat reduced 
through dividing the nursing FTEs by the total FTEs of the total facility. Here, higher 
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nursing density indicates greater nursing capacity and expertise to provide HH services 
which rely largely on the nursing and related professions. The coefficient to this variable 
is also expected to be positive. 
In addition, Hospital size measured by the number of beds set up and staffed in a 
hospital is applied to indicate the transaction frequency. Also, hospital size is associated 
positively with hospital provision of services. In general, larger hospitals are more likely 
than smaller hospitals to provide diverse services in house. Therefore, the coefficient to 
this variable is expected to be positive. 
Furthermore, the variable, case-mix index (CMI), measuring the medical 
complexity of the overall patient condition in a hospital is used to represent the 
transaction complexity the hospital is faced with when transferring patients to HH care. A 
hospital‘s CMI is computed and provided by CMS based on the DRG cases treated in the 
hospital that year. It should be noted that the CMI may only partially account for a 
hospital‘s general complexity of its patient condition. The degree to which the CMI can 
represent the construct depends on the share of Medicare patients in the hospital‘s total 
patients. Yet it has been widely utilized as a relative measure among U.S. hospitals of 
medical utilization and complexity of patients treated. As described in Chapter 3, the 
coefficient to this variable is expected to be positive. 
The fifth group of independent variables is composed of market factors drawn 
from related organizational theories, which are considered to be important for hospitals 
in providing HH services. The measures of these market factors are discussed below. 
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The variable (HHA/elderly) is employed to capture the transaction uncertainty of 
a hospital in transferring patients to HH agencies. The variable is the inverse of the ratio 
of the number of elderly people to the number of HHA in the county. Chiu (1995) used 
the ratio of the number of the elderly to the number of total nursing home beds in the 
county to measure transaction uncertainty in the linkage between hospitals and NHs. 
Here, a greater ratio of the number of elderly people to the number of HHA in the county 
could lead to a higher overall HH utilization rate in the local market, thus increasing the 
challenge for a hospital to discharge or transfer a patient to a HH setting. However, some 
counties had no HHA in one or some of the years in the study period. In this case, the 
ratio can be infinity, resulting in a missing value. To avoid this possibility, an inverse of 
the ratio is employed. Yet, the result regarding this variable should be interpreted in the 
opposite way in order to get the relationship between HH provision and transaction 
uncertainty. For example, a positive coefficient to this variable mean as transaction 
uncertainty increases, hospitals will be more likely to reduce HH care provision. 
According to the discussion presented in Chapter 3, the coefficient to this variable is 
expected to be negative. 
The variables used to measure normative pressures on hospitals concerning 
provision of HH services are the percentage of elderly population in a county in a 
particular year (Elderly) and the growth rate of the elderly population in a county during 
the study period (Growth). The former is the ratio of the number of the people age 65 or 
over to the total population in the county. The elderly population growth rate in a year is 
defined as the ratio of the increase in the elderly population in the past year to the elderly 
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population in the previous year (in percentage). For example, the growth rate in year 
2000 is calculated by [(change in county elderly population from years 1999 to 2000)/ 
county elderly population in 1999]*100. A greater proportion and growth rate of elderly 
in the county may imply a stronger social perception and expectation that HH care is 
needed. In a community with a stronger social expectation of such kind, existing health 
providers such as general community hospitals may be faced with more social pressure in 
order to provide HH care. Thus, the coefficients to these two variables are expected to be 
positive. 
The last two independent variables are for-profit market (FP market) and 
not-for-profit market (NFP market). The former is defined as the percentage of the 
number of total general hospital beds accounted for by for-profit general hospitals in the 
county; the latter is the percentage of the number of total general hospital beds accounted 
for by nonprofit and public general hospitals in the county. The two measures indicate the 
degree to which a market is dominated by for-profit or nonprofit hospitals. These 
variables are used to reveal the potential influence of a dominant ownership type on the 
hospital group with a different ownership form. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) also use FP 
and NFP markets to study the spill-over effects of hospitals in one ownership sector on 
the other regarding the provision of HH services. As described in the previous chapter, 
the coefficient to the interaction term between NFP hospitals and fp_market is expected 
to be negative, while the coefficient to the interaction term between FP hospitals and 
nfp_market is expected to be positive. 
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The set of organizational and market variables discussed above is followed by 
another group of independent variables including the interaction terms of those variables 
in the previous variable set and the year dummies. This set of variables is for exploring 
the influence of these organizational and market factors on hospital change in the 
provision of HH services after the implementation of the BBA. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the coefficients to these interaction terms are expected to be positive except for those 
between HHA/elderly and the year dummies. 
Control Variables 
Certain factors besides those stated above are expected to impact a hospital‘s 
decision to offer HH services. Hence, these factors are employed to mitigate the 
interaction effect of hospital ownership type and the BBA on hospital provision of HH 
care. The first two factors to be controlled for are hospital system affiliation and hospital 
teaching status. Here, two dummy variables (System and Teaching) are created to 
indicate whether a hospital is a member of a health/hospital system and of the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals (COTH) of the Association of American Medical Colleges, 
respectively. Specifically, system is coded as ―1‖ if a hospital has a system ID shown in 
the AHA file and as ―0‖ otherwise. Also in the AHA file, there is a variable indicating 
whether a hospital is a member of the COTH. It is coded as ―1‖ if the answer is yes, and 
as ―0‖ otherwise. 
Multi-hospital health systems, hospital networks or alliances, and vertically 
integrated healthcare system have emerged since the 1990s. The larger, diversified 
hospitals or health systems have sought to provide a more comprehensive continuum of 
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services to address the needs of patients/clients in their communities (Paone and Mullen, 
2005). If there are some types of arrangement in HH care provision among the local 
hospitals in a system so that HH resources can be shared, one might observe lower 
probabilities of offering HH care among individual system-affiliated hospitals. That is, 
the coefficient to the variable system is expected to be negative. Also, teaching hospitals 
are quite different from non-teaching hospitals in types of services and their health care 
workforce. Hence, hospital teaching status is commonly controlled for in health services 
research (Horwitz, 2005a; White and Begun, 1998/1999). Based on the fact that most of 
the teaching hospitals are also research institutions focusing largely on tertiary acute care, 
it is expected that theses hospitals are less likely to offer PAC such as HH services. Thus, 
the coefficient to the variable teaching is also expected to be negative. 
In addition, four environmental factors that could influence hospital provision of 
HH services are identified and controlled for in this study. The first factor is related to 
Certificate of Need (CON) laws or regulations in each state. States differ in CON 
regulations which exist to affirm whether a proposed acquisition, expansion, or creation 
of a healthcare facility is required to fulfill the needs of a community. Hence, in a state 
with CON, a hospital has to get approval from the state health department before it can 
construct a new major facility, acquire large/costly equipment, or expand certain services 
such as with HH agency (Chiu, 1995). CON may also create a binding bed constraint 
which can lead to different operating environments for HH agencies across states 
(Grabowski, 2001). Therefore, a dummy variable to be controlled for is the presence of 
HH CON in every state. The variable, HH CON, is coded as ―1‖ if a HH CON program 
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is present in a state, and as ―0‖ otherwise. It should be harder for hospitals located in a 
state with a HH CON program to establish HHAs compared to their counterparts in a 
state without the program. The coefficient to this variable is expected to be negative. 
The second environmental factor to be controlled for is a dummy variable (Rural) 
indicating whether a hospital is in a rural area. As mentioned earlier, PAC or LTC 
resources and needs may be different in rural areas versus urban areas (Chiu, 1995). As 
described in Chapter 3, this factor (being in a rural area) should be positively related to 
hospitals‘ decisions to provide HH care. This variable is coded as ―1‖ if the hospital is 
located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where population is under 100,000 and 
coded as ―0‖ otherwise. 
The last two environmental factors to be controlled for measure the ability to pay 
for healthcare services in the market. Here, two variables (Income and Unemployment) 
are employed. The former is per capita income while the latter is unemployment rate, 
both in the county where a hospital is located in a particular year. The data for the two 
variables are directly drawn from the ARF file and are shown in $1,000 and percentage, 
respectively. Per-capita income in different years is inflation-adjusted to year 2000 dollar 
through the general Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the CPI inflation calculator 
in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). 
Hospitals located in a market with a greater ability to pay for healthcare services such as 
HH services are more likely to continue to offer HH services than those located in a 
market with limited ability to pay. Since per capita income should be associated 
positively with local ability to pay for health care, the coefficient to this variable is 
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expected to be positive. On the other hand, due to unemployment rate in the county is 
associated negatively with local ability to pay for health care, the coefficient to this 
variable is expected to be negative. 
The measures and sources of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
discussed above are summarized in Table 8. 
Analytical Process 
With respect to the analysis of the data, the following steps are employed. First, 
descriptive statistics of and correlations between the study variables are presented. This 
is followed by bivariate analyses of the hospital provision of HH services by ownership 
types across years. These analyses provide the first glimpse of the relationships of 
interest to this study. Third, several model specifications with different sets of control 
variables are compared and a final model is selected for the primary analysis. As 
mentioned in the data section, many observations in the study sample have either missing 
values or outliers in key variables. Exclusion of these observations can cause sample 
selection bias. Value imputation techniques have been applied in order to keep these 
observations. Dummy variables indicating the observations with imputed values from the 
sample means are created to address the issue of sample selection bias resulting from the 
missing values in the independent variables. Model selection here is based on the 
significance of the coefficients to these missing dummy variables. Also, one model 
including the variable HH CON, and another one replacing HH CON with a whole set of 
state dummy variables are tested and compared, based on the pseudo-R
2
 and a joint test 
of the significance of the coefficients to the state dummies. 
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Table 8. Study Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
Variable Measure Source 
Dependent Variable   
HH provision ―1‖ if the hospital had a nonzero HH revenue 
in a particular year, or reported to AHA survey 
with ownership/provision of a HH if the HH 
revenue information is missing, and ―0‖ 
otherwise 
HCRIS & 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Ownership   
Public ―1‖ for a public hospital in a particular year 
and ―0‖ otherwise 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Religious 
  
―1‖ for a religious nonprofit hospital in a 
particular year and ―0‖ otherwise 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Secular  ―1‖ for a secular private nonprofit hospital in a 
particular year and ―0‖ otherwise 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
For-profit 
 
―1‖ for a for-profit hospital in a particular year 
and ―0‖ otherwise 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Years (base: 1997)   
Year‘98~Year‘03 
 
―1‖ if the observation is from the particular 
year and ―0‖ otherwise 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Organizational Factors   
Medicare Medicare inpatient days percentage in the 
hospital=[(#Medicare inpatient days)/( #total 
inpatient days)]*100 in a hospital 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Margin Total profit margin of a hospital in a particular 
year=[(total net income)/( total revenue)]*100 
 
HCRIS  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Nursing Ratio of the number of nursing FTEs to the 
total FTEs in a hospital and its subsidiary in a 
particular year 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Hospital size The number of beds staffed in a hospital in a 
particular year 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
CMI Case-mix index of a hospital in a particular 
year calculated by CMS 
 
CMI file 
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Market Factors   
HHA/elderly Ratio of the number of HHAs to the number of 
elderly people in the county=(# HHAs) /(# 
elderly in 1,000) in the county 
AHA 
(1997~2003); 
ARF (2006) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Variable Measure Source 
Elderly Elderly population percentage in the county in 
a particular year (in %) 
 
ARF 
(2006) 
Growth The average growth rate of elderly population 
in a county in a particular year=[(#elderly in 
the current year-#elderly in the previous year)/ 
#elderly in the previous year]*100 (in %) 
 
ARF 
(2006) 
FP market  The proportion of the number of total for-profit 
hospital beds to the total hospital beds in a 
county in a particular year (in %) 
 
AHA 
(1997 ~ 2003) 
NFP market  The proportion of the number of total nonprofit 
hospital beds to the total hospital beds in a 
county in a particular year (in %) 
 
AHA 
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Control Variables   
System ―1‖ if the hospital has a health system ID and 
―0‖ otherwise 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Teaching ―1‖ if a member of council of teaching hospital 
of the Association of American Medical 
Colleges and ―0‖ otherwise 
 
AHA  
(1997 ~ 2003) 
HH CON ―1‖ if a hospital is in a state with a HH CON 
program and ―0‖ otherwise 
 
NCSL Website 
http://www.nc
sl.org/program
s/health/cert-n
eed.htm 
Rural ―1‖ if the hospital‘s MSA code is 0 or 1, ―0‖ 
otherwise  
 
AHA 
(1997 ~ 2003) 
Income Per capita income in the county in a particular 
year (in $000) 
 
ARF 
(2001 & 2006) 
Unemployment Unemployment rate in the county in a 
particular year (in %) 
ARF 
(2001 & 2006) 
 
Once a final model specification is decided, logistic regression is conducted to 
comprehensively test each of the hypotheses proposed previously while holding other 
factors constant. This offers an opportunity to examine the relation between each variable 
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of interest on hospital provision and the change of provision following the 
implementation of the BBA. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is employed to examine the 
potential difference in the result between two different data arrangements for the 
dependent variable, hospital provision of HH services. 
Finally, in order to illustrate the relationships of major interest to this study, 
simulated probabilities of HH provision by the four ownership types in years 1997 
through 2003 based on the result of the fitted model is plotted, holding the organizational 
and market factors constant. The flow of the analyses is shown in Figure 11. The 
statistical package Stata version SE 11.0 is employed to carry out the analyses. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis in five sections, 
basically following the process shown in Figure 11 described in the previous chapter. 
First, descriptive statistics showing characteristics of the sample and of the hospitals in 
each year are provided and discussed. This is followed by the presentation of results of 
bivariate analyses which contrast the characteristics of HH-offering and non-offering 
hospitals. Also, the percentages of hospitals with different ownership forms offering HH 
services across the study period are plotted and discussed. The third section describes the 
results of multivariate analyses. Before these results are presented, the decision process 
underlying the final model specification is described. In this section, the estimation of a 
full model including all the year dummy variables and the results will be presented. Each 
hypothesis is discussed based on the results of the full model. In order to reveal the joint 
effect of the post-BBA years, a reduced model replacing the dummy variables with a 
post-BBA variable is then estimated. While the results most relevant to the hypotheses 
are presented with the description of the results, the complete results of the multivariate 
analyses are shown in Appendix. The fourth section presents a sensitivity analysis to 
check the robustness of the model using different combinations of data sources for the 
dependent variable. This chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Statistics 
The characteristics of the study sample are presented in Table 9 by showing the 
key statistics including the mean, standard deviation, and range (minimum and maximum 
values). These statistics are based on the total observations (N=32,642) included in the 
final dataset for this analysis. Since some hospitals are not present in some years, each 
hospital is not equally represented in the dataset. Hence, these statistics should not be 
viewed as the statistics of the hospitals in the sample. However, these statistics provide 
an opportunity for examining the overall soundness of the study data. Special attention is 
directed to the range of the values of each variable since this information can be used to 
identify possible outliers. 
Looking first at the dummy variable indicators, slightly more than half of the 
sample provides HH care. Almost 50 percent of the observations belong to secular 
nonprofit hospitals, 25 percent public hospitals, 14 percent for-profit hospitals, and 11 
percent religious hospitals. Around half of the observations belong to hospitals in health 
systems or in rural areas. Twenty-nine percent of the sample observations are in a state 
with a HH CON program, and only 6 percent of the observations are from teaching 
hospitals.  
With respect to the continuous variables, the proportion of hospital inpatient days 
contributed by Medicare patients ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with a mean of 
48.8 percent for all the observations, which is reasonable. The mean of hospital total 
profit margin is 1.14 percent which is a bit lower if compared to 2 percent, a figure  
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent variable 
    
HH provision 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Ownership 
    
Public 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Religious 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Secular 0.49 0.50 0 1 
For-profit 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Organizational factors 
    
Medicare (%) 48.80 19.02 0.0 100.0 
Margin (%) 1.14 10.25 -484.9 99.7 
Nursing (%) 28.22 6.24 1.91 99.0 
Hospital size (# of beds) 170.74 177.71 2 2,518 
CMI 1.26 0.26 0.4 3.7 
Market factors 
    
HHA/elderly  
(# HHAs per 1000 elderly persons) 
0.32 0.37 0.0 5.1 
Elderly (%)  13.90 3.94 3.0 36.6 
Growth (%)  0.73 2.38 -22.8 48.9 
FP market (%) 12.39 23.14 0.0 100.0 
NFP market (%) 87.61 23.14 0.0 100.0 
Control variables 
    
System 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Teaching 0.06 0.24 0 1 
HH CON 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Rural 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Income ($000 in year 2000 dollar) 25.97 7.61 8.10 90.9 
Unemployment (%) 5.28 2.50 0.7 29.9 
N=32,642 
commonly used as the standard for the operating margin among U.S. hospitals (Zelman, 
McCue, Millikan, and Glick, 2003: 125). Although the range of the total profit margin is 
quite large, from -479.8 percent to 99.7 percent, it is not very surprising given the wide 
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operational and market variations among the U.S. acute-care general community 
hospitals. Likewise, the range of the proportion of the nursing FTEs in the total FTEs in 
the hospital and its subsidiary institutions is very large (from 1.91% to 99.0%), relative to 
its mean (28.22%) and standard deviation (6.24%). Also, a wide range (from 0.0 to 5.1) 
of the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly persons in the county is observed. Further 
examination of the observations related to these potential outliers found no particularly 
unreasonable data. Also, all these potential outliers were calculated using original values 
rather than imputed values. Thus, these values should be acceptable. Other continuous 
variables such as the number of hospital beds, hospital CMI, elderly population 
proportion and growth rate in the county, FP and NFP hospital market penetration ratios, 
and county per-capita income and unemployment rate have reasonable ranges and means. 
Hospital Statistics by Year, 1997-2003 
In order to examine the data in a more sensible way, descriptive statistics for the 
study variables are presented by year. These statistics provide more key characteristics 
specific to hospitals included in the sample each year, revealing the change in 
characteristics of interest of the sampled hospitals over the study period. A test statistic 
(F-value) to assess whether the means of a particular variable are equal across the years 
is also provided. As shown in Table 10, the proportion of hospitals offering HH care 
decreases from 60 percent to 42 percent and this decrease is statistically significant. The 
composition of hospitals by ownership type is by contrast generally stable between 1997 
and 2003. The mean of Medicare proportions drops significantly in 1999, but else remain 
consistent. The mean of hospital total profit margins declines significantly from 2.46  
113 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables, By Year 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
N 4,778 4,752 4,682 4,641 4,610 4,587 4,592 
Statistics 
Variable 
(F value) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
HH provision 
(92.8***) 
 
 
0.60 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.42 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Public  
(1.15) 
 
 
0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Religious  
(0.13) 
 
 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Secular  
(1.09) 
 
 
0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
For-profit  
(0.56) 
 
 
0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Medicare (%) 
(4.46***) 
 
49.16 48.37 47.68 49.06 48.84 49.32 49.20 
(19.02) (18.78) (19.15) (19.13) (19.01) (18.67) (19.36) 
[0,99] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,96] [0,96] [0,100] 
Margin (%) 
(19.72***) 
 
2.46 1.52 1.01 0.94 0.67 0.67 0.65 
(11.64) (9.18) (10.16) (10.96) (8.64) (9.96) (10.72) 
[-485,83] [-196,68] [-307,79] [-284,76] [-146,77] [-391,72] [-471,100] 
Nursing (%) 
(20.78***) 
 
28.71 28.63 28.46 28.24 27.69 27.70 28.10 
(6.38) (6.41) (6.34) (5.88) (6.04) (6.06) (6.49) 
[4.1,99.0] [5.4, 91.3] [1.9,80.9] [6.9,63.5] [5.7,83.1] [6.5,90.9] [5.9,84.6] 
HHA/elderly 
(26.42***) 
 
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.30 
(0.37) (0.38) (0.40) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) 
[0.0,4.8] [0.0,4.7] [0.0,5.0] [0.0,5.0] [0.0,5.1] [0.0,3.6] [0.0,3.6] 
Hospital size 
(0.12) 
 
 
171.57 170.15 170.17 170.40 172.15 171.11 169.61 
(175.09) (174.26) (175.74) (177.62) (179.90) (179.85) (181.73) 
[6,2518] [6,2278] [6,2346] [6,2121] [6,2112] [2,2163] [6,2146] 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
N 4,778 4,752 4,682 4,641 4,610 4,587 4,592 
Statistics 
Variable 
(F value) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
CMI 
(14.11***) 
 
 
1.28 1.25 1.28 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.25 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) 
[0.5,3.1] [0.5,3.7] [0.6,3.7] [0.4,3.7] [0.5,3.6] [0.5,3.6] [0.5,3.2] 
Elderly (%)  
(2.47*) 
 
13.97 14.01 13.96 13.75 13.85 13.86 13.86 
(3.95) (3.96) (3.93) (3.87) (3.94) (3.96) (3.94) 
[3.0,35.9] [3.4,36.6] [3.4,36.2] [3.0,34.2] [3.1,34.3] [3.0,34.7] [3.4,34.6] 
Growth (%) 
(150.41***) 
 
0.22 0.88 0.17 1.25 1.17 0.76 0.69 
(2.43) (2.14) (2.04) (2.86) (2.73) (1.48) (2.45) 
[-15,23] [-12,18] [-12,21] [-19,38] [-23,27] [-8,49] [-10,19] 
FP market 
(%) (1.45) 
 
12.97 12.84 12.14 12.13 11.99 12.03 12.58 
(23.36) (23.24) (22.89) (22.92) (22.99) (23.04) (23.55) 
[0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] 
NFP market 
(%) (1.45) 
 
87.03 87.16 87.86 87.87 88.01 87.97 87.42 
(23.36) (23.24) (22.89) (22.92) (22.99) (23.04) (23.55) 
[0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] [0,100] 
System 
(5.10***) 
 
 
0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Teaching 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
HH CON 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Rural 
(0.36) 
 
 
 
0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
[0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] [0,1] 
Income 
($000) 
(44.37***) 
 
24.41 25.78 26.15 26.23 26.26 26.53 26.49 
(6.93) (7.27) (7.72) (8.09) (8.14) (7.54) (7.35) 
[8.1,73.7] [8.7,76.3] [9.3,84.3] [9.7,90.9] [9.5,90.4] [10.0,81.0] [10.1,78.7] 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
N 4,778 4,752 4,682 4,641 4,610 4,587 4,592 
Statistics 
Variable 
(F value) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
[min,max] 
Unemploy- 
ment (%) 
(272.09***) 
 
5.39 5.03 4.75 4.55 5.17 5.93 6.16 
(2.66) (2.59) (2.45) (2.35) (2.30) (2.29) (2.38) 
[1,28] [1,28] [1,30] [1,28] [1,24] [1,25] [1,24] 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
percent to 0.65 percent, with a dramatic drop of nearly 1 percent in 1998. Wide variations 
in total profit margin ranges are also observed. For example, the range is [-147%, 72%] 
in 1998 and [-471%, 100%] in 2003. The nursing FTE proportion gradually and 
significantly decreased between 1997 and 2001 and slightly increased afterward. 
In addition, the statistics concerning hospital size and teaching status are quite 
consistent across time. On the other hand, the statistics of hospital CMI and system  
affiliation differ significantly among the years. Generally there is a declining trend in 
overall hospital CMI from 1997 through 2003. During the same period, the percentage of 
acute-care general community hospitals affiliated with a health system increased from 48 
percent to 53 percent. 
In terms of the market factors, FP and NFP market penetration ratios, state HH 
CON requirement, and rural versus urban location generally remained consistent in the 
study years. Yet the context regarding the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly persons, 
elderly population proportion and growth rate, county per-capita income and 
unemployment rate differed significantly across time. The number of HHAs per 1,000 
elderly persons declined significantly across the study period. The standard deviations 
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and ranges were consistent across time. The mean of the fraction of elderly in the 
population is statistically significant different across the years, the variations are in fact 
small, ranging from 13.75 percent to 14.01 percent. And, the mean of the elderly 
population growth rate in these years differ significantly among hospitals as well as 
across years. Examination of the related observations reveals no special problems. In 
addition, the mean of the per-capita income of the counties where the sampled hospitals 
were located increased gradually and significantly, from $24,410 in 1997 to $26,530 in 
2002 and slightly fell to $26,490 in 2003. The statistics for the county unemployment 
rate declined from 5.39 percent in 1997 to 4.55 percent in 2000 and then rose to 6.16 
percent in 2003. No additional significant differences are observed for these factors. 
Correlations among Variables 
Table 11 shows the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and 
independent variables as well as correlation coefficients among independent variables. 
The coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.05 significance level are 
highlighted with a bold font. As expected, the dependent variable, hospital provision of 
HH care in a particular year, is significantly correlated with all the independent variables 
except for hospital teaching status. Public and nonprofit hospitals are positively 
correlated with HH provision while for-profit hospitals are negatively correlated with HH 
provision. Medicare proportion, hospital total profit margin, HHA availability, hospital 
size, CMI, elderly population proportion, NFP hospital market penetration, and rural 
location are positively correlated with HH provision. On the other hand, HH provision is 
negatively correlated with nursing FTE proportion, elderly population growth rate, FP  
Table 11. The Correlation Coefficients between the Study Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1.hh provision 1.000  
                    
2.public 0.044  1.000  
                   
3.religious 0.047  -0.208  1.000  
                  
4.secular 0.031  -0.569  -0.354  1.000  
                 
5.for-profit -0.141  -0.236  -0.147  -0.402  1.000  
                
6.medicare 0.059  -0.134  0.021  0.026  0.110  1.000  
               
7.margin 0.066  -0.012  0.002  0.009  -0.001  0.005  1.000  
              
8.nursing -0.014  -0.074  -0.032  -0.107  0.274  0.190  0.023  1.000  
             
9.HHA/elderly 0.234  0.212  -0.047  -0.131  -0.034  -0.043  -0.015  -0.005  1.000  
            
10.hospital size 0.066  -0.187  0.114  0.117  -0.039  -0.158  0.057  -0.001  -0.207  1.000  
           
11.cmi 0.021  -0.300  0.160  0.095  0.091  0.009  0.091  0.104  -0.266  0.666  1.000  
          
12.elderly 0.110  0.116  -0.059  0.021  -0.120  0.091  -0.025  -0.068  0.157  -0.202  -0.281  1.000  
         
13.growth -0.026  -0.034  -0.014  -0.008  0.067  -0.032  0.028  0.028  -0.094  -0.028  0.030  -0.215  1.000  
        
14.fp market -0.074  -0.192  -0.067  -0.264  0.677  0.085  0.011  0.222  -0.041  0.058  0.134  -0.129  0.095  1.000  
       
15.nfp market 0.074  0.192  0.067  0.264  -0.677  -0.085  -0.011  -0.222  0.041  -0.058  -0.134  0.129  -0.095  -1.000  1.000  
      
16.system -0.083  -0.278  0.256  -0.111  0.270  0.024  0.007  0.158  -0.098  0.133  0.228  -0.118  0.030  0.240  -0.240  1.000  
     
17.teaching -0.010  -0.023  -0.013  0.079  -0.073  -0.126  0.007  -0.050  -0.082  0.533  0.411  -0.099  -0.070  -0.026  0.026  0.042  1.000  
    
18.HH CON -0.092  0.009  -0.038  0.014  0.004  -0.033  -0.033  0.017  -0.139  0.076  -0.033  -0.101  0.039  0.022  -0.022  -0.035  0.023  1.000  
   
19.rural 0.123  0.305  -0.111  -0.087  -0.152  0.008  -0.019  -0.074  0.324  -0.468  -0.559  0.401  -0.064  -0.155  0.155  -0.201  -0.226  0.055  1.000  
  
20.income -0.095  -0.221  0.079  0.128  0.020  -0.049  0.013  -0.013  -0.214  0.396  0.422  -0.201  -0.009  0.008  -0.008  0.095  0.262  -0.041  -0.523  1.000  
 
21.unemploy -0.054  0.073  -0.026  -0.064  0.026  -0.009  -0.055  -0.020  -0.018  -0.092  -0.165  -0.056  -0.033  0.037  -0.037  -0.017  -0.033  0.154  0.163  -0.326  1.000  
The coefficients in bold font are significantly different from 0.0 at the 0.05 significance level.
1
1
7
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hospital market penetration, system affiliation, presence of the state HH CON program, 
and per-capita income as well as the unemployment rate in the county. 
All the relationships are consistent with the expectation of this study except for 
three variables including nursing FTE proportion, HHA availability (the number of 
HHAs per 1000 elderly people), elderly population growth rate, and county per-capita 
income. As described in the Variables and Measures section in Chapter 4, this study 
hypothesizes that nursing density measured by the ratio of nursing FTEs to total FTEs in 
the hospital and its subsidiary should be positively correlated with hospital provision of 
HH care. Also, HHA availability in the market, which is an inverse measure of 
transaction uncertainty, is expected to be associated negatively with HH provision. In 
addition, the normative pressure on hospitals for offering HH care (as measured by 
elderly population growth rate) and local ability to pay for health care (as measured by 
per-capital income) are expected to be correlated positively with hospital provision of 
HH care. Yet these two variables are correlated negatively with HH provision. 
It can also be seen from Table 11 that the independent variables are correlated 
with each other. Although some coefficients are quite large (greater than 0.5), they show 
relationships in accordance with common knowledge. For example, FP hospital market 
penetration is highly correlated with for-profit hospital. Also, larger hospitals are very 
likely to be teaching hospitals and to have a higher CMI. Rural hospitals tend to have a 
lower CMI compared to urban hospitals. Finally, examination of the coefficients in Table 
11 demonstrates that no correlations are indeed high enough to raise the issue of 
multicollinearity. 
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Results of Bivariate Analyses 
Comparison of Statistics between HH-Providing and Non-Providing Hospitals 
Table 12 provides a comparison of the key statistics between hospitals offering 
HH care (denoted by ―With HH‖) and those not offering HH care (denoted by ―W/O 
HH‖) by year from 1997 to 2003. The significant differences in means of the 
characteristics between the HH-providing hospital group and the HH-non-providing 
group are tested. It can be seen from Table 12 that HH-providing hospitals and 
non-providing hospitals differ significantly in most of the organizational and market 
characteristics. First, the ownership mix differs between the two groups in most of the 
years. The difference in ownership mix became even more evident in later years. In 1997, 
only the share of religious hospitals is found to be significantly different between the 
HH-providing and non-providing groups. However, the share of each ownership type is 
significantly different between the two groups beginning in 2000. In 2003, for example, 
54.1 percent of HH-providing hospitals are secular hospitals, followed by public 
hospitals (26.7%), religious hospitals (12.8%), and for-profit hospitals (6.3%). For HH 
non-providing hospitals, only 46 percent are secular nonprofits, followed in turn by 
public hospitals (22.4%, less than its share in the providing group), for-profits (21%, 
much more than its share in the providing group), and religious nonprofits (10.6%, less 
than its share in the providing group). 
More dramatic changes across time in the ownership mix between the two groups 
are observed in particular for secular nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In 1997, the share 
of secular hospitals was almost equivalent between the HH-providing and non-providing
Table 12. Characteristics of HH Providing and Non-providing Hospitals, By Year 
Variable 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH 
W/O 
HH  
N 2847 1931 
 
2770 1982 
 
2597 2085 
 
2340 2301 
 
2162 2448 
 
2045 2542 
 
1912 2680 
 
Ownership 
                     
Public (%) 26.2 26.1   26.1 24.8  27.6 22.8 *** 27.7 22.0 *** 27.2 22.6 *** 27.2 22.3 *** 26.7 22.4 *** 
Religious (%) 12.7 9.3  *** 12.5 9.6 ** 13.1 9.5 *** 13.4 9.9 *** 13.6 10.0 *** 12.5 10.4 * 12.8 10.6 * 
Secular (%) 47.0 49.0   48.5 49.1  49.1 48.8  52.0 46.7 *** 52.6 46.9 *** 53.9 47.3 *** 54.1 46.0 *** 
For-profit (%) 14.1 15.6   13.0 16.5 *** 10.2 18.8 *** 6.9 21.4 *** 6.6 20.4 *** 6.4 20.0 *** 6.3 21.0 *** 
Organizational 
factors 
                     
Medicare (%) 50.4 47.4 *** 49.6 46.6 *** 48.7 46.4 *** 49.8 48.4 * 49.8 48.0 ** 50.4 48.4 *** 50.9 48.0 *** 
Margin (%) 3.19 1.38 *** 2.22 0.55 *** 1.53 0.36 *** 1.56 0.32 *** 1.23 0.17 *** 1.09 0.34 * 1.21 0.25 ** 
Nursing (%) 28.9 28.4 * 28.7 28.6  28.4 28.5  28.0 28.5 ** 27.4 28.0 *** 27.5 27.9 * 27.7 28.4 *** 
Hospital size 180 160 *** 179 157 *** 180 158 *** 184 157 *** 187 159 *** 185 160 *** 184 160 *** 
CMI 1.29 1.26 *** 1.26 1.24 ** 1.28 1.28  1.27 1.26  1.25 1.24  1.25 1.24  1.25 1.26  
Market factors                      
HHA/elderly 0.42 0.26 *** 0.42 0.25 *** 0.43 0.26 *** 0.40 0.23 *** 0.39 0.22 *** 0.39 0.22 *** 0.39 0.23 *** 
Elderly (%) 14.3 13.6 *** 14.3 13.5 *** 14.3 13.5 *** 14.2 13.3 *** 14.3 13.4 *** 14.4 13.4 *** 14.4 13.5 *** 
Growth (%) 0.12 0.35 ** 0.88 0.89  0.13 0.23  1.26 1.24  1.17 1.17  0.64 0.86 *** 0.68 0.69  
FP market (%) 13.3 12.5  12.6 13.2  10.8 13.8 *** 9.4 14.9 *** 9.2 14.5 *** 9.0 14.5 *** 9.2 15.0 *** 
NFP market(%) 86.7 87.5  87.4 86.8  89.2 86.2 *** 90.6 85.1 *** 90.8 85.5 *** 91.0 85.5 *** 90.8 85.0 *** 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Variable 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH  
W/O 
HH   
With 
HH 
W/O 
HH  
Control 
variables 
                     
System (%) 47.6 48.7  49.0 51.6  47.2 54.8 *** 46.4 56.5 *** 45.7 57.4 *** 45.7 57.6 *** 46.2 57.8 *** 
Teaching (%) 5.3 6.7 * 5.3 6.6  5.4 6.3  6.0 5.7  6.0 5.8  5.9 5.8  5.9 6.2  
HH CON (%) 24.1 36.7 *** 24.0 36.7 *** 24.6 34.9 *** 25.0 33.9 *** 26.4 31.9 *** 26.5 31.7 *** 26.8 31.2 ** 
Rural (%) 51.1 40.9 *** 51.8 41.0 *** 53.4 40.4 *** 54.5 41.0 *** 54.9 41.8 *** 55.6 42.3 *** 56.6 42.0 *** 
Income ($000) 23.9 25.2 *** 25.2 26.6 *** 25.5 26.9 *** 25.6 26.9 *** 25.6 26.9 *** 25.8 27.1 *** 25.7 27.1 *** 
Unemployment 
(%)  
5.29 5.54 ** 4.97 5.12 * 4.67 4.84 * 4.46 4.65 ** 5.10 5.22  5.78 6.06 *** 6.07 6.23 * 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
1
2
1
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groups. In the same year, the share of for-profit hospitals did not differ significantly 
between the two groups. However, the secular ownership type took a much larger share 
in the HH-providing group than in the non-providing group (54% vs. 46%) in 2003. In 
the same year, the for-profit ownership type played a significantly smaller role in the 
HH-providing group than in the non-providing group (6% vs. 21%). In fact, the for-profit 
ownership type accounted for over 90 percent of the total difference in ownership mix 
between HH-providing and non-providing groups from 1997 to 2003. In other words, the 
role of for-profit hospitals in providing HH care became much less important after the 
BBA, while secular hospitals took on a significantly larger share of the HH care market 
post-BBA. The shares of public and religious nonprofit hospitals in the HH-providing 
group increased initially but declined in later years during the study period. Overall, the 
role of these two ownership types in the HH-providing group did not change 
dramatically. 
Hospitals offering HH care have significantly higher percentages of inpatient 
days contributed by Medicare patients than have the hospitals not offering HH care. This 
relation is consistent across the study period. Also, the hospital total profit margin and the 
hospital size are greater for hospitals offering HH care than for those not offering HH 
care. These findings are in accordance with the expectations that larger or more 
profitable hospitals are more likely to offer their own HH services. Contrary to 
expectations, the nursing FTE proportion is significantly higher for HH-providing 
hospitals than for not providing hospitals only in 1997 (pre-BBA). In the post-BBA years, 
this figure is either comparable or significantly higher for non-HH-providing hospitals 
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than for providing hospitals. In addition, hospital CMI is a factor that distinguishes HH 
providing and non-providing hospitals only for the first two years in the study period. 
This may imply that CMI is no longer a critical consideration concerning HH provision 
in the post-BBA era. 
With respect to the market characteristics, significant differences are also 
observed between the HH-providing and non-providing groups in most of the years 
during the study period. HHA availability in the local market, as measured by the number 
of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county, is significantly higher for the 
HH-providing group than for the non-providing group. This relation is contradicted to the 
expectation. As expected, HH-providing hospitals were located in counties with higher 
proportions of people age 65 or over than were non-providing hospitals. However, there 
is no consistent pattern regarding elderly population growth rate between the 
HH-providing and non-providing groups. In addition, HH-providing hospitals were 
located in counties with lower FP hospital market penetration than were non-providing 
hospitals. This relationship became particularly clear after the BBA. 
Differences in the key characteristics between HH providing and non-providing 
hospitals are also noted. System membership is a significant factor differentiating HH 
providing and non-providing hospitals for most of the post-BBA period. In these years, 
system-affiliated hospitals were significantly more represented in non-HH-providing 
hospitals than in HH-providing hospitals. The proportion of teaching hospitals is 
significantly different between the HH-providing and non-providing groups before the 
BBA but similar post-BBA. Moreover, HH-providing hospitals were less likely than 
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non-providing hospitals to be located in states with a HH CON program. On the other 
hand, HH-providing hospitals were more likely located in rural areas than were 
non-providing hospitals. Finally, in the study period, HH-providing hospitals were more 
likely than non-providing hospitals to be located in counties with lower per-capita 
income as well as unemployment rates.  
Comparison of the Percentage Offering HH Services among Ownership Types 
Table 13 presents the percentage of hospitals offering HH care within each 
ownership type across the study period. In 1997, before the BBA was implemented, more 
than half of hospitals with each ownership form provided HH care. The percentage of 
hospitals providing HH care is highest among religious nonprofit hospitals (67%), 
followed by public hospitals (60%), secular nonprofits (59%), and for-profit hospitals 
(57%). The percentage declines significantly over time for all ownership types after the 
implementation of the BBA. Of most interest is whether hospitals in different ownership 
structures differ in the reduction of HH provision post-BBA. Among the ownership types, 
for-profit hospitals experienced the largest drop of the percentage of offering HH care 
(39%) between 1997 and 2003, followed in turn by religious nonprofits (21%), public 
hospitals (14%), and secular nonprofits (13%). 
In order to get a visual interpretation of the change in HH provision by different 
hospital ownership types, a graphical presentation of Table 13 is shown in Figure 12. A 
number of trends in HH provision can be drawn from the figure. First, the percentage of 
nonprofit hospitals offering HH care in general declined linearly from 1997 through 2003. 
However, the overall reduction range is higher for religious nonprofits than for secular 
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Table 13. Percentage of Hospitals Offering HH Services, By Ownership Type, 1997-2003 
Year 
Ownership       
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 F value 
Public  60% 60% 60% 56% 52% 50% 46% 15.18*** 
Religious  67% 64% 63% 58% 54% 49% 46% 13.64*** 
Secular 59% 58% 56% 53% 50% 48% 46% 23.75*** 
For-profit 57% 52% 40% 25% 22% 20% 18% 89.11*** 
Total 60% 58% 55% 50% 47% 45% 42% 92.80*** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
Figure 12. Hospital Home Health Trends, By Hospital Ownership Type, 1997-2000 
 
nonprofit and public hospitals. Second, public hospitals‘ percentage of providing HH 
care started decreasing after 1999. The reduction in HH provision for public and religious 
hospitals was similar between 1999 and 2001. The slope of public hospitals is similar to 
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that of secular hospitals between 2001 and 2003. Third, the percentage of for-profit 
hospitals offering HH care dropped dramatically between 1997 and 2000, compared to 
other ownership types. However, between 2000 and 2003, the reduction by public 
hospitals is comparable to those of other ownership types. Finally, it can be seen from 
Figure 12 that for-profit hospitals overall behave very differently from public and private 
not-for-profit hospitals, particularly in the years 1997 through 2000. 
Results of Multivariate Analyses 
The bivariate analysis discussed above provides an initial understanding of the major 
relationship of interest. However, as mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, there might be other 
underlying mechanisms influencing hospitals‘ decisions to offer HH care or not. 
If these factors are correlated systematically with the ownership types, the results just 
discussed are biased. Therefore, these factors need to be controlled in order to isolate the 
effects of ownership types on hospital HH provision. Also, some of these factors have 
theoretical and practical relevance, thus meriting examination. This section presents the 
results of multivariate analyses taking all the relevant factors into account. 
Model Selection 
An appropriate model needs to be selected before the analysis is conducted. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, this study is potentially subject to a number of issues including 
hospital closure or non-response, state policy effects, and sample selection biases due to 
the imputation for missing values or outliers in the independent variables. First, for 
testing the effect of hospital closure and nonresponse, a logit model as specified in the 
―Econometric Approach and Model Specification‖ section in Chapter 4 with the variables 
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listed in Table 8 plus a dummy variable (Closure) and the interaction terms of closure and 
year dummy variables is estimated. The results of this model are shown in the first 
column of Appendix 1. The coefficients of the variable closure and the interaction term 
between closure and year 2002 are significantly different from 0 at the significance level 
of 0.05, suggesting that the effect of closure is present. Both coefficients are negative, 
suggesting that hospitals with closure or non-response were more likely than those 
without such issues to not offer HH care before and to reduce HH care after the BBA 
(particularly for 2002).  
Second, in order to test the significance of the state effect, two models are 
compared. More specifically, another logit model with the same specification as 
described in the previous paragraph except for replacing the state HH CON with a set of 
state dummy variables is estimated. The result of this model is shown in the second 
column of Appendix 1. Empirical evidence indicating state effects can be found from the 
result. Many coefficients of the state variables are significantly different from zero at the 
conventional significance levels. Also, the joint test that all the coefficients of the state 
variables equal to 0 yields a χ2 (chi-squared) statistic 287.38 with 50 degree of freedom. 
The probability that a χ2 value is greater than 287.38 is lower than 0.0001. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. In other words, there are significant state effects. Also, a number 
of coefficients change dramatically from the first model to the second model. For 
example, the coefficients of religious and secular ownership variables in model 1 are 
0.430 and 0.085, respectively. The coefficients become 0.658 and 0.247 in model 2. 
There is a 53 percent and a 191 percent increase for the two coefficients, respectively. 
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This is a sign that these two models differ significantly. Based on the fact that the pseudo 
R
2
 improves prominently from the basic model (0.125) to the model with a 
comprehensive set of state dummy variables (0.157), this study includes the state dummy 
variables rather than the state HH CON variable. 
Finally, the potential issue related to sample selection resulting from the 
imputation for missing values or/and outliers in a number of the independent variables is 
tested. This test is done by including the four dummy variables margin_d, pop_d, and 
cmi_d, and income_d indicating observations with imputation of the entire sample mean 
for the variables margin, pop, cmi, and income, respectively. Since year effects are a 
major interest here, each of the four missing dummy variables is also interacted with the 
year dummy variables and added to the second model discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Results of this sample selection test are shown in the last column of Appendix 
1. Only the coefficients of cmi_d and margin_d are significant at the 0.05 significance 
level, implying that only the imputation for the two variables, cmi and margin, could 
cause sample selection biases. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
margin and year‘03 are statistically significant. Thus, the three terms, cmi_d, margin_d, 
and margin x year‘03, are included in the final analysis model in order to control for the 
effects resulting from the value imputation. In addition, the result of the third model 
shows that the coefficients of the variable closure and its interaction term with year 2002 
are also significant at the 0.05 level. Hence, these two terms are included in the final 
analytical model, too. 
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Results of the Full Model 
A logit model with a full set of organizational and market factors (described in 
Chapter 4) and year dummy variables representing years 1998 through 2003 was applied 
to test the hypotheses. The complete results are presented in Appendix 2. The results for 
year and ownership effects, organizational and market factors, and control variables are 
presented separately. 
In Table 14, the coefficients of the year dummy variables represent the change in 
public hospitals‘ probability of offering HH care between 1997 and the corresponding 
year, after controlling for other factors. Positive changes in the probability of offering 
HH services are observed between 1997 and the six years following the implementation 
of the BBA. This means that holding constant all other factors, public hospitals were in 
fact more likely to provide HH care in the post-BBA years than in the pre-BBA year, 
1997. However, the change in the probability of offering HH care among public hospitals 
is statistically significant only for the period between 1997 and 1999. Public hospitals‘ 
odds of offering HH care in 1999 were 1.88 times the odds in 1997. A joint test of the 
coefficients to the year terms results in a χ2 statistic equal to 10.86 with a degree freedom 
of 6 (p value=0.0927), suggesting that the public hospitals‘ probability of offering HH 
care does not change significantly from pre- to post-BBA periods. 
In the baseline year before the BBA was implemented, hospitals with different 
ownership forms differed significantly in the probability of providing HH care. 
Compared to public hospitals, hospitals in other ownership types were significantly more 
likely to offer HH care. The ratios of the probability of offering versus not offering HH  
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Table 14. Estimations of Year and Ownership Effects by Logistic Regression with a Full 
Set of Year Dummy Variables 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Year effects (Base: 1997) 
    
Year‘98 1.156 0.145  
 
0.241 
Year‘99 1.880 0.631  * 0.274 
Year‘00 1.846 0.613  
 
0.324 
Year‘01 1.878 0.630  
 
0.334 
Year‘02 1.180 0.165  
 
0.351 
Year‘03 1.170 0.157  
 
0.358 
Ownership effects 
    
Religious hospital 1.884 0.633  *** 0.132 
Religious x year‘98 0.891 -0.115  
 
0.078 
Religious x year‘99 0.843 -0.171  
 
0.098 
Religious x year‘00 0.793 -0.231  * 0.109 
Religious x year‘01 0.873 -0.136  
 
0.118 
Religious x year‘02 0.775 -0.255  * 0.127 
Religious x year‘03 0.813 -0.207  
 
0.133 
Secular hospital 1.291 0.256  ** 0.090 
Secular x year‘98 0.993 -0.007  
 
0.050 
Secular x year‘99 0.895 -0.111  
 
0.062 
Secular x year‘00 0.953 -0.048  
 
0.073 
Secular x year‘01 1.031 0.031  
 
0.079 
Secular x year‘02 1.041 0.040  
 
0.083 
Secular x year‘03 1.120 0.113  
 
0.088 
For-profit hospital 1.591 0.464  * 0.184 
For-profit x year‘98 0.768 -0.263  
 
0.135 
For-profit x year‘99 0.416 -0.876  *** 0.174 
For-profit x year‘00 0.284 -1.257  *** 0.209 
For-profit x year‘01 0.309 -1.173  *** 0.217 
For-profit x year‘02 0.306 -1.185  *** 0.223 
For-profit x year‘03 0.373 -0.987  *** 0.222 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2. 
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care among religious hospitals, for-profit hospitals, and secular hospitals were 1.88, 1.59, 
1.29 times, respectively, the ratios among their public counterparts. 
Consistent with expectations, the relative changes in the probability of offering 
HH care from the pre- to the post-BBA periods between the for-profit and public hospital 
groups are all significantly different from zero except for year 1998 (in fact it is 
marginally significant in 1998, p value=0.05). For example, the ratio of the odds of 
offering HH care among for-profit versus public hospitals in 1999 was 0.768 times the 
ratio in 1997. In other words, the probability of offering versus not offering HH care was 
lower for for-profit as compared to public hospitals in response to the enactment of the 
BBA. Also, the probability of not offering versus offering HH care was much higher (3.5 
times (1/0.284)) for for-profit as compared to public hospitals following the 
implementation of the BBA between 1997 and 2000. This relation is significant 
throughout the whole study period. Therefore, hypothesis 1a is supported. Nevertheless, 
for-profit hospitals‘ reduction in the likelihood of offering versus not offering HH care 
relative to that of public hospitals rose between 1997 and 2000 but declined between 
2000 and 2003. The coefficients to the interaction terms between for-profit hospitals and 
year 1998 and between for-profit hospitals and year 2000 are statistically significant (χ2 
(1)= 22.66, p value<0.0001), while the coefficients to the interaction terms between the 
for-profit hospital and year 2000 and between the for-profit hospital and year 2003 are 
not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level (χ2 (1)= 2.62, p value =0.1056). 
Thus, compared to public hospitals, the change in the probability of offering versus not 
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offering HH care among for-profit hospitals is significant between 1997 and 2000, but 
not significant after 2000. 
In addition, the relative changes in ratio of the probability of offering versus not 
offering HH between the for-profit and private nonprofit hospital groups after the 
implementation of the BBA are significantly different from zero. Table 15 provides the 
results concerning year and ownership effects on hospital provision and change in 
provision of HH care by applying a full model with private nonprofit hospitals (including 
religious and secular nonprofits) serving as the base group. The results suggest that 
for-profit hospitals were significantly less likely than their private nonprofit counterparts 
to continue offering HH care post-BBA. For example, the ratio of the odds of offering 
HH care among for-profit versus private nonprofit hospitals in 2003 was only 0.353 
times the ratio in 1997. In other words, the probability of not offering versus offering HH 
care was significantly higher (nearly 3 times) for for-profit as compared to private 
nonprofit hospitals in response to the enactment of the BBA. Although the relative 
change between 1997 and 1998 is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, a joint test 
of all the relative changes from 1997 to the post-BBA years are all zero results in a χ2 (6) 
equal to 36.12 (p value<0.0001). This provides empirical evidence that for-profit 
hospitals were more likely than private nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH care post-BBA. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1b is supported. 
On the other hand, the relative changes in the probability of offering versus not offering 
HH between the public and private nonprofit hospital groups after the implementation of 
the BBA are only significantly different from zero for the period between 1997 and 1999.  
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Table 15. Estimations of Year and Ownership Effects by Logistic Regression with a Full 
Set of Year Dummy Variables (Private NFPs Serve as Base group) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
z P>|z| 
Year Effect (Base: 1997) 
     
1998 1.129 0.122 0.245 0.500 0.620 
1999 1.642 0.496 0.278 1.780 0.075 
2000 1.704 0.533 0.328 1.630 0.104 
2001 1.872 0.627 0.339 1.850 0.065 
2002 1.186 0.171 0.353 0.480 0.628 
2003 1.268 0.237 0.361 0.660 0.511 
Ownership Effect (Base: private nonprofits) 
   
Public 0.733 -0.310*** 0.089 -3.490 0.000 
Public x year‘98 1.026 0.026 0.048 0.540 0.589 
Public x year‘99 1.131 0.123* 0.060 2.050 0.040 
Public x year‘00 1.082 0.079 0.070 1.120 0.262 
Public x year‘01 0.998 -0.002 0.076 -0.020 0.983 
Public x year‘02 1.011 0.011 0.081 0.140 0.890 
Public x year‘03 0.944 -0.057 0.085 -0.670 0.502 
For-profit 1.141 0.131 0.181 0.730 0.467 
For-profit x year‘98 0.790 -0.236 0.134 -1.760 0.079 
For-profit x year‘99 0.471 -0.754*** 0.173 -4.360 0.000 
For-profit x year‘00 0.309 -1.176*** 0.206 -5.700 0.000 
For-profit x year‘01 0.309 -1.173*** 0.214 -5.470 0.000 
For-profit x year‘02 0.310 -1.171*** 0.221 -5.300 0.000 
For-profit x year‘03 0.353 -1.041*** 0.220 -4.740 0.000 
Other independent and control variables are not shown here   
Model Statistics      
Log pseudolikelihood = -18949.708     
Wald χ2 (150)= 1582.37     
Prob (> Wald χ2 (150)) <0.0001     
Pseudo R
2
=0.1622     
N=32,642     
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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A joint test of all the relative changes from 1997 to the post-BBA years are all zero 
results in a χ2 (6) equal to 10.18 (p value =0.1174). This means that there is no 
considerable difference in the change in the probability of offering versus not offering 
HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals post-BBA. Therefore, hypothesis 
1c is not supported. 
In addition, it can be noted from Table 14 that there may be differences between 
religious and secular nonprofit hospitals in the change in the ratio of the probability of 
providing versus not providing HH services after the BBA. Tests are conducted to 
examine whether the differences in coefficients between the two nonprofit ownership 
types are statistically significant following the estimation of the model reported in 
Appendix 2. The results of the tests shown in Table 16 suggest that the coefficients are 
not significantly different for years 1998 through 2001 but are significantly different for 
years 2002 and 2003. Contrary to expectations, secular nonprofit hospitals were more 
likely than religious nonprofit hospitals to continue providing HH care in 2002 and 2003 
as compared to 1997. Also, different patterns of change in the probability of offering 
versus not offering HH are noted between religious and secular nonprofit hospital groups. 
Compared to public hospitals, religious hospitals were always more likely to reduce HH 
provision in the years following the implementation of the BBA. For secular hospitals, 
this only holds for two years, 1999 and 2000. In other post-BBA years, secular hospitals 
were less likely than their public counterparts to reduce HH provision. These findings 
provide initial evidence that hypothesis 1d is not supported. The difference in the change 
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Table 16. Test Results of the Significance of the Differences between Religious and 
Secular Nonprofit Hospitals in the Change in HH Provision Post-BBA 
Year Coefficients χ2 (1) p value 
 
Secular x Year Religious x Year Difference 
 
 
1998 -0.007  -0.115  0.108  2.00  0.1569  
1999 -0.111  -0.171  0.060  0.41  0.5240  
2000 -0.048  -0.231*  0.184  2.23  0.0722  
2001 0.031  -0.136  0.167  2.30  0.1290  
2002 0.040  -0.255*  0.295*  6.34  0.0118  
2003 0.113  -0.207  0.321**  6.84  0.0089  
Post-BBA 0.009 -0.183* 0.192*  4.98  0.0256  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
in the odds of offering HH care between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals in 
response to the BBA as a whole will be discussed in the next section. 
Based on the results reported in Table 17, most of the organizational and market 
factors assumed to be relevant to hospitals‘ decisions to offer HH care are significantly 
associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of providing HH care. On average, a one percent 
increase in the Medicare proportion results in 1.009 times significantly more likely to 
offer versus not offer HH care. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. Also, the result 
suggests that a one percent increase in hospital total profit margin results in 1.015 times 
the ratio of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care. This provides 
empirical evidence that hypothesis 3a is supported. In addition, one more hospital bed 
results in 1.002 times the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH care. This 
finding can be used to support hypothesis 6a. Furthermore, one point increase in the 
hospital case mix index on average results in 2.18 times the odds of offering HH care. 
This provides empirical evidence that hypothesis 7a is supported. Finally, hospitals  
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Table 17. Estimations of the Effects of Organizational and Market Factors by Logistic 
Regression with a Full Set of Year Dummy Variables  
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Organizational factors 
    
Medicare 1.009 0.009  *** 0.002 
Medicare x year‘98 1.001 0.001  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘99 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘00 0.999 -0.001  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘01 1.002 0.002  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘02 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘03 1.003 0.003  
 
0.002 
Margin 1.015 0.015  *** 0.003 
Margin x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
0.004 
Margin x year‘99 0.992 -0.008  
 
0.004 
Margin x year‘00 0.994 -0.006  
 
0.005 
Margin x year‘01 1.002 0.002  
 
0.006 
Margin x year‘02 0.995 -0.005  
 
0.008 
Margin x year‘03 1.000 0.000  
 
0.007 
Nursing 1.000 0.000  
 
0.005 
Nursing x year‘98 0.988 -0.012  * 0.005 
Nursing x year‘99 0.994 -0.006  
 
0.006 
Nursing x year‘00 0.984 -0.016  * 0.007 
Nursing x year‘01 0.984 -0.017  * 0.007 
Nursing x year‘02 0.997 -0.003  
 
0.007 
Nursing x year‘03 0.988 -0.013  
 
0.007 
Hospital size 1.002 0.002  *** <0.001 
Hospital size x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
<0.001 
Hospital size x year‘99 1.000 0.000  
 
<0.001 
Hospital size x year‘00 1.001 0.001  
 
<0.001 
Hospital size x year‘01 1.001 0.001  ** <0.001 
Hospital size x year‘02 1.000 0.000  
 
<0.001 
Hospital size x year‘03 1.000 0.000  
 
<0.001 
Hospital CMI 2.180 0.779  *** 0.216 
CMI x year‘98 1.026 0.026  
 
0.167 
CMI x year‘99 0.684 -0.379  * 0.183 
CMI x year‘00 0.769 -0.263  
 
0.215 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
CMI x year‘01 0.613 -0.489  * 0.208 
CMI x year‘02 0.733 -0.311  
 
0.218 
CMI x year‘03 0.641 -0.445  
 
0.233 
Market factors 
    
HHA/elderly 4.764 1.561  *** 0.190 
HHA/elderly x year‘98 1.030 0.029  
 
0.087 
HHA/elderly x year‘99 0.855 -0.157  
 
0.125 
HHA/elderly x year‘00 1.121 0.114  
 
0.141 
HHA/elderly x year‘01 1.275 0.243  
 
0.157 
HHA/elderly x year‘02 1.055 0.054  
 
0.178 
HHA/elderly x year‘03 0.987 -0.013  
 
0.198 
Elderly proportion 1.023 0.023  * 0.010 
Elderly x year‘98 1.006 0.006  
 
0.006 
Elderly x year‘99 1.002 0.002  
 
0.008 
Elderly x year‘00 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.009 
Elderly x year‘01 0.984 -0.016  
 
0.010 
Elderly x year‘02 0.991 -0.009  
 
0.010 
Elderly x year‘03 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.011 
Growth 1.016 0.016  
 
0.015 
Growth x year‘98 1.015 0.015  
 
0.020 
Growth x year‘ 99 1.030 0.029  
 
0.020 
Growth x year‘ 00 1.007 0.007  
 
0.018 
Growth x year‘ 01 1.008 0.008  
 
0.019 
Growth x year ‗02 0.970 -0.031  
 
0.024 
Growth x year‘ 03 1.037 0.036  
 
0.019 
NFP hospital x FP market 1.001 0.001  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
NFP x FP market x year‘99 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘00 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘01 0.997 -0.003  
 
0.004 
NFP x FP market x year‘02 0.991 -0.009  * 0.004 
NFP x FP market x year‘03 0.989 -0.011  ** 0.004 
FP hospital x NFP market 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.003 
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Table 17 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
FP x NFP market x year‘98 1.003 0.003  
 
0.002 
FP x NFP market x year‘99 1.003 0.003  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market x year‘00 0.999 -0.001  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘01 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘02 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘03 0.991 -0.009  * 0.004 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2. 
located in a county with one percent more elderly population causes the ratio of the 
probability of offering to not offering HH services to rise by a factor of 1.023. Therefore, 
hypothesis 8a is supported. 
Several factors are founded to be either not associated with hospital provision of 
HH care or in a way contrary to the expectation of this study. First, Table 17 suggests that 
one more HHA per 1,000 elderly people in the county results in 4.76 times the ratio of 
the probability of offering to not offering HH care in 1997, other relevant factors being 
equal. This finding contradicts hypothesis 5a which states that HHA resource availability 
is associated negatively with hospital provision of its own HH care. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5a is not supported. 
In addition, an increase in the nursing FTE proportion has no discernable effect 
on the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH care (odds ratio=1.000). This 
suggests that nursing FTE proportion is not associated with hospital provision of HH care. 
Thus, hypothesis 4a is also not supported. Finally, elderly population growth rate in the 
county is associated positively with hospitals‘ probabilities of offering HH care. A one 
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percent increase in elderly population growth rate results in about 1.016 times the ratio of 
the probability of providing to not providing HH care. However, this coefficient is not 
statistically significantly different from zero at a 0.05 significance level. Therefore, 
hypothesis 9a is not empirically supported. 
With respect to the interaction terms of the organizational/market factors and year 
dummy variables, most of the coefficients are non-significant at the 0.05 significance 
level. This implies that these factors in general are not associated with the change in 
hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of providing versus not providing HH care between 
1997 and the corresponding years post-BBA. Yet there are a few exceptions. Hospital 
nursing FTE proportion is found to be associated negatively with hospitals‘ change in the 
ratio of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care in 1998, 2000, and 2001, 
compared to 1997. This implies that, contrary to expectations, hospitals with higher 
proportions of total FTEs contributed by nursing staff were more likely to reduce HH 
care in these years following the implementation of the BBA. 
In addition, hospital size is noted to be associated negatively with the reduction in 
hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of providing versus not providing HH care between 
1997 and 2001. This means that larger hospitals were significantly less likely than 
smaller hospitals to reduce HH care between 1997 and 2001. Moreover, hospital CMI is 
associated positively with the reduction in hospitals‘ probability of offering versus not 
offering HH services between 1997 and 1999 as well as 2001. For example, the result 
shows that an one point increase in CMI results in 0.684 times the ratio of the probability 
of offering versus not offering HH care in response to the enactment of the BBA between 
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1997 and 1999. Furthermore, there is a negative impact of for-profit hospital market 
penetration on public and private nonprofit hospitals‘ change in the probability of 
offering versus not offering HH care in the 1997-2002 and 1997-2003 periods. This 
implies that public and private nonprofit hospitals located in a county with higher FP 
hospital penetration are significantly more likely than those located in lower FP hospital 
penetration counties to reduce HH care between 1997 and 2002 or 2003. 
Because there is in general a dearth of significant and consistent relationships 
between each of the organizational and market factors and hospitals‘ changes in the ratio 
of the probability of offering versus not offering HH care in the post-BBA years, 
hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10a, and 10b are not supported. These 
hypotheses will be reexamined later by using a reduced model investigating the joint 
effect of the post-BBA years. 
Finally, the relationships between the control variables and hospitals‘ likelihood 
of offering HH care are presented in Table 18. All the coefficients are significant at 
conventional levels. First, the result suggests the odds of providing HH care among 
system-affiliated hospitals were 0.694 times the odds among their freestanding 
counterparts in the study period. In other words, system-affiliated hospitals were less 
likely than their freestanding counterparts to provide HH care in the study period. 
During the same period, non-teaching hospitals‘ ratio of the probability of 
offering to not offering HH care was nearly 2 (1/0.526) times that of teaching hospitals. 
Also, the ratio of the probability of offering to not offering HH services among rural 
hospitals were 1.59 times the ratio among urban hospitals. Furthermore, a $1,000  
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Table 18. Results Showing the Relationship between Hospital Provision of HH Care and 
Control Variables in the Logit Model with a Full Set of Year Dummy Variables  
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Control variables 
    
System 0.694 -0.365  *** 0.060 
Teaching 0.526 -0.642  *** 0.150 
Rural 1.598 0.469  *** 0.085 
Income 0.987 -0.013  * 0.006 
Unemployment  0.966 -0.035  ** 0.013 
Closure 0.577 -0.550  *** 0.108 
Closure x year‘02 0.504 -0.686  * 0.327 
CMI_d 0.195 -1.634  *** 0.364 
Margin_d 0.490 -0.713  ** 0.227 
Margin_d x year‘03 1.517 0.417  * 0.179 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Complete results are shown in Appendix 2. 
increase in county per-capita income on average resulted in 1.01 (1/0.987) times the ratio 
of not offering to offering HH care. Finally, a 1 percent increase in county unemployment 
rate caused the ratio of the probability of not offering to offering HH care to rise by a 
factor of 1.04 in the period of 1997 through 2003. These suggest that all the control  
variables are negatively associated with hospitals‘ likelihood of offering HH care, except 
that rural hospitals are more likely than urban hospitals to offer HH care. 
Results of the Reduced Model 
Since the majority of the coefficients of the interaction terms between the 
organizational and market factors and year dummy variables are non-significant at the 
conventional level of 0.05, a reduced model is applied to examine the joint effect of the 
post-BBA years on the change in the likelihood of providing HH care as compared to the 
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pre-BBA year. In this model, a dummy variable (post_BBA) indicating the post-BBA 
period years 1998 through 2003 is used to replace all the year dummies in the full model. 
A shortened version of the results without showing the state effects is reported in Table 
19 while the completed results are presented in Appendix 3. 
The results of the reduced model are very similar to those of the full model. This 
model further confirms that the post-BBA effect on hospitals‘ changes in the probability 
of offering HH care is present for the for-profit hospital group compared to public 
hospitals. Thus, hypothesis 1a is supported. A test of significance of the difference in the 
coefficient for the interaction terms of ownership and post_BBA between for-profit and 
private nonprofit (including religious and secular nonprofits) results in a χ2 (2) equal to 
39.92 (p value<0.0001), suggesting that hypothesis 1b is also supported. However, a test 
of significance of the joint effect of secular and religious ownership on the change in 
probability of offering HH care post-BBA results in a χ2 (2) equal to 5.19 (p 
value=0.0745). This means that there is no significant overall difference in the change in 
probability of offering HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals after the 
implementation of the BBA. Thus, hypothesis 1c is not supported. Also, a test of the 
significance of the difference in the coefficient between religious and secular nonprofit 
hospitals after the BBA results in a χ2 (1) equal to 4.98 (p value= 0.0256). Although the 
difference is statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is opposite to the 
expectation. It suggests that religious hospitals were more likely than secular nonprofit 
hospitals to reduce HH provision after the BBA. Therefore, hypothesis 1d is rejected. 
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Table 19. Results of the Reduced Logit Model with a Post-BBA Dummy Variable  
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA) 1.357 0.305  
 
0.253  
Ownership effects (vs. Public) 
    
Religious 1.865 0.623  *** 0.132 
Religious x Post-BBA 0.833 -0.183  * 0.090 
Secular 1.278 0.245  ** 0.090 
Secular x Post-BBA 1.009 0.009  
 
0.059 
For-profit 1.625 0.485  ** 0.183 
For-profit x Post-BBA 0.385 -0.956  *** 0.159 
Organizational factors 
    
Medicare 1.009 0.009  ** 0.002 
Medicare x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
Margin 1.015 0.015  *** 0.003 
Margin x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.004 
Nursing 1.000 0.000  
 
0.005 
Nursing x Post-BBA 0.990 -0.010  
 
0.005 
Hospital size 1.002 0.002  *** 0.000 
Hospital size x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
CMI 2.114 0.749  *** 0.214 
CMI x Post-BBA 0.799 -0.224  
 
0.165 
Market factors 
    
HHA/elderly  4.956 1.601  *** 0.191 
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA 1.073 0.070  
 
0.113 
Elderly 1.024 0.024  * 0.010 
Elderly x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.007 
Growth 1.015 0.015  
 
0.015 
Growth x Post-BBA 1.010 0.010  
 
0.015 
NFP x FP market 1.001 0.001  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market 0.995 -0.005  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.003 
Control variables 
    
System 0.694 -0.366  *** 0.059 
Teaching 0.533 -0.629  *** 0.148 
Rural 1.576 0.455  *** 0.083 
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Table 19 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Income 0.983 -0.017  ** 0.006 
Unemployment 0.944 -0.057  *** 0.012 
Closure 0.678 -0.388  *** 0.113 
Closure x Post-BBA 0.937 -0.066  
 
0.110 
CMI_d 0.252 -1.380  *** 0.409 
CMI _d x Post-BBA 0.701  -0.355  
 
0.356 
Margin_d 0.422 -0.863  *** 0.262 
Margin_d x Post-BBA 1.271  0.240  
 
0.214 
Constant 
 
-1.140  ** 0.419 
State variables are not shown here 
   
Model Statistics 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -19201.629 
   
Wald χ2 (88) 1365.6 
   
P(>Wald χ2 (88)) <0.0001 
   
Pseudo R
2
 0.151 
   
N 32642 
   
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Complete results are shown in Appendix 3. 
The results of the reduced model concerning the effects of the organizational and market 
factors on HH provision before the BBA are close to those of the full model as the 
coefficients and significance of the related terms are very similar. Thus, the findings also 
support hypotheses 2a, 3a, 6a, 7a, and 8a, but fail to support hypotheses 4a, 5a, and 9a. 
Of particular interest are the effects of these factors on the change in the 
probability of offering HH care after the BBA. It is clearly noted that all the coefficients 
to the interaction terms of these factors and post_BBA are not significant at the 0.05 
significance level. These findings provide further evidence that hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 
6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10a, and 10b are not supported. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the data regarding the dependent variable, hospital 
provision of HH care in a particular year, came from two data sources including the 
HCRIS and AHA. The results discussed above are based on the data combining 
information from the two files using the HCRIS as the master source and AHA as the 
supplementary source. Although this arrangement of the data should result in the best 
data quality given the information available, it is necessary to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis to check potential inconsistencies in results due to this particular type of data 
arrangement. Because the two data files have their own strengths and weaknesses, this 
sensitivity analysis employs a different arrangement of the data sources to create a new 
dependent variable. That is, the AHA data are used as the master source and the HCRIS 
as the supplementary source. More specifically, this new dependent variable 
(hhprov_new) is coded as ―1‖ if a hospital reported to the AHA survey that HH services 
are owned or provided by the hospital or its subsidiary and as ―0‖ if HH services are 
provided through other arrangements. However, if a hospital did not report related 
information to the AHA survey but had non-zero HH revenues included in the HCRIS 
file in a particular year, the new HH provision variable is also coded as ―1‖ and as ―0‖ 
otherwise. Then a reduced logit model similar to that described in the previous section 
except using the new dependent variable is estimated. 
A comparison of the result of this new model (AHA model) with that of the model 
(HCRIS model) presented in the previous section is reported in Appendix 4. The 
comparison suggests that the two models yield similar results. All significant coefficients 
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between the two models have the same signs. The differences in the significant 
coefficients across the models range from -24 percent to 37 percent. The differences in 
the coefficients of major interest between the two models are between -21 percent and 37 
percent. In general, the two models do not differ in the major findings of this study 
except for the effect of nursing FTE proportion after the BBA. While this effect is 
insignificant for the HCRIS model, it becomes statistically significant for the AHA model. 
In fact, the effect of nursing FTE proportion on hospital provision of HH care after the 
BBA is marginally significant for the HCRIS model (p value=0.51). Both models 
demonstrate a negative effect, suggesting that the proportion of hospital total FTEs 
contributed by nursing staff is associated positively with the likelihood of reducing HH 
provision after the BBA. However, the results of the hypotheses tests are the same no 
matter which data arrangement for the dependent variable discussed above is applied.   
Summary of Findings 
The major findings of the analyses organized by the structure of the study 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 20. Seven out of twenty-two proposed hypotheses 
are empirically supported. Hospital Medicare inpatient day proportion, hospital total 
profit margin, hospital case mix index, number of hospital beds, and elderly population 
proportion in the county are positive and significant determinants of hospital provision of 
HH care. Hospital‘s nursing FTE proportion and annual elderly population growth rate in 
the county are insignificant determinants of hospital provision of HH services. Finally, 
contrary to the expectation, the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county 
is a positive and significant contributor to hospital provision of HH services. 
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Table 20. Effects of Factors on Hospitals‘ Provision of HH Care Before and Reduction in 
Provision of HH Care After the Implementation of the BBA  
Hypotheses Variables Expected Sign Effect Founded 
P (offer) P(continue) 
post-BBA 
P (offer) P(continue) 
post-BBA 
Economics- Ownership     
H1a FP vs. Public  (-)  (-)*** 
H1b FP vs. NFP  (-)  (-)*** 
H1c NFP vs. Public  (-)  (-)
NS
 
H1d Secular vs. Religious   (-)  (+)* 
Resource Dependence     
H2a~H2b Medicare (+) (+) (+)** (+)
NS
 
H3a~H3b Margin (+) (+) (+)*** (-)
NS
 
H4a~H4b Nursing (+) (+) (+)
NS
 (-)
MS
 
Transaction Cost     
H5a~H5b HHA/elderly (-) (-) (+)*** (+)
NS
 
H6~H6b Hospital size (+) (+) (+)*** (+)
NS
 
H7a~H7b CMI (+) (+) (+)*** (-)
NS
 
Institutional Theory     
H8a~H8b Elderly (+) (+) (+)** (-)
NS
 
H9a~H9b Growth (+) (+) (+)
NS
 (+)
NS
 
H10a NFPs x FP market   (-)  (-)
NS
 
H10b  FPs x NFP market    (+)  (+)
NS
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
NS: not statistically significant at the 5% significance level 
MS: marginally significant at the 5% significant level 
 
 
After the implementation of the BBA, as hypothesized, for-profit hospitals were 
significantly more likely than public and private nonprofit hospitals to reduce HH care. 
However, other relationships proposed in this study are not supported. There is no 
discernable difference in the change in the probability of offering HH care between 
public and private nonprofit hospitals after the BBA. Surprisingly, religious hospitals 
were indeed more likely than secular hospitals to discontinue HH services post-BBA. 
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Nine out of the ten organizational and market factors that were supposed to play 
certain roles in hospitals‘ decisions to continue or discontinue HH care after the BBA 
have no significant effects, based on the empirical result of the analyses performed. Yet 
the hospital nursing FTE proportion has a negative and marginally significant effect on 
hospitals‘ continuation of HH care provision after the BBA. These findings will be 
further discussed in the next chapter.
  
 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Following the implementation of the BBA, there was a decline in the number of 
hospital-based HHAs and in the probability hospitals would provide HH services. As 
stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study is to shed light on the objective function of 
hospitals by examining how they change their provision of HH services in response to a 
change in financial incentives, and to explore the factors that influence hospital provision 
of HH services. Using a multi-theoretical framework and a difference-in-difference 
estimation approach, the current study reveals the objective functions of hospitals with 
different ownership forms and explores the key factors affecting hospitals provision and 
change in provision of HH services in the face of the BBA. This chapter summarizes the 
results presented in the previous chapter, interprets the findings, describes implications, 
discusses study limitations, and suggests areas for future research. 
Summary and Interpretation of the Descriptive and Bivariate Analyses 
This study examines hospitals‘ probabilities of reducing or discontinuing HH 
provision from one pre-BBA period to six post-BBA periods. Significant decreases in the 
percentage as well as the number of hospitals offering HH care over the study period 
were noted. Between 1997 and 2003, the percentage of acute-care general community 
hospitals offering HH care dropped from 60 percent to 42 percent; the number of 
hospital-based HHAs kept declining from 2,847 to 1,912 (a 33% decline. 
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Various degrees of reduction in HH provision among different hospital ownership 
types were also clearly observed. Among the hospitals of different ownership types, 
for-profit hospitals were the most likely to reduce provision of HH services (39%), 
followed by religious nonprofit hospitals (21%), public hospitals (14%), and secular 
nonprofit hospitals (13%). Between 1997 and 2000, the percentage offering HH services 
fell 32 percent among for-profit hospitals, 9 percent among religious hospitals, 6 percent 
among secular hospitals, and 4 percent among public hospitals (see Table 13). These 
findings are similar to those from Horwitz (2005a) who reported a 37.5 percent, 7.7 
percent, and 1.5 percent decline among for-profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals, 
respectively. 
As shown in the last two columns of Table 21, the number of hospitals offering 
HH care declined by 303 for secular nonprofit hospitals, 281 for for-profit hospitals, 234 
for public hospitals, and 117 for religious hospitals. However, the number of hospitals 
offering HH care declined by around 70 percent among for-profits, 32 percent among 
religious nonprofits, 31 percent among public hospitals, and 23 percent among secular 
nonprofits. 
 
Table 21. The Number of Hospitals Offering HH Care, By Ownership Type and Year 
Year 
Ownership 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Change 
in # 
Change 
in % 
Public 745 723 718 648 589 556 511 -234 -31.4% 
Religious 362 345 339 314 293 256 245 -117 -32.3% 
Secular 1,338 1,343 1,276 1,217 1,137 1,102 1,035 -303 -22.6% 
For-profit 402 359 264 161 143 131 121 -281 -69.9% 
Total 2,847 2,770 2,597 2,340 2,162 2,045 1,912 -935 -32.8% 
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From these results, at least four conclusions can be drawn. First, compared to 
public and private nonprofit hospitals, for-profit hospitals behaved differently, 
dramatically decreasing provision of HH care after the implementation of the BBA. 
Second, the share of nonprofit hospital-based HHAs in total hospital-based HHAs 
increased from 86 percent in 1997 to 94 percent in 2003. This may have implications for 
the quality of hospital-based HH care if HHA ownership is associated with care quality 
(Rosenau and Linder, 2003). Third, although for-profit hospitals dropped HHAs more 
dramatically than did other ownership types, the impact of the reduction on HH access 
may not be proportionally strong because for-profit hospitals only account for 10 percent 
to 15 percent of total hospitals. In fact, the reduction in for-profit hospital-based HHAs 
accounts for only 30 percent of overall decrease in total hospital-based HHAs during the 
study period. Finally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, for-profit hospitals‘ 
probability of offering HH care dropped dramatically between 1997 and 2000, compared 
to other ownership types. However, between 2000 and 2003, the change in the overall 
probability with which for-profit hospitals offered HH care became more comparable to 
those of other ownership types (see Figure 12). This may be an indication that the HH 
IPS and/or BBRA of 1999 to a certain extent lessened the financial concern of for-profit 
hospital managers about HH provision. However, the HH IPS or/and BBRA do not seem 
to have had a clear influence on public and private nonprofit hospitals‘ concerns in 
continuing to provide HH care or not. F tests to assess whether hospitals‘ probabilities of 
offering HH care changed across years from 1997 through 1999 result in F values equal 
to 0.06 (p value=0.94), 0.86 (p value=0.42), 2.03 (p value=0.10) for public, religious, and 
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secular nonprofit hospitals, respectively. This indicates that there were no significant 
changes in the probability of offering HH care right after the implementation of the BBA 
among each type of nonprofit hospitals. 
Certain trends with regard to the organizational and market factors of interest are 
revealed by the descriptive and bivariate analyses. First, the overall hospital total profit 
margin fell significantly across the post-BBA period, particularly in the first year 
following the implementation of the BBA. The average hospital total profit margin 
decreased from 2.46 percent in 1997 to 1.52 percent in 1998. This provides evidence that 
the BBA may have a direct impact on hospitals‘ financial performance. Yet the decreases 
in total profit margin became less dramatic after 2001. From 2001 to 2003, the overall 
hospital profit margin declined slightly from 0.67 percent to 0.65 percent. The 
implementation of the HH IPS and/or BBRA of 1999 should play an effective role in 
slowing down the deterioration of hospital financial conditions. 
Second, the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county declined 
over the study period. This may be a result of the implementation of the BBA which 
made HH services unprofitable. Third, during the study period, both hospital nursing 
density (as measured by the proportion of total FTEs accounted by nursing FTEs) and 
hospital average CMI in general decreased. This is reasonable because as the overall 
complexity of patient conditions decreased, fewer nursing capacities are needed to take 
care of the patients in the hospital. Finally, across the study period, the proportion of 
system-affiliated hospitals kept rising, probably due to market pressures on hospitals to 
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share resources, reduce costs, building up bargaining power, and increase legitimacy 
(D‘Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Luke and Walston, 2003). 
For the market factors, the counties where acute-care general community 
hospitals were located on average did not become more aged or less aged across time 
during the study period, while the growth rate of the elderly population in counties 
differed considerably from one year to another. Finally, two contrasting social trends are 
observed in the analysis. Between 1997 and 2003, the counties where the sampled 
hospitals were located, on average, became wealthier, as reflected by the increase in 
per-capita income. However, the same counties experienced an overall decrease in 
unemployment rate in the first half period followed by a dramatic increase in the second 
half period. This is a sign that these counties were faced with increasing socioeconomic 
inequity, particularly in the period of 2000 to 2003. 
Summary and Interpretation of the Hypotheses Tests 
The primary goal of this study is to shed light on how the objective functions of 
hospitals with different ownership forms differ by comparing their responses to changes 
in payment policies following enactment of the BBA. Thus, the first research question 
asked: Did the relative changes in hospital provision of HH care differ among public, 
religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals after the implementation of 
the BBA? Four hypotheses (hypotheses 1a-1d) were proposed to examine the effects of 
the ownership types on the change in hospitals‘ probability of offering HH care after the 
reduction in financial incentive brought about by the implementation of the BBA. 
The second major interest of this study is to examine the effects of certain organizational 
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and market factors on hospital provision and change in provision of HH services after the 
BBA. These factors including hospitals‘ reliance on PAC, hospital financial and 
workforce capabilities, transaction uncertainty, frequency, and complexity, normative and 
mimetic pressures, and the interaction of ownership and market penetration. To explore 
these issues eighteen hypotheses were developed. Multivariate analyses were conducted 
to test these hypotheses. The results of the hypothesis testing are shown in Table 22. The 
following section will provide further discussion and interpretation of these results. The 
effects of ownership will be discussed first, followed by the roles of the organizational 
and market factors. 
Hypotheses 1a-1d: Ownership Effects 
In alignment with hypotheses 1a and 1b, for-profit hospitals were significantly 
more likely than public and private nonprofit hospitals, respectively, to reduce HH 
services after the implementation of the BBA, holding other things equal. Since the BBA 
prominently reduced the Medicare reimbursement payments for HH services and 
Medicare payment accounts for the largest portion of total HHA revenues, the 
implementation of the BBA created a strong financial incentive to reduce HH provision 
among hospitals. However, if hospitals of different ownership types have different 
objectives, they should respond differently to the BBA, as reflected by differences in the 
change in the likelihood of providing HH. This empirical finding suggests that for-profit 
hospitals were the most responsive ownership type in the face of a major reduction in 
financial incentive. In other words, compared with both public and private nonprofit 
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Table 22. Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Hypotheses Ownership/Factors Supported 
Offer HH 
pre-BBA 
Change HH 
provision post-BBA 
Economics- Ownership   
H1a FP vs. Public  Yes 
H1b FP vs. NFP  Yes 
H1c NFP vs. Public  No 
H1d Secular vs. Religious  Opposite 
Resource Dependence   
H2a~H2b Level of hospital dependence 
on post-acute care- 
% Medicare inpatient days 
Yes No 
H3a~H3b Hospital financial capability- 
Hospital profit margin 
Yes No 
H4a~H4b Professional capability- 
Nursing density 
No No 
(Opposite) 
Transaction Cost    
H5a~H5b Uncertainty- 
Limited HHAs 
Opposite No 
H6~H6b Frequency-Hospital size Yes No 
H7a~H7b Complexity-Hospital CMI Yes No 
Institutional Theory   
H8a~H8b Normative pressure- 
Elderly population % 
Yes No 
H9~H9b Normative pressure- 
Elderly population growth rate 
No No 
H10a Mimetic pressure- 
NFPs x FP market penetration 
 No 
H10b  Mimetic pressure- 
FPs x NFP market penetration 
 No 
 
hospitals, for-profit hospitals are indeed more profit-oriented. They behave like other 
profit-maximizing firms, as expected by economic theory. 
This finding is consistent with the findings from Wheeler et al. (1999) on 
subacute care (SAC), Horwitz (2005a) on HH, and Lucente (2006) on NH. Similar to the 
current study, the studies by Horwitz (2005a) and Lucente (2006) compared hospital 
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provision of HH and NH services, respectively, before and after the implementation of 
the BBA, and found that for-profit hospitals were the most likely to reduce HH provision 
post-BBA. Wheeler et al. (1999) reported that for-profit hospitals are more responsive to 
financial conditions in their decisions to invest SAC than are nonprofit hospitals. As 
expected by finance theory, profit-maximizing hospitals with lower financial returns 
would be more likely than those with higher returns to search for diversified cash flow. 
Wheeler and colleagues found that for-profit hospitals that experienced relatively low 
financial returns began to offer more SAC services than more profitable for-profits. This 
study observes similar results by including interaction terms of ownership types and total 
profit margin using private nonprofit hospitals as the base group. The coefficient to the 
interaction term between for-profit type and total profit margin is -0.0092 with a standard 
error of 0.0049 and a p value of 0.06, which is marginally significant at the 0.05 level. 
This means that compared to nonprofit hospitals, less profitable for-profit hospitals are 
more likely than more profitable for-profits to provide HH care, holding other things 
constant. 
However, based on the aforementioned discussion, it is still unclear whether 
nonprofit hospitals are also profit-oriented in nature and whether there are differences in 
operational objectives among public, religious, and secular nonprofit hospitals. This 
study found no significant difference in the reduction in the ratio of the probabilities of 
offering versus not offering HH care between public and private nonprofit hospitals 
post-BBA. Yet there are significant differences between religious and secular nonprofit 
hospitals in the likelihood of dropping HH services after the BBA. As shown in Table 16 
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in the previous chapter, religious nonprofits were significantly more likely than secular 
nonprofits to reduce HH care since 2002. The difference in the likelihood of reduction of 
HH provision between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals gradually increased over 
the study period. The overall post-BBA difference is also statistically significant between 
the two nonprofit ownership types. 
In order to further examine these relationships, the probability of offering HH 
care is simulated for hospitals with different ownership types across the study period and 
plotted in Figure 13. These simulated probabilities were calculated based on the fitted 
full model reported in Appendix 2, holding constant the factors except years (used here to 
represent the presence of the BBA) and ownership types. The purpose of this figure is to 
illustrate the relationship between ownership types and the probability of providing HH 
care while holding constant all other factors for each year. More specifically, the 
following steps were applied to compute the simulated probabilities: 
The fitted model is simplified as: 
probhh=1/(1+e-(β0+B1Years+B2Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years+ B4Others))—(1);  
Where probhh is the predicted probability of offering HH care based on the fitted 
model. From (1), the following expression is obtained: 
e
(β0 + B1Years + B2Ownerships + B3Ownerships x Years + B4Others)
 = probhh/ (1- probhh) —(2); 
From (2), the following expression is obtained: 
β0 + B1Years + B2Ownerships + B3Ownerships x Years + B4Others = 
ln(probhh/(1-probhh))—(3) 
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Figure 13. A Simulation of the Probability of Offering HH Care, By Ownership Type and 
Year, Holding Other Factors Constant 
 
From (3), the following expression is obtained: 
B4Others=ln[probhh/(1-probhh)-( β0+B1Years+B2Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years)] 
Then the mean of B4Others, mean_B4Others, is calculated. Finally, the simulated 
probability equals to 1/(1+e
-(β0+B1Years+B2Ownerships+B3Ownerships x Years+ mean_B4Others)
). 
It can be seen from Figure 13 that, after holding equal other factors, the 
probability of offering HH care in the first year after the implementation of the BBA rose 
slightly for hospitals of all ownership types except for for-profit hospitals. Overall, the 
for-profit group had a downward trend in the probability of offering HH services after the 
implementation of the BBA. Surprisingly, in the second period (1998- 1999), the 
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likelihood of providing HH care increased dramatically for public and private nonprofit 
ownership types. The probabilities of offering HH services among hospitals of these 
three nonprofit ownership types remained stable between 1999 and 2001. Between 2001 
and 2002, all the ownership types had a considerable drop in the probability of offering 
HH care. However, the probability among for-profit hospitals flattened out after 2002. 
 After holding all other considered conditions equal, for-profit hospitals and 
religious hospitals had an overall (1997 through 2003) reduction in the probability of 
offering HH services, while the probability of offering HH care increased for public and 
secular nonprofit hospitals between 1997 and 2003. The probability decreased most 
significantly for for-profit hospitals (a 20% reduction), followed by religious nonprofit 
(1%). The probabilities of offering HH care among public and secular nonprofit hospitals 
increased slightly by 4 percent and 7 percent, respectively. It is also clear that the trends 
regarding the probability of offering HH care are similar among the three types of 
nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals have a pattern of HH provision very different 
from the nonprofit sectors in the post-BBA periods. These findings are basically 
consistent with the results of the bivariate analyses described earlier. In addition, the 
simulated graph further demonstrates that the three nonprofit ownership types did not 
change significantly in the probability of offering HH care in the face of the reduced 
reimbursement payments that followed the implementation of the BBA, if other 
conditions were all the same. This provides empirical evidence that U.S. acute-care 
general nonprofit community hospitals in general may not be very sensitive to the change 
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in the reimbursement environment. It can thus be concluded that public and private 
hospitals do have objectives other than profit-maximization. 
These results suggest that nonprofit hospitals could be two-good producers whose 
objective is to maximize total market outputs (Weisbrod, 1988). As long as the total 
profit margin can be maintained or is not lower than zero, they will continue to offer 
unprofitable services to meet the health care needs of the community. While Weisbrod‘s 
original model focuses on private nonprofits, scholars have extended this perspective to 
view all nonprofit (including public and private nonprofits) hospitals as the producers 
providing the under-supplied but necessary services such as charity care in the market 
(Frank and Salkever, 1991). 
Based on the two-good model, the increase in the probability of offering HH care 
among nonprofit hospitals between 1997 and 2001 can be explained as efforts nonprofit 
hospitals made to make up for the loss of for-profit hospital-based HHAs and expected 
loss of the total hospital-based HHA capacities. By doing this, the overall HH care need 
could be met. 
However, between 2001 and 2002, the probability of offering HH care among 
nonprofit hospitals dropped significantly. This may be a result of the combination of the 
implementation of the HH PPS on October 1, 2000 as well as that nonprofit hospitals‘ 
profit margins had reduced considerably due largely to the implementation of the BBA 
since 1997. Yet it can also be argued that public and private nonprofit hospitals are 
inefficient profit maximizers, although public hospitals have seldom been modeled in this 
way. 
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It should be noted that the discussion here focuses largely on the relative change 
or simulated change, not the real change in the probability of offering HH care among 
different hospital ownership forms. In fact, hospitals of all ownership types declined in 
HH provision during the study period. Therefore, the finding should still be consistent 
with that of Bazzoli and colleagues (2006) who reported a reduction in uncompensated 
care provision in safety-net hospitals that were largely comprised of public and religious 
hospitals after a decline in Medicaid payments resulting from the BBA.  
With respect to the significant difference in the change in probabilities of offering 
HH care between religious and secular nonprofit hospitals after the BBA, a number of 
explanations are provided. First, more than 80 percent of religious nonprofit hospitals 
were members of health systems, while only 40-50 percent of secular nonprofit hospitals 
were system-affiliated hospitals in the study period. Religious health systems should be 
able to take an advantage of their systemized structures in the arrangement of acute and 
PAC continuum. If religious health systems are more likely to adopt certain types of 
regional planning strategies or are more effective in arranging PAC services for their 
member hospitals as compared to their secular counterparts, individual religious hospitals 
may be more flexible in discontinuing HH services. This is likely because in the face of 
the payment reduction resulting from the BBA, religious health systems may take a more 
active role in arranging or centralizing PAC services in the region. The benefits of doing 
this include economies of scale or scope, resource sharing, and meeting the community 
need as well as the bottom line at the same time. 
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The second explanation may be that religious hospitals carried a larger 
responsibility for providing uncompensated care, compared to their secular counterparts. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the BBA also reduced the adjustment received by hospitals 
that treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients. Thus, religious hospitals might 
have perceived a stronger impact from the BBA than secular nonprofits. As a result, 
religious hospitals were more likely than secular hospitals to reduce HH care after the 
implementation of the BBA. 
The third possible explanation for the difference in the change in HH provision 
between the religious and secular ownership types would be that secular nonprofit 
hospitals are governed directly by their communities, while religious hospitals are 
directed in large part by church authorities or large healthcare systems in the case of 
Catholic hospitals. While the community representatives are more concerned with the 
heath care need of their communities, church representatives may have the objective of 
serving the needs of their church such as for evangelical purposes, increasing church 
reputation or/and competitive power (Bercea, Ekelund, and Tollison, 2005), and 
delivering a social ministry in addition to meeting community needs. If the provision of 
HH care is not closely related to the objectives valued highly by church authorities, 
religious hospitals may be more likely to discontinue it in an environment unfavorable to 
HH operation. On the other hand, secular nonprofit hospitals are not as responsive as 
their religious hospitals to policy changes as long as there is a demand for PAC in the 
community. 
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Hypotheses 2a-9a: Effects of Organizational and Market Factors on Hospital Provision 
of HH Care 
In addition to revealing the ownership effects on hospital provision of HH 
services after the implementation of the BBA, this study is intended to explore related 
organizational and market factors that influence HH provision. Hypotheses 2a~9a are 
employed for this particular purpose. This section presents the discussion of the major 
findings to these hypotheses. 
First, in accordance with hypothesis 2a, the proportion of hospital inpatient days 
contributed by Medicare patients was found to be positively associated with the 
probability of offering HH care. Here, the proportion of Medicare patients in a hospital is 
used to measure the hospital‘s reliance on PAC. Hospitals with higher Medicare 
proportions should be faced with greater pressure of seeking suitable PAC facilities for 
their discharged elderly patients. This result suggests that hospitals with a higher level of 
dependence on PAC facilities are more likely to offer HH care. This finding is consistent 
with the findings from Xu (2000) on HH care, and Chiu (1995) and Lucente (2006) on 
NH services, although they used the Medicare proportion to measure transaction 
frequency. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that hospitals‘ reliance on PAC is 
associated with a greater likelihood for hospitals to offer HH care. 
In alignment with hypothesis 3a, this study finds that hospital financial capability, 
as measured by total profit margin, is positively associated with hospital provision of HH 
care. This finding is partially consistent with the findings reported by Wheeler et al. 
(1999). In their study, the size of hospital SAC was found to be negatively associated 
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with hospital financial risk as measured by the variance of cash flow. That is, hospitals 
with greater fluctuations in financial returns are less likely than financially stable 
hospitals to provide SAC. However, the relationship between the level of financial 
returns (measured by cash flow) and hospital probability of offering SAC is reported by 
Wheeler et al. to be insignificant, although positive. By applying total profit margin as a 
measure of financial performance, the current study demonstrates that financial resources 
are important for hospitals in offering HH services. 
Inconsistent with hypothesis 4a, workforce capability (as measured by the ratio of 
nursing FTEs to total FTEs in a hospital and its subsidiary) is not significantly associated 
with hospital provision of HH care. This suggests that hospital nursing capability does 
not matter regarding HH care provision. Using a somewhat different nursing density ratio, 
the number of RN and LPN per bed, Wheeler et al. (1999) and Lucente (2006) found a 
significant effect of nursing density on hospital provision of both SAC and NH services. 
However, nursing density was found to be positively associated with SAC provision in 
the Wheeler et al. study, while it was negatively associated with NH care provision in 
Lucent‘s study. There are at least two reasons that may explain why this study found no 
significant relationship between nursing density and hospital provision of HH care. On 
the one hand, hospitals with higher nursing density are more capable of providing HH 
services. On the other hand, these hospitals are more able to provide better inpatient 
acute care to their patients, reducing the need to transfer their patients to HH settings. 
Contrary to hypothesis 5a, this study finds that HHA service availability 
(measured by the number of HHAs per 1,000 elderly people in the county) is positively 
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associated with hospitals‘ probability of providing HH care. HHA availability in the local 
market should reduce the level of transaction uncertainty between acute care and HH 
services. Hospitals faced with lower levels of transaction uncertainty (with more HHAs 
in the county) concerning discharging patients to necessary HH settings should feel less 
need to provide their own HH services. However, the finding suggests that hospitals with 
lower levels of transaction uncertainty in discharging patients to HHAs are more likely 
than those with higher levels of transaction uncertainty to provide their own HH services. 
This confusing result may be a result of the use of an imprecise measure. That is, the 
number of HHAs in the county may not be able to correctly measure the actual HH 
capacity in the market. It is very likely that each HHA differs materially in size or service 
volume. Therefore, it is suggested that a more appropriate measure should be employed, 
if available. For example, Chiu (1995) used area hospital occupancy rate as a measure of 
transaction uncertainty and found positive association between the measure and hospital 
provision of NH care. Also in studying the linkage between hospitals and NHs, Lucente 
(2006) applied the ratio of NH beds to the elderly population in the county to measure 
transaction uncertainty and found a positive association. 
However, the effect of transaction uncertainty on hospital provision of PAC may 
depend on the type of care studied. For example, Wheeler et al. (1999) found a negative 
association between hospital size of SAC and two-year lagged hospital occupancy, a 
measure used by Xu (2000) and Lucente (2006) to represent transaction uncertainty. In 
studying hospital integration with HH services, Xu (2000) employed a number of 
variables to measure transaction uncertainty. These variables include the ratio of the 
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number of RNs and LPNs employed by HHAs to the elderly population, hospital 
occupancy rate, the ratio of the number of NHs to the elderly population, and imbalanced 
demand over supply of HH services (using a dichotomous variable to indicate the level of 
the number of Medicare-certified HHAs relative to the elderly population). None of the 
coefficients to these variables were shown to be statistically significant. These findings 
may suggest that transaction uncertainty is not a major concern in hospitals‘ decisions to 
offer HH care, at least not in the expected way. 
Consistent with hypothesis 6a, hospital size, which is used to measure transaction 
frequency, is empirically found to be associated positively with hospital provision of HH 
care. Hospital size has been consistently demonstrated by a number of studies to be 
associated positively with hospital offering of PAC services such as HH (Xu, 2000), SAC 
(Wheeler et al., 1999), NH (Lucente, 2006), and end-of-life care (White et al., 2002). 
Several theoretical perspectives would predict that larger hospitals are more likely to 
offer HH services. First, this relationship may be predicted by economies of scale or 
scope from the viewpoint of economics. Second, resource dependence theory argues that 
larger hospitals have more resources to provide more necessary services. Also, larger 
hospitals usually have more patients and diverse health care needs, driving hospitals to 
integrate various services in order to secure their patient sources, the most critical 
resource for hospitals. Finally, from the perspective of transaction cost economics, larger 
hospitals may need to be involved with more activities discharging patients to necessary 
PAC services, thus increasing transaction frequency and transaction costs. In order to 
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reduce related transaction costs, these hospitals may set up their own PAC facilities and 
provide PAC services for their discharged patients. 
Furthermore, this study observes a positive and significant effect of hospital CMI 
on hospital provision of HH care. Most of the people who need HH care are partially 
dependent patients whose conditions may be more complex than those who do not need 
HH care. The CMIs of these chronic conditions should be higher. This result suggests 
that transaction complexity is a key concern in transferring patients to HHAs. That is, 
hospitals with more medically complex patients are more likely to offer HH services, 
driven by the difficulty and relating costs in transferring these medically complex 
patients to external HHAs. Thus hypothesis 7a is supported. 
Consistent with hypothesis 8a, normative pressure (as measured by the proportion 
of elderly population in the county) is a driving force for hospital adoption of HH care. 
Previous studies such as Wheeler et al. (1999) and Xu (2000) were unable to find a 
discernable effect of elderly population proportion on hospital offering of SAC and HH, 
respectively. This study empirically reveals that higher social pressures resulting from 
higher elderly density in the local area is associated with hospitals to provide their own 
HH care. It is also possible that hospitals in counties with a higher elderly density view it 
as a market opportunity for PAC diversification. 
However, the second measure of the level of social/normative pressure, elderly 
population growth rate in the county, is noted to be not significantly associated with 
hospital offering of HH services. Possible explanations include (1) the change in elderly 
population may not be directly perceived by the residents in a community; (2) elderly 
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population change varies year by year. Hence, people in the community will evaluate the 
need of LTC/PAC in the community based on the elderly proportion instead of the 
change in the elderly population. 
Hypotheses 2b-10b: Effects of Organizational and Market Factors on Hospital Provision 
of HH Care after the Implementation of the BBA 
One of the major interests of this study is to examine the factors that affect 
hospitals‘ decisions to drop HH care after enactment of the BBA. From the results 
presented in Chapter 5, it is clear that only one of the factors examined has significant 
effect on changing hospitals‘ probabilities of offering HH services. More specifically, 
only ownership type (i.e., for-profit versus public and private nonprofit hospitals, and 
religious nonprofit versus secular nonprofit hospitals) can statistically explain the relative 
decrease in the probability of offering HH care post-BBA. All other organizational and 
market factors considered overall did not influence hospitals‘ changes in provision of HH 
services, except for nursing FTE proportion whose effect is marginally significant. 
The non-significant effects of the organizational and market factors on the 
changes in hospital provision of HH care suggest that the change in financial incentive is 
the most critical and consistent consideration in hospitals‘ responses to the 
implementation of the BBA. Compared to the ownership effects resulting from hospitals‘ 
objectives, other factors are minimized when it comes to planning for the strategic 
change in HH care in the face of the BBA. However, this does not mean that these 
organizational and market factors are no longer important in hospital managers‘ 
considerations concerning HH provision. These factors are still in the hospital‘s equation 
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of HH provision but simply do not affect the change in hospitals‘ likelihood of providing 
HH services in the post-BBA period. 
Also, the findings related to the role of the organizational and market factors in 
the change in HH provision could also be a result of the analytical approach used here. It 
is likely that hospital managers made service provision decisions in one particular year 
based on the performance and situation of the previous year. However, this study 
assumes no time lag between performance evaluations and decisions. Nevertheless, most 
of the factors considered such as ownership, CMI, nursing staff proportion, proportion of 
Medicare patients, hospital size, and market characteristics are basically quite stable for 
individual hospitals. The application of a time-lagged approach may not make a big 
difference to the result. 
In addition, although this study observes expected spillover effects of nonprofit 
hospitals on for-profit hospitals, and vice versa (hypotheses 10a and 10b), the effects are 
not statistically significant. This suggests that the mimetic pressure resulting from cross 
ownership influence may be present, but it is relatively weak. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) 
reported that nonprofit hospitals were more likely to offer HH services in the high than 
the low for-profit penetration markets when the services were profitable (in the pre-BBA 
period). Yet when the services became less profitable, nonprofit hospitals reduced their 
likelihood of offering HH services more dramatically in high than low for-profit 
penetration markets. The results for for-profit hospitals are similar. The directions of the 
relationships found in the current study are consistent with those from Horwitz and 
Nichols, but the relationships are not significant. The difference in these findings may be 
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due to the different definitions employed by the current study and that conducted by 
Horwitz and Nichole.  
The Relationships between the Control Variables and Hospital Provision of HH Care 
As expected, all the control variables are significantly associated with hospitals‘ 
likelihood of providing HH care. Teaching hospitals and system-affiliated hospitals were 
less likely to offer HH care than non-teaching and freestanding hospitals, respectively. As 
mentioned earlier, health systems may have particular regional resource sharing 
mechanisms (Luke, Walston, and Plummer, 2004), thus reducing system member 
hospitals‘ likelihood of establishing their own HHAs. In addition, teaching hospitals may 
focus largely on providing acute care tertiary services, conducting educational programs 
and research projects rather than offering PAC services. This study also found that rural 
hospitals were more likely than their urban counterparts to provide HH care, due 
probably to the relative lack of family members to take care of the dependent elderly at 
home in rural areas. 
Finally, two variables measuring local ability to pay for health care were 
controlled for in the analysis. Results show that hospitals located in counties with higher 
unemployment rates were less likely than those located in counties with lower 
unemployment rates to offer HH services. This result makes sense since counties with 
higher unemployment rates should be less able to pay for HH care, given some of HH 
services are privately paid. There might be more uninsured people in these counties, thus 
reducing the motivation of hospitals to set up HHAs. It is also observed that hospitals 
were more likely to discontinue HH services in higher than in lower per-capita income 
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counties. If county per-capita income also measures local ability to pay for health care, 
the result should be opposite. Obviously these findings contradict with each other. 
However, it is very likely that counties with higher per-capita incomes have more 
working residents, and they are less likely to need HH services. 
Implications of the Findings 
The findings of this study have several important implications. The discussions of 
the implications in this section are divided into four parts, including policy implications, 
implications for hospital managers, theoretical implications, and implications for 
methodology. 
Policy Implications 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the empirical findings of this 
study. First, the findings reported here provide evidence in support of tax exempt status 
for private nonprofit hospitals. This study reveals that private nonprofit hospitals‘ 
objectives are similar to those of their public counterparts but are very different from 
those of for-profit hospitals. Public and private nonprofit hospitals together play a critical 
role in meeting the total health care need of the market. In this light, they exist because of 
market failure or the expectation of market deficiency such as the expected reduction in 
HH provision after the BBA. Therefore, the tax benefits enjoyed by nonprofit hospitals 
should be justifiable given their provision of the necessary but under-supplied services 
(because these services are less profitable or unprofitable) in the health care market. 
Second, these findings do not support the argument that ―We (the U.S.) are the 
only advanced country in the world that has chosen to leave health care to the tender 
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mercies of a panoply of for-profit businesses, whose purpose is to maximize income and 
not to provide health‖ quoted earlier in this dissertation. Thus, in thinking of health care 
reform or policy changes, it may be more appropriate to view hospitals as groups with 
different objectives instead of one industry with an overarching for-profit purpose. As 
Horwitz (2005a: 796) states, ―ownership could be considered in designing 
reimbursement policies‖. 
Third, this study provides evidence that the BBRA of 1999 were particularly 
effective in stopping or slowing down the declining pace of HH care provision among 
for-profit hospitals. The decline in the probability of offering HH care among for-profit 
hospitals flattened out right after the implementation of the BBRA at the end of 1999 in 
both the actual or simulated probability figures (see Figures 12 and 13, respectively). 
However, the BBRA does not seem to have an influence on provision of HH services 
among public and private nonprofit hospitals. Surprisingly, the HH PPS which is 
considered to be less stringent in HH service reimbursement than the HH IPS did not 
significantly change the reduction pace in the probability of offering HH care among 
hospitals of all ownership types in the actual probability figure, but did significantly 
reduced the probability among all ownership types in the simulated probability figure. 
This may be a result of hospitals‘ view of the HH PPS as another major policy scheme 
for controlling Medicare HH expenditures and reducing HH reimbursement. 
Finally, between 1997 and 2003, the share of nonprofit hospital-based HHAs 
increased, due to the dramatic decline in the number of for-profit hospital-based HHAs 
after the implementation of the BBA. If nonprofit HHAs are more likely than their 
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for-profit counterparts to provide services with better quality (Rosenau and Linder, 2003), 
the BBA might have brought some benefits to the quality of overall HH services. The 
quality benefits could offset some of the negative impacts resulting from the reduction in 
access to hospital-based HH services. This may explain in part why researchers were not 
able to find discernable reductions in quality of PAC services received by Medicare 
patients after the BBA (e.g., McCall, Korb, Petersons, and Moore, 2003; Kilgore et al., 
2009). 
Management Implications 
This study provides at least three insights for hospital managers. First, private 
nonprofit hospital managers can use the empirical evidence found in this study to support 
their tax exempt status. In addition, most of the organizational and market factors 
examined here are significantly associated with hospital provision of HH services. In 
considering providing HH services or diversifying into PAC services, hospitals can 
conduct a comprehensive assessment of their situations based on these factors. 
Furthermore, a key contribution of this study is to reveal that, in response to a 
major payment policy change, hospitals‘ adaptive strategies concerning service provision 
may be based largely on their operative objectives rather than other organizational or 
market performance or conditions following the implementation of the policy. Whether 
this phenomenon is specific to hospital provision of HH care in response to the BBA or is 
also applicable to hospital provision of other service types after the implementation of 
other policies warrants further research.  
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Theoretical Implications 
A number of theoretical implications can be drawn here. First, the findings of this 
study mostly support the economic model viewing nonprofit hospitals as two-good 
producers whose objective function is to maximize market output for meeting the health 
care needs of the community. Yet the possibility that nonprofit hospitals are inefficient 
profit-maximizers still cannot be totally ruled out based on the analytical results. 
Second, this study empirically demonstrates the different behavior between 
religious and secular nonprofit hospital groups. Nevertheless, the proposed conceptual 
model in Chapter 3 is not able to explain the difference observed. Given the fact that very 
limited existing theoretical or conceptual models can be applied to differentiate these two 
nonprofit hospital sectors, this study calls for further development of conceptual 
frameworks in exploring the distinct behaviors between religious and secular nonprofit 
hospitals. 
Third, the findings of this study strengthen the argument of and the proposal for 
using multi-theoretical frameworks in empirical research. It can be seen from the results 
of the hypothesis tests that only part of the constructs proposed by each organization 
theory are empirically supported. This finding suggests that there is no perfect or ideal 
theory that alone can explain or predict all the relations regarding hospitals‘ responses to 
environmental changes. Each theoretical perspective has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. In this regard, different theories are in fact complementary in providing a 
wider and more comprehensive view of organization behaviors. However, the difference 
in theoretical predicting ability may be due to the extent to which the measures are 
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appropriately selected. Thus, alternative measures may be needed for further tests of the 
theories. 
Methodology Implications 
Policy evaluation is an important task for researchers and analysts. This study 
demonstrates a straightforward analytical approach for conducting longitudinal research 
to examine several aspects of hospital behavior across time following the implementation 
of a particular policy. In addition, compared to previous related studies, the current study 
should be able to obtain a more valid estimation of the relationships of interest by taking 
into account more organizational and market factors drawn from relevant theories. 
Possible validity issues or biases related to data and analysis are also considered and 
addressed with reasonable efforts. Therefore, this study provides a useful example for 
future related research. 
Limitations of the Study 
There are several noteworthy limitations to this study that should be addressed. 
First, there might be history threats present in this study. Although this study controls for 
potential state policy effects, the approach employed here only control for the differences 
present throughout the study period. That is, possible changes in reimbursement 
payments in individual states within the study period may fail to be controlled for 
(Spector, Cohen, and Pesis-Katz, 2004). In addition, no effort was taken to isolate the 
effects of concurrent events that might influence hospital provision of HH services at the 
national level. However, the implementation of the BBA has been widely recognized as 
the national landmark policy affecting the operation of acute-care, PAC, and LTC 
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organizations in the late 90s. In addition, the findings here are aligned with the expected 
path of hospitals‘ responses following the implementations of the HH IPS, BBRA, and/or 
HH PPS. No other underlying effects resulting from national policies or events could be 
observed in the analysis. 
Second, there might be issues resulting from omitted variables. For example, the 
financial performance of hospital-based HHAs should be a critical factor in the equation 
of hospital closure of HHAs. Yet this factor is not included in the analytical model due to 
technical difficulty. Nevertheless, pre- versus post-BBA indicators (i.e., the year 
dummies) were employed to represent the overall profitability of HH agencies in this 
study. This is based on the assumption that HH services were profitable before and 
unprofitable after the BBA (Horwitz, 2005b). In this case, if the financial performance of 
individual hospital-based HHAs is controlled for, it may not be able to see the post-BBA 
effect which is the primary interest of this study. This is because the actual financial 
impact of the BBA reflected by the financial performance of HHAs is set to be equal. 
That is, this may cause an issue of an overspecified model in this analysis (Wooldridge, 
2006: 94-95). Therefore, this study examines a perceived impact (post-BBA effect) rather 
than a direct impact (i.e., the effect of the actual reduction or change in hospital-based 
HHA financial performance post-BBA) of the BBA. Also, a hospital total profit margin 
measure is included in the analysis to reflect the overall financial performance of 
individual sampled hospitals. Future research may be conducted to evaluate the direct 
impact of the BBA on hospital operations. 
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Another set of omitted variables include other PAC/LTC services individual 
hospitals provide as well as other types of arrangement for provision of these services. 
These factors should also be in the equations of hospitals‘ provision of HH services. 
However, there are issues of reverse causality between these factors and hospital HH 
provision. Those hospitals that already owned a HHA should have lower likelihood of 
having other PAC services and other service arrangements. For the issue of service 
arrangement, system membership has been included in the analysis, which is supposed to 
partially control for the effect of service arrangement. For the issue of other type of PAC 
services, the effect of NH provision may need to be considered since HH and NH care 
are the two major types of PAC services hospitals provide. Future studies can apply a 
bivariate probit model to simultaneously study hospital provision of HH and NH services, 
while considering the correlation of these two service types. 
In addition, the effectiveness or ability of health systems in arranging services 
continuum among their member hospitals in a local market should also be considered. As 
mentioned earlier, this factor may explain why religious hospitals were more likely to 
reduce HH provision after the enactment of the BBA, compared to their secular 
counterparts. However, there is still a lack of a widely-recognized measure for this factor. 
Third, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there might be anticipatory effects of hospitals 
in response to the BBA. However, these effects have been observed to be minor. As 
demonstrated in Figures 12, the change in the percentage of offering HH services is not 
significant for each ownership type in the beginning of the study period, i.e., 1997 to 
1998. A dramatic drop in the percentage among for-profit hospitals was not observed 
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until 1998, one year after the implementation of the BBA. According to Horwitz (2005a), 
hospitals‘ probability of offering HH services were generally stable among all types of 
hospitals between 1995 and 1997. The decline in the probability among for-profit 
hospitals accelerated after 1997. These findings provide evidence that the anticipatory 
effects of hospitals in response to the BBA before 1997 can be ignored. 
Fourth, one potential limitation may result from that the pre-BBA data are based 
on only one year of data while the post-BBA data are based on six-year data. Biases 
could be present if the pre-BBA data are systematically under- or over-estimated. 
However, there is no clear evidence that the pre-BBA data are problematic, based on the 
examination of the variable statistics reported in Table 10. 
Finally, this study is only applicable to the U.S. non-federal, short-term, 
acute-care general community hospitals located in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Since the hospitals without a Medicare provider ID were excluded from the 
analysis, the findings of this study should be only generalizable to those 
Medicare-certified general community hospitals. 
Suggestions for Future Studies 
This study raises several questions for future research. While this study in fact 
examines a post-BBA effect, future research might study the direct impact of the BBA on 
hospital provision of HH services. This can be done by employing the reduction in HH 
Medicare revenues after the BBA as the key explanatory variable. 
Future studies might also study the impact of the BBA on hospital provision of 
other types of PAC services such as NH care. Results of studying hospital provision of 
179 
 
NH services after the implementation of the BBA are seldom reported. Given that NH 
and HH services differ in service population, service scope, and revenue source, hospitals 
should have different strategic considerations in changing NH provision post-BBA. New 
knowledge about the linkage between hospitals and PAC services can be gained by 
comparing the results from studies on hospital provision of NH services with the findings 
regarding hospital offering HH care reported by previous and the current studies. 
While this study applies whether a hospital provides its own HH care to indicate 
HH provision, future research might use HH service volume to measure HH provision. In 
response to the BBA, some hospitals may still provide HH services, but the level of 
provision may be decreased. A whether-or-not measure is not able to detect the change in 
the size of HH service over time. Thus, HH service volume should be a more sensitive 
measure for studying the relationship of interest. 
Finally, more studies are needed for revealing the different behaviors between 
religious and secular hospitals. So far economic and organizational theories usually 
consider these two nonprofit types to be the same health care organizations in terms of 
operational objectives and resulting behaviors. However, this study and previous studies 
(e.g., Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan, 2003; White, 
Cochran, and Patel, 2002) have empirically demonstrated that religious and secular 
nonprofit hospitals differ significantly in operational behaviors or responses to the 
change in operating environment. More sophisticated theoretical or conceptual models on 
nonprofit hospitals are needed for guiding related research. On the other hand, more 
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empirical studies comparing the behavior of these two hospital ownership types are 
helpful in verifying the theoretical or conceptual models. 
Conclusions 
By using a natural experiment approach and longitudinal national hospital data, 
this study sheds light on the objective functions of hospitals with different ownership 
forms by comparing their relative reductions in HH provision after the implementation of 
the BBA. The empirical findings reveal that for-profit hospitals behave differently as 
compared to public and private nonprofit hospitals, due to their different operational 
objectives. While the response of for-profit hospitals is consistent with the 
profit-maximizer model, both public and private nonprofit ownership types behave 
consistently in accordance with the model of two-good producers whose objective is to 
maximize market outputs for meeting the health care needs of the community, given the 
break-even requirement. This finding provides support for the tax exemption the United 
States government has granted private nonprofit hospitals. 
Although the response patterns of the nonprofit ownership types are in general 
similar, this study found that, contrary to expectation, religious hospitals were more 
likely than secular nonprofit hospitals to have reduced HH provision after the BBA. 
Further studies are needed to explore the difference in operational behaviors between 
these two ownership types. 
Built on previous related studies and applying a more comprehensive set of 
independent and control variables and improved data sources, this study is able to 
examine the effects of certain organizational and market factors on hospital offering of 
181 
 
HH care pre-BBA and the change in the provision of HH care in the six years following 
the implementation of the BBA. Hospital proportion of Medicare patients, hospital size, 
total profit margin, case mix index, elderly density in the market are found to be positive 
determinants of a hospital‘s likelihood of offering HH care. However, these 
organizational and market factors, in general, play a non-significant role in influencing 
hospitals‘ changes in HH care provision after the implementation of the BBA. These 
findings raise a number of relevant questions for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Appendix 1. Comparison of the Three Models with Different Sets of Control Variables 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(1) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(2) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
Year effects (Base: 1997) 
      
Year‘98 0.293  
 
0.165  
 
0.161  
 
Year‘99 0.751  ** 0.704  * 0.646  * 
Year‘00 0.833  ** 0.673  * 0.639  * 
Year‘01 0.929  ** 0.737  * 0.650  
 
Year‘02 0.444  
 
0.263  
 
0.174  
 
Year‘03 0.473  
 
0.270  
 
0.174  
 
Ownership effects 
      
Religious hospital 0.430  *** 0.658  *** 0.634  *** 
Religious x year‘98 -0.078  
 
-0.105  
 
-0.116  
 
Religious x year‘99 -0.133  
 
-0.162  
 
-0.171  
 
Religious x year‘00 -0.182  
 
-0.225  * -0.228  * 
Religious x year‘01 -0.083  
 
-0.136  
 
-0.131  
 
Religious x year‘02 -0.204  
 
-0.255  * -0.254  * 
Religious x year‘03 -0.157  
 
-0.209  
 
-0.208  
 
Secular hospital 0.085  
 
0.247  ** 0.255  ** 
Secular x year‘98 0.008  
 
0.002  
 
-0.004  
 
Secular x year‘99 -0.096  
 
-0.100  
 
-0.109  
 
Secular x year‘00 -0.022  
 
-0.037  
 
-0.045  
 
Secular x year‘01 0.058  
 
0.040  
 
0.035  
 
Secular x year‘02 0.061  
 
0.052  
 
0.039  
 
Secular x year‘03 0.135  
 
0.130  
 
0.114  
 
For-profit hospital 0.359  * 0.449  * 0.459  * 
For-profit x year‘98 -0.231  
 
-0.273  * -0.265  * 
For-profit x year‘99 -0.798  *** -0.855  *** -0.880  *** 
For-profit x year‘00 -1.161  *** -1.257  *** -1.264  *** 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(3) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(4) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
For-profit x year‘01 -1.071  *** -1.160  *** -1.176  *** 
For-profit x year‘02 -1.083  *** -1.168  *** -1.185  *** 
For-profit x year‘03 -0.898  *** -0.974  *** -1.012  *** 
Organizational factors 
      
Medicare 0.010  *** 0.009  *** 0.009  *** 
Medicare x year‘98 0.001  
 
0.002  
 
0.001  
 
Medicare x year‘99 0.000  
 
0.001  
 
0.000  
 
Medicare x year‘00 0.000  
 
-0.001  
 
-0.001  
 
Medicare x year‘01 0.003  
 
0.003  
 
0.002  
 
Medicare x year‘02 0.001  
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
Medicare x year‘03 0.003  
 
0.003  
 
0.003  
 
Margin 0.013  *** 0.015  *** 0.015  *** 
Margin x year‘98 0.000  
 
-0.001  
 
0.000  
 
Margin x year‘99 -0.006  
 
-0.008  
 
-0.009  
 
Margin x year‘00 -0.005  
 
-0.006  
 
-0.006  
 
Margin x year‘01 0.003  
 
0.001  
 
0.001  
 
Margin x year‘02 -0.004  
 
-0.006  
 
-0.006  
 
Margin x year‘03 0.001  
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
Nursing 0.008  
 
0.002  
 
0.000  
 
Nursing x year‘98 -0.011  * -0.012  * -0.013  * 
Nursing x year‘99 -0.004  
 
-0.007  
 
-0.007  
 
Nursing x year‘00 -0.012  
 
-0.016  * -0.016  * 
Nursing x year‘01 -0.014  * -0.017  * -0.017  * 
Nursing x year‘02 -0.002  
 
-0.004  
 
-0.003  
 
Nursing x year‘03 -0.010  
 
-0.014  
 
-0.013  
 
Hospital size 0.002  *** 0.002  *** 0.002  *** 
Hospital size x year‘98 0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
Hospital size x year‘99 0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
Hospital size x year‘00 0.001  
 
0.001  
 
0.001  
 
Hospital size x year‘01 0.001  ** 0.001  ** 0.001  ** 
Hospital size x year‘02 0.001  
 
0.001  
 
0.000  
 
Hospital size x year‘03 0.001  
 
0.001  
 
0.000  
 
Hospital CMI 1.001  *** 0.800  *** 0.778  *** 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(5) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(6) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
CMI x year‘98 -0.110  
 
-0.010  
 
0.029  
 
CMI x year‘99 -0.469  ** -0.415  * -0.380  * 
CMI x year‘00 -0.423  * -0.309  
 
-0.265  
 
CMI x year‘01 -0.663  ** -0.536  ** -0.483  * 
CMI x year‘02 -0.506  * -0.367  
 
-0.308  
 
CMI x year‘03 -0.699  ** -0.506  * -0.436  
 
Market factors 
      
HHA/elderly 1.720  *** 1.540  *** 1.558  *** 
HHA/elderly x year‘98 -0.003  
 
0.027  
 
0.037  
 
HHA/elderly x year‘99 -0.215  
 
-0.166  
 
-0.153  
 
HHA/elderly x year‘00 0.080  
 
0.116  
 
0.115  
 
HHA/elderly x year‘01 0.226  
 
0.259  
 
0.248  
 
HHA/elderly x year‘02 0.074  
 
0.074  
 
0.048  
 
HHA/elderly x year‘03 0.002  
 
0.016  
 
-0.014  
 
Elderly proportion 0.033  *** 0.023  * 0.022  * 
Elderly x year‘98 0.005  
 
0.006  
 
0.005  
 
Elderly x year‘99 -0.001  
 
0.000  
 
0.001  
 
Elderly x year‘00 -0.012  
 
-0.007  
 
-0.005  
 
Elderly x year‘01 -0.024  * -0.019  
 
-0.017  
 
Elderly x year‘02 -0.015  
 
-0.012  
 
-0.010  
 
Elderly x year‘03 -0.005  
 
-0.003  
 
-0.003  
 
Growth 0.022  
 
0.017  
 
0.017  
 
Growth x year‘98 0.018  
 
0.018  
 
0.014  
 
Growth x year‘ 99 0.028  
 
0.030  
 
0.030  
 
Growth x year‘ 00 -0.009  
 
0.006  
 
0.007  
 
Growth x year‘ 01 -0.008  
 
0.009  
 
0.009  
 
Growth x year ‗02 -0.029  
 
-0.032  
 
-0.031  
 
Growth x year‘ 03 0.039  * 0.037  
 
0.036  
 
NFP hospital x FP market 0.004  
 
0.000  
 
0.001  
 
NFP x FP market x year‘98 0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
NFP x FP market x year‘99 -0.002  
 
-0.002  
 
-0.002  
 
NFP x FP market x year‘00 -0.002  
 
-0.001  
 
-0.001  
 
NFP x FP market x year‘01 -0.003  
 
-0.003  
 
-0.003  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(7) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(8) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
NFP x FP market x year‘02 -0.008  * -0.008  * -0.009  * 
NFP x FP market x year‘03 -0.010  ** -0.010  ** -0.011  ** 
FP hospital x NFP market -0.004  
 
-0.005  
 
-0.004  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘98 0.003  
 
0.003  
 
0.003  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘99 0.002  
 
0.004  
 
0.004  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘00 -0.002  
 
-0.001  
 
-0.001  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘01 -0.003  
 
-0.002  
 
-0.002  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘02 -0.005  
 
-0.003  
 
-0.004  
 
FP x NFP market x year‘03 -0.010  ** -0.009  * -0.009  * 
Control variables 
      
System -0.269  *** -0.382  *** -0.365  *** 
Teaching -0.760  *** -0.637  *** -0.642  *** 
HH CON -0.337  *** 
    
Rural 0.393  *** 0.488  *** 0.477  *** 
Income -0.022  *** -0.013  * -0.013  * 
Unemployment rate -0.025  * -0.035  ** -0.035  ** 
Closure -0.505  *** -0.542  *** -0.449  *** 
Closure x year‘98 -0.089  
 
-0.076  
 
-0.072  
 
Closure x year‘99 -0.141  
 
-0.096  
 
-0.086  
 
Closure x year‘00 -0.304  
 
-0.234  
 
-0.253  
 
Closure x year‘01 -0.392  
 
-0.331  
 
-0.326  
 
Closure x year‘02 -0.876  ** -0.799  * -0.804  * 
State dummies 
      
Maine 
  
-1.543  *** -1.374  *** 
New Hampshire 
  
-1.742  *** -1.585  *** 
Vermont
#
 
  
-4.889  *** -4.721  *** 
Massachusetts 
  
-0.922  ** -0.747  * 
Rhode Island 
  
-1.067  
 
-0.778  
 
Connecticut 
  
-1.535  *** -1.371  ** 
New York 
  
-1.493  *** -1.314  *** 
New Jersey 
  
-1.024  ** -0.839  ** 
Pennsylvania 
  
-0.562  * -0.393  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(9) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(10) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
Delaware 
  
0.072  
 
0.253  
 
Maryland 
  
-0.979  ** -0.816  * 
D.C. 
  
-1.368  
 
-1.196  
 
West Virginia 
  
-0.141  
 
0.157  
 
North Carolina 
  
-0.684  ** -0.496  
 
South Carolina 
  
-0.995  ** -0.815  * 
Georgia 
  
-1.497  *** -1.324  *** 
Florida 
  
-0.275  
 
-0.098  
 
Ohio 
  
-0.524  * -0.335  
 
Indiana 
  
0.245  
 
0.421  
 
Illinois 
  
-0.466  
 
-0.288  
 
Michigan 
  
-0.696  ** -0.525  
 
Wisconsin 
  
-1.641  *** -1.478  *** 
Kentucky 
  
-0.686  * -0.513  
 
Tennessee 
  
-0.610  * -0.410  
 
Alabama 
  
-0.002  
 
0.161  
 
Mississippi 
  
-1.392  *** -1.221  *** 
Minnesota 
  
-0.579  * -0.417  
 
Iowa 
  
-0.365  
 
-0.201  
 
Missouri 
  
0.033  
 
0.234  
 
North Dakota 
  
-0.940  ** -0.773  * 
South Dakota 
  
-0.422  
 
-0.095  
 
Nebraska 
  
-0.515  
 
-0.347  
 
Kansas 
  
-0.817  ** -0.527  
 
Arkansas 
  
0.812  * 1.001  ** 
Louisiana 
  
-0.681  ** -0.432  
 
Oklahoma 
  
-0.016  
 
0.168  
 
Texas 
  
-0.622  ** -0.432  
 
Montana 
  
-0.570  
 
-0.394  
 
Idaho 
  
-0.131  
 
0.043  
 
Wyoming 
  
-0.033  
 
0.143  
 
Colorado 
  
-0.674  * -0.469  
 
New Mexico 
  
-0.756  
 
-0.593  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(11) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(12) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
Arizona 
  
-0.620  
 
-0.427  
 
Utah 
  
-0.079  
 
0.064  
 
Nevada 
  
-0.758  * -0.595  
 
Washington 
  
-0.911  ** -0.734  * 
Oregon 
  
0.824  * 1.005  ** 
California 
  
-0.341  
 
-0.124  
 
Alaska 
  
-0.527  
 
-0.321  
 
Hawaii 
  
-1.110  * -0.913  
 
CMI_d 
    
-1.377  *** 
CMI_d x year‘98 
    
-0.242  
 
CMI_d x year‘99 
    
-0.223  
 
CMI_d x year‘00 
    
-0.098  
 
CMI_d x year‘01 
    
-0.402  
 
CMI_d x year‘02 
    
-0.346  
 
CMI_d x year‘03 
    
-0.638  
 
Pop_d  
    
-1.638  
 
Pop_d x year‘98 
    
0.136  
 
Pop_d x year‘99 
    
0.403  
 
Pop_d x year‘00 
    
-0.072  
 
Pop_d x year‘01 
    
0.553  
 
Pop_d x year‘02 
    
0.365  
 
Pop_d x year‘03 
    
0.132  
 
Margin_d 
    
-0.844  ** 
Margin_d x year‘98 
    
-0.037  
 
Margin_d x year‘99 
    
0.111  
 
Margin_d x year‘00 
    
0.180  
 
Margin_d x year‘01 
    
0.100  
 
Margin_d x year‘02 
    
0.480  
 
Margin_d x year‘03 
    
0.605  * 
Income_d 
    
1.499  
 
Income_d x year‘98 
    
0.073  
 
Income_d x year‘99 
    
-0.400  
 
Income_d x year‘00 
    
-0.052  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
                   Model 
Variable 
Simple logit 
model  
(1) 
(13) plus State 
Dummy 
variables 
(14) plus 
Missing Dummy 
Variables 
Income_d x year‘01 
    
-0.465  
 
Income_d x year‘02 
    
-0.537  
 
Income_d x year‘03 
    
-0.206  
 
Constant -2.330  *** -1.429  *** -1.504  *** 
Model Statistics 
      
Log pseudolikelihood -19787.842  -19056.515  -18920.998  
Wald χ2 
1399.52 
(df=109) 
1603.70 
(df=158) 
1775.75 
(df=186) 
P(>Wald χ2) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.125  0.157  0.163  
N 32642  32642  32642  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Appendix 2. Completed Results of the Full Model 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Year effects (Base: 1997) 
    
Year‘98 1.156 0.145  
 
0.241 
Year‘99 1.880 0.631  * 0.274 
Year‘00 1.846 0.613  
 
0.324 
Year‘01 1.878 0.630  
 
0.334 
Year‘02 1.180 0.165  
 
0.351 
Year‘03 1.170 0.157  
 
0.358 
Ownership effects 
    
Religious hospital 1.884 0.633  *** 0.132 
Religious x year‘98 0.891 -0.115  
 
0.078 
Religious x year‘99 0.843 -0.171  
 
0.098 
Religious x year‘00 0.793 -0.231  * 0.109 
Religious x year‘01 0.873 -0.136  
 
0.118 
Religious x year‘02 0.775 -0.255  * 0.127 
Religious x year‘03 0.813 -0.207  
 
0.133 
Secular hospital 1.291 0.256  ** 0.090 
Secular x year‘98 0.993 -0.007  
 
0.050 
Secular x year‘99 0.895 -0.111  
 
0.062 
Secular x year‘00 0.953 -0.048  
 
0.073 
Secular x year‘01 1.031 0.031  
 
0.079 
Secular x year‘02 1.041 0.040  
 
0.083 
Secular x year‘03 1.120 0.113  
 
0.088 
For-profit hospital 1.591 0.464  * 0.184 
For-profit x year‘98 0.768 -0.263  
 
0.135 
For-profit x year‘99 0.416 -0.876  *** 0.174 
For-profit x year‘00 0.284 -1.257  *** 0.209 
For-profit x year‘01 0.309 -1.173  *** 0.217 
For-profit x year‘02 0.306 -1.185  *** 0.223 
For-profit x year‘03 0.373 -0.987  *** 0.222 
Organizational factors 
    
Medicare 1.009 0.009  *** 0.002 
Medicare x year‘98 1.001 0.001  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘99 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Medicare x year‘00 0.999 -0.001  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘01 1.002 0.002  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘02 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
Medicare x year‘03 1.003 0.003  
 
0.002 
Margin 1.015 0.015  *** 0.003 
Margin x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
0.004 
Margin x year‘99 0.992 -0.008  
 
0.004 
Margin x year‘00 0.994 -0.006  
 
0.005 
Margin x year‘01 1.002 0.002  
 
0.006 
Margin x year‘02 0.995 -0.005  
 
0.008 
Margin x year‘03 1.000 0.000  
 
0.007 
Nursing 1.000 0.000  
 
0.005 
Nursing x year‘98 0.988 -0.012  * 0.005 
Nursing x year‘99 0.994 -0.006  
 
0.006 
Nursing x year‘00 0.984 -0.016  * 0.007 
Nursing x year‘01 0.984 -0.017  * 0.007 
Nursing x year‘02 0.997 -0.003  
 
0.007 
Nursing x year‘03 0.988 -0.013  
 
0.007 
Hospital size 1.002 0.002  *** 0.000 
Hospital size x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
Hospital size x year‘99 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
Hospital size x year‘00 1.001 0.001  
 
0.000 
Hospital size x year‘01 1.001 0.001  ** 0.000 
Hospital size x year‘02 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
Hospital size x year‘03 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
Hospital CMI 2.180 0.779  *** 0.216 
CMI x year‘98 1.026 0.026  
 
0.167 
CMI x year‘99 0.684 -0.379  * 0.183 
CMI x year‘00 0.769 -0.263  
 
0.215 
CMI x year‘01 0.613 -0.489  * 0.208 
CMI x year‘02 0.733 -0.311  
 
0.218 
CMI x year‘03 0.641 -0.445  
 
0.233 
Market factors 
    
HHA/elderly 4.764 1.561  *** 0.190 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
HHA/elderly x year‘98 1.030 0.029  
 
0.087 
HHA/elderly x year‘99 0.855 -0.157  
 
0.125 
HHA/elderly x year‘00 1.121 0.114  
 
0.141 
HHA/elderly x year‘01 1.275 0.243  
 
0.157 
HHA/elderly x year‘02 1.055 0.054  
 
0.178 
HHA/elderly x year‘03 0.987 -0.013  
 
0.198 
Elderly proportion 1.023 0.023  * 0.010 
Elderly x year‘98 1.006 0.006  
 
0.006 
Elderly x year‘99 1.002 0.002  
 
0.008 
Elderly x year‘00 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.009 
Elderly x year‘01 0.984 -0.016  
 
0.010 
Elderly x year‘02 0.991 -0.009  
 
0.010 
Elderly x year‘03 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.011 
Growth 1.016 0.016  
 
0.015 
Growth x year‘98 1.015 0.015  
 
0.020 
Growth x year‘ 99 1.030 0.029  
 
0.020 
Growth x year‘ 00 1.007 0.007  
 
0.018 
Growth x year‘ 01 1.008 0.008  
 
0.019 
Growth x year ‗02 0.970 -0.031  
 
0.024 
Growth x year‘ 03 1.037 0.036  
 
0.019 
NFP hospital x FP market 1.001 0.001  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘98 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
NFP x FP market x year‘99 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘00 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x year‘01 0.997 -0.003  
 
0.004 
NFP x FP market x year‘02 0.991 -0.009  * 0.004 
NFP x FP market x year‘03 0.989 -0.011  ** 0.004 
FP hospital x NFP market 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market x year‘98 1.003 0.003  
 
0.002 
FP x NFP market x year‘99 1.003 0.003  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market x year‘00 0.999 -0.001  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘01 0.998 -0.002  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘02 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.004 
FP x NFP market x year‘03 0.991 -0.009  * 0.004 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Control variables 
    
System 0.694 -0.365  *** 0.060 
Teaching 0.526 -0.642  *** 0.150 
Rural 1.598 0.469  *** 0.085 
Income 0.987 -0.013  * 0.006 
Unemployment  0.966 -0.035  ** 0.013 
Closure 0.577 -0.550  *** 0.108 
Closure x year‘02 0.504 -0.686  * 0.327 
CMI_d 0.195 -1.634  *** 0.364 
Margin_d 0.490 -0.713  ** 0.227 
Margin_d x year‘03 1.517 0.417  * 0.179 
State dummies 
    
Maine 0.215 -1.537  *** 0.378 
New Hampshire 0.174 -1.747  *** 0.442 
Vermont
#
 0.008 -4.883  *** 1.040 
Massachusetts 0.401 -0.914  ** 0.313 
Rhode Island 0.387 -0.950  
 
0.625 
Connecticut 0.215 -1.538  *** 0.444 
New York 0.227 -1.483  *** 0.251 
New Jersey 0.365 -1.007  ** 0.311 
Pennsylvania 0.569 -0.564  * 0.249 
Delaware 1.091 0.087  
 
0.879 
Maryland 0.375 -0.982  ** 0.338 
D.C. 0.256 -1.363  
 
0.702 
West Virginia 0.991 -0.009  
 
0.339 
North Carolina 0.516 -0.661  * 0.264 
South Carolina 0.375 -0.981  ** 0.325 
Georgia 0.226 -1.486  *** 0.270 
Florida 0.749 -0.289  
 
0.245 
Ohio 0.606 -0.502  * 0.248 
Indiana 1.292 0.256  
 
0.267 
Illinois 0.635 -0.454  
 
0.243 
Michigan 0.501 -0.691  ** 0.256 
Wisconsin 0.193 -1.645  *** 0.277 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Kentucky 0.508 -0.678  * 0.269 
Tennessee 0.563 -0.575  * 0.266 
Alabama 0.994 -0.006  
 
0.273 
Mississippi 0.250 -1.385  *** 0.302 
Minnesota 0.556 -0.587  * 0.263 
Iowa 0.690 -0.371  
 
0.277 
Missouri 1.070 0.068  
 
0.261 
North Dakota 0.389 -0.943  ** 0.329 
South Dakota 0.767 -0.265  
 
0.343 
Nebraska 0.596 -0.517  
 
0.284 
Kansas 0.498 -0.697  * 0.277 
Arkansas 2.295 0.831  * 0.347 
Louisiana 0.551 -0.596  * 0.259 
Oklahoma 1.004 0.004  
 
0.281 
Texas 0.551 -0.596  ** 0.225 
Montana 0.571 -0.561  
 
0.325 
Idaho 0.885 -0.122  
 
0.363 
Wyoming 0.977 -0.024  
 
0.484 
Colorado 0.531 -0.633  * 0.317 
New Mexico 0.470 -0.755  
 
0.415 
Arizona 0.555 -0.589  
 
0.318 
Utah 0.909 -0.095  
 
0.314 
Nevada 0.469 -0.758  * 0.383 
Washington 0.407 -0.899  ** 0.295 
Oregon 2.314 0.839  * 0.368 
California 0.751 -0.287  
 
0.228 
Alaska 0.626 -0.468  
 
0.589 
Hawaii 0.341 -1.076  
 
0.557 
Constant 
 
-1.332  ** 0.423 
Model Statistics:  
    
Log pseudolikelihood= -18933.834 N= 
 
32642 
Wald χ2 (df=157)= 1602.52 Pseudo R2 = 0.163 
Prob (>Wald χ2 (157))= <0.0001 
   
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
205 
 
Appendix 3. Completed Results of the Reduce Model with the Post-BBA Dummy 
Variable 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA) 1.357 0.305  
 
0.253  
Ownership effects (vs. Public) 
    
Religious 1.865 0.623  *** 0.132 
Religious x Post-BBA 0.833 -0.183  * 0.090 
Secular 1.278 0.245  ** 0.090 
Secular x Post-BBA 1.009 0.009  
 
0.059 
For-profit 1.625 0.485  ** 0.183 
For-profit x Post-BBA 0.385 -0.956  *** 0.159 
Organizational factors 
    
Medicare 1.009 0.009  ** 0.002 
Medicare x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.002 
Margin 1.015 0.015  *** 0.003 
Margin x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.004 
Nursing 1.000 0.000  
 
0.005 
Nursing x Post-BBA 0.990 -0.010  
 
0.005 
Hospital size 1.002 0.002  *** 0.000 
Hospital size x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.000 
CMI 2.114 0.749  *** 0.214 
CMI x Post-BBA 0.799 -0.224  
 
0.165 
Market factors 
    
HHA/elderly  4.956 1.601  *** 0.191 
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA 1.073 0.070  
 
0.113 
Elderly 1.024 0.024  * 0.010 
Elderly x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.007 
Growth 1.015 0.015  
 
0.015 
Growth x Post-BBA 1.010 0.010  
 
0.015 
NFP x FP market 1.001 0.001  
 
0.003 
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA 0.996 -0.004  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market 0.995 -0.005  
 
0.003 
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA 1.000 0.000  
 
0.003 
Control variables 
    
System 0.694 -0.366  *** 0.059 
Teaching 0.533 -0.629  *** 0.148 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Rural 1.576 0.455  *** 0.083 
Income 0.983 -0.017  ** 0.006 
Unemployment 0.944 -0.057  *** 0.012 
Closure 0.678 -0.388  *** 0.113 
Closure x Post-BBA 0.937 -0.066  
 
0.110 
CMI_d 0.252 -1.380  *** 0.409 
CMI _d x Post-BBA 0.701  -0.355  
 
0.356 
Margin_d 0.422 -0.863  *** 0.262 
Margin_d x Post-BBA 1.271  0.240  
 
0.214 
State dummies 
    
Maine 0.223 -1.501  *** 0.376 
New Hampshire 0.177 -1.732  *** 0.439 
Vermont
#
 0.008 -4.854  *** 1.039 
Massachusetts 0.423 -0.861  ** 0.309 
Rhode Island 0.406 -0.901  
 
0.622 
Connecticut 0.228 -1.480  *** 0.439 
New York 0.246 -1.402  *** 0.248 
New Jersey 0.397 -0.924  ** 0.307 
Pennsylvania 0.587 -0.532  * 0.246 
Delaware 1.127 0.120  
 
0.883 
Maryland 0.403 -0.908  ** 0.333 
D.C. 0.295 -1.222  
 
0.687 
West Virginia 1.033 0.032  
 
0.333 
North Carolina 0.538 -0.620  * 0.260 
South Carolina 0.398 -0.921  ** 0.320 
Georgia 0.236 -1.442  *** 0.267 
Florida 0.755 -0.281  
 
0.240 
Ohio 0.625 -0.470  
 
0.245 
Indiana 1.281 0.248  
 
0.263 
Illinois 0.669 -0.401  
 
0.239 
Michigan 0.522 -0.651  * 0.253 
Wisconsin 0.198 -1.617  *** 0.273 
Kentucky 0.523 -0.649  * 0.266 
Tennessee 0.580 -0.545  * 0.261 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
Variable Odds ratio Coefficient Standard error 
Alabama 0.999 -0.001  
 
0.266 
Mississippi 0.267 -1.321  *** 0.298 
Minnesota 0.551 -0.595  * 0.260 
Iowa 0.667 -0.405  
 
0.274 
Missouri 1.073 0.070  
 
0.257 
North Dakota 0.384 -0.958  ** 0.326 
South Dakota 0.723 -0.324  
 
0.339 
Nebraska 0.568 -0.565  * 0.281 
Kansas 0.478 -0.738  ** 0.275 
Arkansas 2.146 0.764  * 0.337 
Louisiana 0.555 -0.590  * 0.254 
Oklahoma 0.976 -0.024  
 
0.277 
Texas 0.548 -0.602  ** 0.222 
Montana 0.566 -0.570  
 
0.325 
Idaho 0.917 -0.087  
 
0.360 
Wyoming 0.919 -0.084  
 
0.473 
Colorado 0.536 -0.624  * 0.314 
New Mexico 0.469 -0.756  
 
0.410 
Arizona 0.579 -0.547  
 
0.313 
Utah 0.902 -0.103  
 
0.306 
Nevada 0.494 -0.705  
 
0.373 
Washington 0.443 -0.814  ** 0.291 
Oregon 2.464 0.902  * 0.363 
California 0.810 -0.210  
 
0.225 
Alaska 0.677 -0.391  
 
0.586 
Hawaii 0.362 -1.017  
 
0.550 
Constant 
 
-1.140  ** 0.419 
Model Statistics 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -19201.629 
   
Wald χ2 (88) 1365.6 
   
P(>Wald χ2 (88)) <0.0001 
   
Pseudo R
2
 0.151 
   
N 32642 
   
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Appendix 4. Results of Sensitivity Analysis: Comparison of the Coefficients between the 
Two Models with Dependent Variables Derived from the HCRIS and AHA 
Files, Respectively 
Model 
Variable 
Coefficients 
HCRIS Model AHA Model ∆% 
Post-BBA (vs. Pre-BBA) 0.305  
 
0.361  
  
Ownership effects (vs. Public) 
     
Religious 0.623  *** 0.615  *** -1% 
Religious x Post-BBA -0.183  * -0.154  
 
-16% 
Secular 0.245  ** 0.201  * -18% 
Secular x Post-BBA 0.009  
 
0.081  
  
For-profit 0.485  ** 0.491  ** 1% 
For-profit x Post-BBA -0.956  *** -1.093  *** 14% 
Organizational factors 
     
Medicare 0.009  ** 0.009  *** -3% 
Medicare x Post-BBA 0.000  
 
0.000  
  
Margin 0.015  *** 0.014  *** -6% 
Margin x Post-BBA -0.004  
 
-0.001  
  
Nursing 0.000  
 
0.004  
  
Nursing x Post-BBA -0.010  
 
-0.014  ** 37% 
Hospital size 0.002  *** 0.002  *** -14% 
Hospital size x Post-BBA 0.000  
 
0.000  
  
CMI 0.749  *** 0.721  *** -4% 
CMI x Post-BBA -0.224  
 
-0.247  
  
Market factors 
     
HHA/elderly  1.601  *** 1.520  *** -5% 
HHA/elderly x Post-BBA 0.070  
 
0.039  
  
Elderly 0.024  * 0.023  * -7% 
Elderly x Post-BBA -0.004  
 
-0.001  
  
Growth 0.015  
 
0.015  
  
Growth x Post-BBA 0.010  
 
0.006  
  
NFP x FP market 0.001  
 
0.002  
  
NFP x FP market x Post-BBA -0.004  
 
-0.004  
  
FP x NFP market -0.005  
 
-0.005  
  
FP x NFP market x Post-BBA 0.000  
 
0.000  
  
Control variables 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 
Model 
Variable 
Coefficients 
HCRIS Model AHA Model ∆% 
System -0.366  *** -0.385  *** 5% 
Teaching -0.629  *** -0.497  *** -21% 
Rural 0.455  *** 0.438  *** -4% 
Income -0.017  ** -0.015  ** -10% 
Unemployment -0.057  *** -0.049  *** -15% 
Closure -0.388  *** -0.405  *** 5% 
Closure x Post-BBA -0.066  
 
-0.144  
  
CMI_d -1.380  *** -1.283  ** -7% 
CMI_d x Post-BBA -0.355  
 
-0.374  
  
Margin_d -0.863  *** -0.737  ** -15% 
Margin_d x Post-BBA 0.240  
 
0.292  
  
State dummies 
     
Maine -1.501  *** -1.437  *** -4% 
New Hampshire -1.732  *** -1.765  *** 2% 
Vermont
#
 -4.854  *** -4.729  *** -3% 
Massachusetts -0.861  ** -0.925  ** 7% 
Rhode Island -0.901  
 
-0.859  
  
Connecticut -1.480  *** -1.364  ** -8% 
New York -1.402  *** -1.320  *** -6% 
New Jersey -0.924  ** -0.881  ** -5% 
Pennsylvania -0.532  * -0.479  
 
-10% 
Delaware 0.120  
 
-0.151  
  
Maryland -0.908  ** -0.874  ** -4% 
D.C. -1.222  
 
-1.174  
  
West Virginia 0.032  
 
0.030  
  
North Carolina -0.620  * -0.566  * -9% 
South Carolina -0.921  ** -0.923  ** 0% 
Georgia -1.442  *** -1.456  *** 1% 
Florida -0.281  
 
-0.367  
  
Ohio -0.470  
 
-0.458  
  
Indiana 0.248  
 
0.243  
  
Illinois -0.401  
 
-0.424  
  
Michigan -0.651  * -0.592  * -9% 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 
Model 
Variable 
Coefficients 
HCRIS Model AHA Model ∆% 
Wisconsin -1.617  *** -1.622  *** 0% 
Kentucky -0.649  * -0.607  * -7% 
Tennessee -0.545  * -0.547  * 0% 
Alabama -0.001  
 
-0.067  
  
Mississippi -1.321  *** -1.202  *** -9% 
Minnesota -0.595  * -0.476  
 
-20% 
Iowa -0.405  
 
-0.355  
  
Missouri 0.070  
 
-0.333  
  
North Dakota -0.958  ** -1.052  ** 10% 
South Dakota -0.324  
 
-0.216  
  
Nebraska -0.565  * -0.453  
 
-20% 
Kansas -0.738  ** -0.750  ** 2% 
Arkansas 0.764  * 0.783  * 3% 
Louisiana -0.590  * -0.598  * 1% 
Oklahoma -0.024  
 
-0.088  
  
Texas -0.602  ** -0.704  ** 17% 
Montana -0.570  
 
-0.686  * 20% 
Idaho -0.087  
 
-0.107  
  
Wyoming -0.084  
 
-0.321  
  
Colorado -0.624  * -0.670  * 7% 
New Mexico -0.756  
 
-0.818  * 8% 
Arizona -0.547  
 
-0.550  
  
Utah -0.103  
 
-0.200  
  
Nevada -0.705  
 
-0.647  
  
Washington -0.814  ** -0.814  ** 0% 
Oregon 0.902  * 0.685  * -24% 
California -0.210  
 
-0.239  
  
Alaska -0.391  
 
-0.307  
  
Hawaii -1.017  
 
-0.892  
  
Constant -1.140  ** -1.259  ** 11% 
Model Statistics 
   
Log pseudolikelihood  -19201.629 -19309.34 
 
Wald χ2 (df=88) 1365.6 1338 
 
211 
 
P(>Wald χ2 (88)) <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.151 0.1451 
 
N 32642 32642 
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  
212 
 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
 
 
Tiang-Hong Chou was born in Tainan, Taiwan on November 15, 1964. He 
graduated from the Tamkang University with a B.E. in Electronic Engineering in 1987 
and received a Master of Science in Resource Development at Michigan State University 
in 1993. Between 1994 and 2004, he worked as a director of the Development Office and 
the Planning Department, respectively, in the Mennonite Christian Hospital (MCH) in 
Hualien, Taiwan. In 2004, he was admitted to the Department of Health Management and 
Policy at the University of Michigan and received a Master in Health Services and 
Administration in 2006. After working in MCH for another year, he enrolled in the VCU 
Department of Health Administration‘s doctoral program in August, 2007, and completed 
the requirements for the Ph.D. degree in December, 2009. 
 
